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1 Hazard Identification 
1.1 Introduction 
The identification of hazards on process plant is the 
most crucial stage in Loss Prevention. Modern chemical plants 
are increasingly complex and, for reasons of efficiency and 
economy, may need to be run closer to known hazard conditions. 
Kletz (l1 says 
"The traditional method of identifying hazards - in use 
from the dawn of technology until the present day - was 
to build the plant and see what happens - "every dog is 
allowed one bite". Until it-bites someone we can say that 
we did not know it would. This is not a bad method when 
the size of the incident is limited but is no longer 
satisfactory now that we keep dogs which may kill many 
people in one bite". 
Thus, the identification of hazards has-become more critical. 
Once a hazard has been identified, steps can be taken to 
either contain the hazard or eliminate it altogether but this 
can only be done after-the hazard has been identified. The 
process of identification of hazards is no simple matter, 
however. Loss Prevention tends, increasingly, to rely on 
management systems and tools. Lees 121 gives a complete 
account of the management systems and tools currently 
available. Lees also indicates the techniques that are most 
appropriate to the different stages of the design process. 
These management systems and tools will lay out the 
procedures, rules and guidelines to follow in order to aid the 
identification of specific hazards. The major management tools 
are 
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i) Safety audits. These subject the activity under 
consideration to the closest possible scrutiny. The 
objective of this close examination being to 
minimize the frequency of loss making incidents and 
the severity of the loss caused by an accident. The 
audit appraises the quality of the safety and hazard 
control efforts of the operation. Wells [31 breaks 
down a safety audit into the following constituent 
stages. 
- Identify possible loss producing situations 
- Assess potential losses associated with these 
risks 
- Select measures to minimize losses 
- Implement these measures within the organisation 
- Monitor the change 
ii) Checklists. These are used as a check on the design 
to ensure that nothing has been neglected. They are 
a very essential part of hazard identification and a 
primary means of passing on and documenting 
experience. The documenting of evidence is a 
critical step in the process of Loss Prevention. 
Kletz 141 says 
"If the incident is a trivial one , people 
forget after a couple of years and the accident 
is repeated. If the accident is a serious one, 
the people concerned do not forget but after 10 
years or so they have moved on, their 
successors do not know what happened in the 
past, and the accident occurs again. 
"Organisations have no memory". Only people 
have memories and they move. " 
There are checklists for a wide variety of 
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objectives. Wells [3) gives checklists for potential 
hazards (Table 1.1), information required on 
hazardous materials (Table 1.2), pre-commissioning 
operations and a full sample safety checklist for 
use in plant design. 
iii) Hazard Indices. These are a rough guide to the 
hazards intrinsic in plant and not, strictly 
speaking, a tool for hazard identification. Indices 
can, however, indicate or be used to narrow down the 
area of specific hazards. The process of using 
hazard indices is one of the summation of the base 
hazards for each of all the unit operations of the 
plant and for each of all the process materials 
present on the plant. The most widely used of these 
indices is the Dow Chemical Company's Fire and 
Explosion Index (the Dow Index). 
iv) Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP). Developed by 
a team at ICI 151, these are a family of techniques 
used to review a design. HAZOPs are carried out by a 
multi-disciplinary team using an approach similar to 
that of a checklist. HAZOP studies are essentially 
an application of the technique of critical 
examination, an early account of which is given by 
Elliot and Owen 16]. 
Hazard identification has, traditionally, been conducted 
on a rather "ad hoc" basis. Design plans for new plant were 
circulated to the various departments and sections concerned. 
These sections focused primarily on the aspects that each 
party or department was most knowledgeable. There was limited 
consideration of the design as whole, dynamic, working unit. 
Now, this approach sufficed for designs where ... 
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Table 1.1 Some Potential Hazards 
Energy Process chemicals, fuels, nuclear reactors, 
source generators, batteries 
Source of ignition, radio frequency energy 
sources, activators, radiation sources 
Rotating machinery, prime movers, pulverisers, 
grinders, conveyors, belts, cranes 
Pressure containers, moving objects, falling 
objects 
Release of Spillage, leakage, vented material 
material Exposure effects, toxicity, burns, bruises, 
biological effects 
Flammability, reactivity, explosiveness, 
corrosivity and fire-promoting properties of 
chemicals 
Wetted surfaces, reduced visibility, falls, 
noise, damage 
Dust formation, mist formation, spray 
Fire hazard Fire, fire spread, fireballs, radiation 
Explosion, secondary explosion, domino effects 
Noise, smoke, toxic fumes, exposure effects 
Collapse, falling objects, fragmentation 
4 
Table 1.1 (contd. ) 
Process High/low/changing temperature and pressure 
state Stress concentrations, stress reversals, 
vibration, noise 
Structural damage or failure, falling objects, 
collapse 
Electrical shock and thermal effects, 
inadvertent activation, power source failure 
Radiation, internal failure, overheated vessel 
Failure of equipment/utility supply/flame/ 
instrument/component 
Start-up and shutdown condition 
Maintenance, construction and inspection 
condition 
Environmental Effect of plant on surroundings, drainage, 
effects pollution, transport, wind and light change, 
source of ignition/vibration/noise/radio 
interference/fire spread/explosion 
Effect of surroundings on plant 
Climate, sun, wind, rain, snow, ice, grit, 
contaminants, humidity, ambient conditions 
Acts of God, earthquake, arson, flood, typhoon 
Site layout factors, groups of people, 
transport features, space. limitations, geology, 
geography 
Security 
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Table 1.2 Information Required on Hazardous Materials 
Name of chemical; other names 
Formula 
Physical state; purity, appearance, odour, detectable 
concentration 
Physical characteristics 
Corrosivity 
Flammability information 
Reactivity information 
Toxicity information 
Biological properties 
Exposure effects 
Radiation information 
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i) the process was simple and well-established 
ii) no new technology was involved 
iii) no new chemistry was involved 
However, closer consideration reveals that very few designs 
actually fall into one of the above categories. All new 
projects embody some element of change but in the chemical 
industry the degree of change from one plant to the next is 
often considerable. It is important to recognise that the body 
of established experience expressed in codes etc. is limited 
by the extent of existing knowledge and can only be relevant 
to the extent to which it is possible to apply it to the new 
design. In recent years it has become increasingly clear that 
although these codes of practice are indispensable it is 
extremely important to supplement them with an imaginative 
anticipation of hazards in new projects and technology. One 
such method of examination is the HAZOP study. 
1.2 The HAZOP Process 
HAZOP studies are now well established as a means of 
identifying hazards on process plants. Accounts of the basic 
method have been given by Lawley [51, Kletz (11, Gibson [71 
and others [8-121. There is available a guide (131 and a 
number of specific studies have been published 114-221. The 
HAZOP study process is, in essence, an abbreviated form of 
"critical examination" based on the principle that a problem 
can only occur when there is a deviation from intent or from 
what is normally to be expected. The procedure is, thus, to go 
through the design systematically in the general direction of 
flow and consider every conceivable deviation and all the 
possible causes and consequences of that deviation. Deviations 
are considered in all the relevant process variables in every 
single unit in the design. 
The study can vary considerably in scope and depth 
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depending on 
i) the cost and time resources available compared to 
the possible risk or expense due to downtime of the 
plant. If the risks posed by the plant are great, 
then this provides the justification for a thorough 
study. Similarly, if the cost of downtime is high 
then expenditure in the form of an extensive 
operability study is justified. Note that HAZOP 
studies are also valuable in the commissioning of 
process plant. 
ii) the detail available on the new design. The design 
may be at any particular stage between a conceptual 
word model to a detailed piping and instrumentation 
diagram (P&ID). 
1.2.1 The HAZOP Team 
HAZOPs are carried out by a multi-disciplinary team of 
specialists, directed by an experienced group leader. The 
study team is chosen with care in order to provide experience 
and detailed knowledge of the design. The choice of team 
members is critical because the HAZOP process will not make up 
for any deficiencies or gaps in the knowledge. Thus, the team 
has to be large enough to provide the knowledge of the design 
commensurate with the scope and depth of the study. However, 
the team also has to be small enough to be efficient. 
Lawley [141, Fawcett [231, 'Fitt [241 and Mitchell (251 
provide the basis for. the qualifications required of the team 
members and the team leader and secretary. It is desirable, 
generally, to have one member for each department concerned. 
This member should be senior enough to make on-the-spot 
decisions if called upon to do so. Ideally, there will be 
members of the HAZOP team from other than the project design 
team. These will provide fresh input that is not, in any way, 
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influenced by the members of the project team. Other 
specialist design engineers may be called in to attend 
particular HAZOP study sessions when requested to do so. This 
is because design intent may not be perfectly clear from the 
P&IDs alone and the specialists may be required to provide 
extra information. For a major new project, the study team 
would also include representatives from the production, 
technical and engineering departments together with an 
instrument engineer to advise on the instrumentation and to 
deal with any control problems. If new chemistry is involved 
then the study team should also include a member of the 
research and development department. A typical study team 
would comprise the following. 
HAZOP leader 
HAZOP secretary 
Process Engineer (usually a chemical engineer) 
Mechanical Engineer 
Production Operations Manager or Supervisor 
Instrument Engineer 
Other specialists (civil engineer, electrical engineer, 
chemist etc. ) 
The HAZOP study leader should possess the following 
qualities 
-a technical background 
- design and operations experience 
-a thorough understanding of HAZOP techniques 
- experience as a member and secretary of HAZOP studies 
- the ability to plan the study session sequence and 
duration from prior examination of the P&IDs 
- the ability to direct progress through the study 
schedule whilst stimulating creative thinking by the 
team members and ensuring the thoroughness of the 
study. 
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The Chemical Industries Association (131 says of the study 
leader 
"The study leader has a role to play throughout a study. 
He should help whoever has commissioned the study to 
define its scope. He may help in the selection and 
training of the team. He will advise on the assembly of 
the necessary data and may help convert this into a 
suitable form. However, his most obvious role emerges 
during the examination sessions where he guides the 
systematic questioning and he must be thoroughly trained 
for this job. It is not desirable that he should be 
responsible for making-a major technical contribution. If 
possible he should not have been closely associated with 
the subject of the study as there is a danger of 
developing blind spots and failing to use the technique 
objectively. But he should have sufficient technical 
knowledge to be able to understand and control the team 
discussions. " 
It is usually desirable to have a supporting member of 
the team to make a note of the hazards as they are detected. 
This person is known as the study secretary. The study 
secretary will also take responsibility for ensuring that the 
HAZOP session runs smoothly. This will entail the collection 
of all the relevant diagrams and information prior to the 
start of the HAZOP session. 
1.2.2 The HAZOP Study Procedure 
Basically, a Hazard and Operability study takes a 
description of plant and subjects that description to a 
critical examination. The description may be in the form of a 
word model or a flow sheet but more often than not consists of 
a number of P&IDs. The level of detail available in the 
description will determine the extent of the results of the 
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study and thus also the time that the study merits. The 
critical examination consists of questioning every part of the 
process design to discover how deviations from the intention 
of the design can occur and deciding whether these deviations 
can give rise to hazards. 
The study is conducted by the team leader systematically 
asking questions of the team based on a series of guidewords. 
These guidewords, with explanatory notes, are listed in Table 
1.3. The guidewords are used to ensure that the questions, 
which are posed to test the integrity of the design, will 
explore every conceivable way in which the design could 
deviate from the design intention. The guidewords are combined 
with a set of physical variables (listed in Table 1.4) to 
provide the questions to be posed of the design. The process 
of questioning the design consists of taking each guideword 
and physical variable combination and applying it to the 
design, one section at a time. Each guideword and variable 
combination is considered to determine how, if at all, it 
could be caused and what, if any, the consequences of it would 
be. Now, the causes of a particular deviation may be deemed to 
be unrealistic and improbable and in this case the derived 
consequences are rejected as not meaningful. Similarly, there 
may be a deviation that has rather trivial or no consequences. 
In this case the deviation is again rejected. On the other 
hand, there may be a deviation which has both valid and 
probable causes as well as potentially hazardous consequences. 
Here, the deviation together with its causes and consequences 
is noted for remedial action. 
1.2.2.1 Valid Guideword and Physical Variable Combinations 
Not all the permutations of the combination of guidewords 
with the physical variables will be valid. There are some 
'specials', mainly for flow. For instance, the combination of 
the guideword "NONE" with the physical variable "TEMPERATURE" 
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Table 1.3 HAZOP Guidewords 
NONE / NO No flow when there should be 
LESS Lower flow, temperature, viscosity, pressure 
etc. than the design intention. 
MORE More of flow, temperature, viscosity, pressure 
etc. than the design intention. 
REVERSE Flow or pressure gradient in the opposite 
direction to the design intention. 
PART OF Change in composition of the process stream. 
MORE THAN Impurities or an extra phase present in the 
stream. 
OTHER THAN Consideration of start-up, shut-down, 
maintenance etc. 
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Table 1.4 Physical Variables Considered in a HAZOP Study 
Flow 
Pressure 
Temperature 
Concentration 
Level 
Viscosity 
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will yield the nonsensical deviation "TEMPERATURE NONE". Thus, 
the combination of the guidewords with the physical variables 
be 
has to1(selective. A list of all the valid combinations is 
shown in Table 1.5. 
1.2.2.2 The Decomposition of the Design for Stud 
The complete and whole design needs to be broken down 
into sections for study. The recommended sectioning for a 
HAZOP study is to consider the design on a "line-by-line" and 
a "vessel-by-vessel" basis. This decomposition by pipe is 
natural and logical for a chemical plant. In effect this 
specifies the size of the section to which the deviations of 
1.2.2.1 are applied. The sections are either a single process 
line, which can contain any number of process units, or a 
single process vessel. A process line is defined as a number 
of linked units bounded at either end by process vessels. The 
order of consideration of these lines and vessels is in the 
general direction of flow. The Chemical Industries Association 
1131 gives a flowsheet (Figure 1.1) detailing the sequence of 
examination during a HAZOP study. 
1.2.2.3 A HAZOP Session 
The examination sessions are strictly structured with the 
HAZOP leader controlling the discussion. Dealing with each 
vessel in turn, the team is asked to explain its function and 
the explicit intention of each of the process lines connected 
to the vessel. Deviations cannot sensibly be considered until 
the function and operation of the equipment is precisely 
understood. The study leader applies the HAZOP guidewords in 
turn. The function of the team is not only to provide the 
answers to the study leader's questions but also to be 
creative in their thinking. The study leader can inspire this 
creative thinking by the way he questions the team and sparks 
off the discussion about a particular deviation. 
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Table 1.5 Valid Combinations of Guidewords and Physical 
Variables 
More Flow 
Less Flow 
No Flow 
Reverse Flow 
More Pressure 
Less Pressure 
Reverse Pressure Gradient 
More Temperature 
Less Temperature 
More Concentration 
Less Concentration 
More Viscosity 
Less Viscosity 
More Level 
Less Level 
More Than 
Other Than 
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Select a vessel 
Explain the general intention of the vessel and its lines 
Select a line 
Explain the intention of the line 
Apply the first guide words 
Develop a meaningful deviation 
Examine possible causes 
Examine consequences 
Detect hazards 
Make suitable record 
Repeat 6-10 for all meaningful deviations derived from first guide words 
Repeat 5-11 for all the guide words 
Mark line as having been examined 
Repeat 3-13 for each line 
Select an auxiliary e. g. heating system 
Explain the intention of the auxiliary 
Repeat 5-12 for each auxiliary 
Mark auxiliary as having beeen examined 
Repeat 15-18 for all auxiliaries 
Explain intention of vessel 
Repeat 5-12 
Mark vessel as completed 
Repeat 1-22 for all vessels on flow sheet 
Mark flow sheet as completed 
Repeat 1-24 for all flow sheets 
Figure 1.1 
Sequence of Examination During a HAZOP Study 
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When a hazard is detected, it is usually dealt with in 
one of the following ways. 
i) If the solution for a particular hazard is 
straightforward and local (that is, without 
ramification for other process plant or streams) 
then a decision can be taken and the design amended 
accordingly. It is to be stressed that instant 
design is to be avoided. Only when the team are 
absolutely certain that the proposed solution is 
straightforward and local should the design be 
amended. 
ii) If the suggested solution for a particular hazard is 
not local-, (i. e. it may have effects in other process 
lines or vessels) then that solution is usually 
further probed to see exactly what the effects 
elsewhere would be. The proposed solution to the 
hazard may, in some rare instances, be shelved until 
the later consideration of another process line or 
vessel. In this case a detailed note is made to 
redirect the study team's attention at that stage. 
iii) If a question is noted for further evaluation or for 
further information a note is also made of the 
person nominated to follow it up. 
For the benefit of the secretary as well as the team, the 
study leader needs to sum up the discussion on each guideword 
before moving on to the next one. The secretary uses this 
summing up to check the record of the discussion (see 
1.2.2.4). Once a section of pipeline or a vessel or utility 
has been fully examined, the study leader must mark his copy" 
of the P&IDs to indicate this. This rather simple step will 
ensure comprehensive coverage of even very complex P&IDs. 
The duration of the study sessions is important. Very 
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long study sessions are likely to lead to the falling off of 
concentration and of alertness of the team. This may result in 
hazards going undetected simply because the study team was too 
tired to have visualised the hazard. The study sessions are 
very taxing on the team members and so the Chemical Industries 
Association [131 states that study sessions should be limited 
to 3 hours and preferably take place in the morning. The rest 
of the day can be usefully spent by the study team in 
following up that mornings work. The study leader and 
secretary usually spend the afternoon recording that mornings 
work and preparing for the following morning. 
A detailed study of the features of and activities in a 
HAZOP study have been described by Roach and Lees [26], who 
sat in on one and tape recorded it. 
1.2.2.4 Recording and Reporting a HAZOP Study 
The main recording effort of a study is the filling in 
and completion of the HAZOP worksheets. This task is normally 
performed by the study secretary. A standard format for a 
HAZOP worksheet is shown in Figure 1.2. 
There are two modes of recording. 
i) Full recording. Every single deviation is noted 
regardless of whether or not it has any probable 
causes and whether or not any hazardous condition 
arises as a result of that deviation. This is 
obviously very time consuming and produces a bulky 
report in which the important information is lost. 
The one advantage of this form of reporting is that 
there is a record of the thoroughness of the study. 
ii) Recording of only the points requiring action. Only 
the deviations that are deemed to have probable 
causes and hazardous effects are noted. This is the 
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preferred form of recording as it cuts down 
considerably on the time spent on recording. As only 
the points requiring attention are noted, the report 
is concise and there is no effort required to 
separate the noteworthy from the inconsequential. 
The report of a HAZOP study will typically comprise the 
following sections. 
- Summary , 
- Conclusions 
- Scope of work 
- Hazop recommendations and queries with the appropriate 
responses and the comments of the HAZOP study team 
- Methodology 
- HAZOP study worksheets 
- Database list 
- Summary of the modes of operation, of the plant 
- Design changes made as a result, of the HAZOP study 
It must be emphasised that the above list represents the 
contents of a very-full and complete report. To produce such a 
report will require significant effort and expenditure after 
the HAZOP study, itself has been completed. It may be decided 
by project management to dispense with some of the above 
sections and thus conserve resources. 
ICI have developed a computer recording system for HAZOP 
studies. The function of this system is primarily one of 
recording although it also serves to prompt the HAZOP team 
through a full list of the process deviations to be 
considered. This reduces the burden on the secretary 
considerably. 
There has also recently been a great deal of interest in 
the follow up work and the documentation of that work after a 
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HAZOP study. It is rather difficult to keep track of the- 
modifications and the responsibility for those modifications 
made as a result of the study. There are various procedures 
that could be followed but the easiest seem to be the 
processing of a list of records of all the points raised by 
the HAZOP study. This processing is best done by list or word 
processing software. 
1.2.2.5 Computer Aids for HAZOP Studies 
HAZOP studies are themselves a relatively recent feature 
and thus computer aids for this task are not in great 
evidence. ICI's computer recording system has already been 
mentioned in the previous section. Jones and Lihou [27) have 
developed a computer aid for operability studies (CAFOS). 
CAFOS aids the transformation of HAZOP studies in the form of 
cause and symptom equations into pictorial fault trees and 
provides facilities for the calculation of probabilities in 
the fault trees. CAFOS is not a computer aid for HAZOP studies 
as, developed here. 
1.3 Literature on HAZOP Studies 
HAZOP studies have been documented in a number of papers 
by various authors. Following are some of the more notable 
accounts. 
1.3.1 HAZOP Study on the Feed Section of a Proposed Olefin 
Dimerisation Plant 
One of the team at ICI who pioneered the work on HAZOP 
studies, Lawley (51 introduces the HAZOP study and details an 
operability study performed on the feed section of an olefin 
dimerisation plant. The process involves the transfer of the 
olefin from storage to a buffer/settling tank where the water 
impurity is settled out. The olefin passes from the 
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buffer/settling tank through a feed/product heat exchanger to 
a dimerisation reactor. 
The results of the HAZOP study are not notable in 
themselves but they do illustrate the principle and also the 
usefulness of HAZOP studies. For instance, the HAZOP study 
identifies one of the main problems as poor separation of 
water in the settler. The causes that are listed are "more 
flow" and increased levels of the water impurity. The 
consequence listed is that poor separation of the water would 
lead to an undesirable amount of water passing through to the 
reactor section. Lawley also provides much valuable background 
on the planning and execution of HAZOP studies. Much of this 
work has already been referred to in this chapter. 
1.3.2 HAZOP Study of a Reactor Section 
Austin and Jeffries [161 perform a HAZOP study on the 
reactor section of a process design. This study is unique in 
that the plant in question operates in a semi-batch manner. 
Each of the three reactors is considered together with each of 
the periods and modes in the operating cycle. This application 
of the HAZOP study procedure illustrates its flexibility. The 
semi-batch operation requires the amendment of the table of 
valid guideword and physical variable combinations (see Table 
1.5) to encompass the different process operations. The 
process operations used in addition to Table 1.5 are listed 
below. 
- Dehydrogenate 
- Oxidise 
- Purge 
- Reduce 
- Cycle time 
- Preheat 
- Stand-by 
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The HAZOP study reveals mainly the problems of leakage; 
either reverse flow past leaking valves or leakage to the 
environment. Reverse flow is countered by the addition of non- 
return valves at the appropriate points. Leakage to the 
environment is dealt with mainly by the provision of gas 
detectors and alarms. 
1.3.3 HAZOP Study of a Gas Drying Unit 
Rushford [151, also of ICI, describes the concept and 
procedures of the HAZOP study and details part of an actual 
case study. The study concerns the small section of plant 
dealing with the gaseous product from a cracker unit. The gas 
is heated and passed through a suction catchpot before being 
fed to a compression train. Some 21 points concerning the 
design were raised by the study team for just this small 
section of plant. The quality of the study is indicated by the 
fact that the follow-up of the action report recommended 
implementation of 16 of the 21 points listed. One especially 
salient point concerned the redundancy of a whole vessel. This 
was one of the 16 points implemented and the complete, deletion 
of this vessel resulted in a-significant saving in capital 
cost. 
1.3.4 HAZOP Study of a Liquid Propane Transfer and 
Vaporisation Unit 
Lawley and Mitchell 1251 originally presented this case 
study as part of a HAZOP study workshop and this work has 
subsequently been quoted by Kletz 1211. The workshop was 
intended to simulate the procedure of an actual HAZOP study. A 
full P&ID and detailed information on the process is included. 
This is, of course, done to provide the expert knowledge that 
the HAZOP study team would normally input. The process plant 
under study can be roughly broken down into two sections: 
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propane transfer from main storage to a buffer tank via a 10 
mile pipeline and propane feed system to vaporiser. The study 
raises a number of points in each of the two sections. The 
basis of most of these points is that the material being 
handled is propane. A brief list of the main hazardous 
consequences is as follows. 
- Leaks 
- Loss of suction to and the subsequent overheating of pumps 
- Flashing of the propane causing low temperatures and 
possible backflow 
In addition to the above, there is also consideration of the 
problems that may arise on start-up or shut-down or due to 
online maintenance. 
1.3.5 HAZOP Study of Ethylene Oxide Feed System to Batch 
Reactors 
In this work, Lawley [141 outlines the procedures of -a 
HAZOP study. The process plant under consideration is the 
ethylene oxide feed supply to a group of batch reactors. A 
summary of the results of the HAZOP study is included. As in 
1.3.4 the fact that the handling of the process material is 
intrinsically hazardous provides the basis for most of the 
consequence scenarios listed. The points requiring action can 
be briefly classified as follows. 
- Leaks 
- Loss of suction to and the subsequent overheating of pumps 
- Polymerisation and blockages due to the oxide polymer 
- Overtemperature / Overpressure due to increased heat of 
reaction 
- Overfilling 
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1.3.6 HAZOP Study on an Ethylene Oxide Reactor 
The work of Piccinini and Levy (201 illustrates the use 
of a HAZOP study to render a 30,000 t/yr ethylene oxide plant 
"reasonably safe". They give a detailed account of that part 
of the HAZOP study which refers to the cooling system of the 
reactor. This 'system has been selected as an example of a 
particularly critical installation. Ethylene is epoxidised to 
ethylene oxide with pure oxygen on a silver base catalyst. The 
main undesirable reaction is the complete combustion of 
ethylene to carbon dioxide and water. The heat evolution of 
the complete combustion is some eleven times that of the 
epoxidation. An increase in reaction temperature leads both to 
a loss of-selectivity and-the possibility of a reaction 
runaway. Thus, temperature control of the reaction is of the 
greatest importance. The cooling system uses an evaporating 
liquid to maintain a gradient of less than 4 degrees C. in the 
medium between the inlet and outlet of the reactor shell. 
There are a number of control loops that are crucial to the 
safe operation of this cooling system and, not surprisingly, 
most of the points raised by the HAZOP study are related to 
these control loops. The integrity of the control loops has 
been increased by employing redundant components. Control 
loops have also been added to alarm or control deviations that 
had originally been ignored or overlooked. 
1.3.7 HAZOP and its use in the Elimination of Potential 
Process Hazards 
Kletz 1211 gives the general background to HAZOP studies 
and details the study performed by Lawley and mentioned in 
1.3.4 above. Kletz also illustrates the fact that HAZOP 
studies carried out on seemingly simple systems can be useful. 
The case of a HAZOP study on the feed system to a distillation 
column is mentioned. A pump is used to feed liquid from a 
storage tank to a distillation column. A non-return valve on 
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the pump outlet and a kickback line with a restriction plate 
protects the pump against reverse and no flow situations. 
Twelve points worthy of mention resulted from the HAZOP study 
of this system. 
Kletz also mentions the use of quantitative methods 
during a HAZOP study. The need for a second independent trip 
to protect a compressor is assessed by a rough calculation of 
the probability of failure of the original trip configuration. 
1.3.5 HAZOP Study on a Flammable Liquid Storage Tank 
Ozog [221 goes through the techniques of hazard 
assessment and gives a detailed example of the use of a HAZOP 
study. The HAZOP study technique is applied to a flammable 
reagent storage tank. The tank operates under a nitrogen 
blanket and has associated with it a pump to deliver liquid 
from the tank to the process. The main problem areas 
highlighted by the HAZOP study are listed below. 
- Overpressure of the tank due to failure or inadequacy of 
relief or the isolation of the vessel from the relief valve 
- Possible implosion of the tank due to failure of pressure 
control or loss of the nitrogen blanket through maloperation 
of valves or failure of control valves 
Ozog also introduces a system of classifying the points 
raised by a HAZOP study. After the HAZOP session all notes on 
the worksheets are identified as category A. which signifies a 
hazardous event, or B, which signifies a potential hazardous 
event, depending on resolution of unanswered question 
regarding operation or design. Once these questions are 
answered from data on file or by communication with the 
designer, all B notes are reclassified as As or Cs (non- 
hazardous events). 
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2 Artificial Intelligence 
2.0 Background and History of Artificial Intelligence 
This chapter deals with Artificial Intelligence (AI) and 
Expert Systems technology and the history of this technology. 
Before any attempt is made to describe artificial 
intelligence we must'define or describe intelligence. What is 
intelligence? With a concept as complex and as nebulous as 
intelligence it is probably impossible to find a definition 
that is both complete and exact. Thus, intelligence is best 
described by enumeration i. e. by listing its characteristic 
features. The features of intelligence may be summarised 
briefly by the following list: 
- judgement 
- comprehension 
- reasoning 
- concept formation 
- response selection 
- adaptation 
- creativity 
This list, by no means complete, illustrates the complexity of 
intelligence. A truly intelligent being will display all the 
characteristics listed. Attempts at describing intelligence 
are vital to the building of artificial'intelligence. Thus, 
artificial intelligence is the conferring of intelligent 
behaviour on to a machine. Expert systems are defined as 
particular embodiments of artificial intelligence. 
Man's fascination with intelligent machines has stretched 
back through history. Here, a distinction must be made between 
the early automatons which were essentially elaborate moving 
devices and the early so-called calculating machines. The 
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early automatons cannot really be referred to as intelligent 
machines. They were 'programmed' with the use of machinery to 
perform one set of movements. Mechanical calculators have been 
in existence fora long time. The early forms of these were 
the different types of abacus found in ancient China. These 
mechanical tools, though useful, could in no way be considered 
to be computers; they had no means öf storing and executing an 
internal set of instructions. The first industrial revolution 
was essentially one of power, 
_its 
production and its use. The 
second industrial revolution was of information and control, 
information technology. 
Charles-Babbage, born in 1792, is often hailed as the 
father of modern computing. Babbage developed two machines: 
the "Difference Engine" and the "Analytical Engine". These, 
machines demonstrated, in mechanical terms, the components 
essential to any computer'system. These components are 
- input of numbers and program instructions 
- storage of numbers and program instructions 
- arithmetic unit to perform the calculations 
- control unit-to control task performance under the direction 
of the stored program 
- output of the results of the computation 
The next milestone was the introduction, in 1892, by 
William Burroughs, of the first commercially available adding 
machine. Following the invention of thermionic valves in the 
early 1940s it proved possible to use electronic components in 
digital computing circuits. This led to the development of the 
digital computer. 
Second generation computers, based on the transistor 
rather than the glass valve were developed in the 1950s. Third 
generation technology, in the early 1970s, involved the 
silicon chip containing thousands of transistor elements on 
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one chip. Denser circuit integration and new languages was 
termed the fourth generation. In the 1980s, we are seeing the 
start of the fifth generation of computers in which artificial 
intelligence is to play the major role. 
We have just had a brief history of computers; the 
hardware. However, the history of artificial intelligence 
involves both hardware and software. Software advances have 
almost always, albeit loosely, been linked with hardware 
advances. As more computer power, speed and memory have become 
available computer software has become more ambitious. In 
1937, Turing published a paper on 'computable numbers' in 
which the concept of the 'universal Turing machine' was 
launched. In this, he proposed that a machine could carry out 
any mathematical procedure, providing the machine was supplied 
with an adequate instruction table (the equivalent of today's 
computer program). In 1947, Turing produced a paper entitled 
"Computing Machinery and Intelligence". This has since proved 
to have been remarkably prophetic. In the paper, Turing 
details the 'imitation game', known today as the Turing test. 
In the game, an interrogator is separated from the machine 
under interrogation, and communication is only possible using 
a teletype. If the interrogator cannot tell, through the 
interrogation, whether the communication is with another human 
or a machine then the machine may be regarded as intelligent. 
In the 1950s AI-researchers tried to build intelligent 
machinery by imitating the structure of the brain. This 
technique, referred to as a neural net, depended on a richly 
interconnected system of simulated neurons. It was felt, at 
the time, that this system could be subject to a training 
program and eventually end up an intelligent machine. These 
attempts were doomed to failure; the human brain contains 10 
billion neurNons, each of which is considerably more 
complicatedithat modelled by the neural net. 
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The following decade led to the notion of heuristic 
search. The concept of heuristic search came from the belief 
that human thinking was accomplished by simple symbol- 
manipulating tasks such as comparing, searching, modifying a 
symbol and so on. These symbol manipulating tasks were easily 
modelled on the computers of the day. Problem solving was 
thought to be a search through a space of potential solutions, 
guided by heuristic rules which helped direct the search to 
its destination. Heuristics, or rules of thumb, are necessary 
in a great many applications in order to reduce the size of 
the problem search space. Heuristics are not logic but rules 
that have been developed as a result of experience. The 
technique is perhaps better described as one where a problem 
is broken repeatedly into pieces until a subproblem is reached 
that is small enough to be solved directly i. e. a depth first 
search (see 2.1.2 below). Heuristic search was probably best 
known for its applications to computer chess playing. 
In the very early 1970s a team led by Edward Feigenbaum 
at Stanford University began to refine the techniques of 
heuristic search. The team narrowed their focus. Instead of 
trying to find a few very powerful general problem solving 
heuristics they concentrated on the heuristics for a very 
specific problem - the interpretation of mass spectogram data. 
This resulted in the first expert system, DENDRAL. DENDRAL was 
an unprecedented success. It was clear that the solution was 
to concentrate on a small clearly defined problem and the 
know-how, the useful tricks and rules of thumb associated with 
that problem. 
MYCIN, produced by Shortliffe was DENDRAL's immediate 
successor. MYCIN is a computer system which diagnoses 
bacterial infections of the blood and prescribes drug therapy. 
MYCIN has spawned a whole series of medical-diagnostic 
'clones', one of which is PUFF, a lung function diagnostic 
tool. DENDRAL and MYCIN introduced several new features which 
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have since become the hallmarks of the expert system. These 
features will be elaborated in the next section. 
The current trend in AI research has been towards machine 
learning. Hayes-Roth et. al. [28] define knowledge as facts, 
beliefs and heuristics. Facts are propositions that are 
generally held to be true. Beliefs are a particular person's 
confidence in a proposition that is uncertain. Heuristics are 
rules of thumb for performing the particular task. An example 
of a fact is "Today is Monday", whereas a belief maybe 
whether or not it will rain. An example of a heuristic for 
forecasting the weather is "Red sky at night, shepherd's 
delight - Red sky in the morning, sailor's warning". Until 
recently, machine learning has been concentrated on the 
automatic collection of more facts and beliefs. In the last 
few years, however, the focus has shifted to include the 
heuristics so that machine learning now embraces the 
development of an expert system that improves and extends its 
own body of heuristic rules, automatically. Douglas Lenat [29- 
30] of. Stanford University has created such a machine learning 
system, EURISKO. 
2.1 The Architecture of Expert Systems 
2.1.1 Features of Expert Systems 
DENDRAL and MYCIN, the first expert systems, introduced 
several features new to computer programs. These features are 
i) The knowledge consists of hundreds of rules such as the 
following MYCIN rule quoted by Forsyth 1311. 
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IF (1) the infection is primary-bacteremia, and 
(2) the site of the culture is a sterile site, and 
(3) the suspected portal of entry of the organism is 
the gastro-intestinal tract 
THEN there As suggestive evidence (0.7) that the identity 
of the organism is bacteroides. 
ii) The rules are probabilistic. There is uncertainty in the 
evidence and the rules. The evidence may be incomplete or 
incorrect and the rules may not be very precise. DENDRAL 
and MYCIN deal with this probabilistic information with 
the use of certainty factors. This allows the formulation 
of the most correct conclusions in spite of the 
uncertainty in the evidence. 
iii) DENDRAL and MYCIN can explain their reasoning processes. 
They can explain why they asked a particular question or 
how they reached a particular conclusion. 
DENDRAL is the prime example of how the software tradition of 
DATA + ALGORITHM = PROGRAM 
has been changed to 
KNOWLEDGE + INFERENCE = EXPERT SYSTEM 
Forsyth 1311 lists the distinctive features of expert 
systems as 
1) An expert system is limited to a specific domain of 
expertise 
2) It can reason with uncertain data 
3) It can explain its train of reasoning in a comprehensible 
way 
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4) Facts and inference mechanism are clearly separated 
(Knowledge is not hard-coded into the deductive procedures) 
5) It is designed to grow incrementally 
6) It is typically rule-based 
7) It delivers advice as its output - not tables of figures, 
nor pretty video screens but sound advice 
8) It makes money (This is a performance requirement) 
2.1.2 Components of an Expert System 
Hayes-Roth et. al. [281 give the anatomy of the ideal 
expert system as shown in Figure 2.1. They describe the ideal 
system and its components as follows : 
"The ideal expert system contains a language processor for 
problem-oriented communications between the user and the 
expert system; a 'blackboard' for recording intermediate 
results; a knowledge base comprising facts as well as 
heuristic planning and problem-solving rules; an interpreter 
that applies these rules; a scheduler to control the order of 
rule processing; a consistency enforcer that adjusts previous 
conclusions when new data (or knowledge)'alter their bases of 
support; and a justifier that rationalizes and explains the 
systems behaviour". 
Few, if any, expert systems will contain all of the above 
components but all expert systems will contain many of them. 
The list given in the paragraph above can be consolidated 
into four essential items. These are 
i) The knowledge base 
ii) The inference engine 
iii) The knowledge acquisition facility 
iv) The explanation facility 
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USER 
BLACKBOARD 
Figure 2.1 
Anatomy of Ideal Expert System 
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These items are discussed in turn. 
i) The Knowledge Base 
The knowledge base will contain facts and rules. Facts 
are short-term information on specific topics. This 
information is likely to change as the consultation with the 
expert system proceeds. Rules are longer term information on 
how to handle the facts and how to generate new facts or 
hypotheses from the existing ones. 
ii) The Inference Engine 
This is the "how to do it" knowledge or the solution 
search strategy of the problem. Broadly speaking, there are 
two overall inference strategies: forward chaining and 
backward chaining. Basically, forward chaining is the 
reasoning from the data to the hypotheses whilst backward 
chaining involves selecting a hypothesis and then attempting 
to prove or disprove it with the facts. Engineering analogies 
of forward and backward chaining are event trees (bottom-up) 
and fault trees (top-down), respectively. The selection of a 
search strategy will depend on the particular application. It 
is conceivable even that a mix of both forward and backward 
chaining may be the best solution for a particular problem. 
Given an orientation, forward or backward, there are also 
several different systematic orders in which the nodes of the 
solution space may be considered. There are three main types 
of systematic orders. 
1) Depth first. This is a process where successive nodes in 
the solution space are searched prior to those nodes at the 
same level. 
2) Breadth first. This is a process where all the nodes at the 
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current level are searched prior to the search of any 
successive nodes. 
3) Heuristic search. Here, information specific to a 
particular domain is used to guide the search process to a 
satisfactory solution. This guiding the search process can 
also be regarded as the selection of rules on the basis of 
probability i. e. high probability rules are tried first. 
As with overall search strategies the selection of a 
systematic order of search will depend on the particular 
application. 
One requirement of the inference engine may be, depending 
on the problem, an ability to deal with uncertainty. There are 
a number of measures of uncertainty; fuzzy logic, Bayesian 
logic, certainty factors and so on. The choice of measure of 
uncertainty will, again, be dependent on the problem. 
iii) The Knowledge Acquisition Facility 
An expert system must be able to learn in order to 
develop. It is inconceivable that an expert system could be 
developed that did not need to be refined as a result of 
experience. Thus, a means by which the expert system can add 
facts or rules to the knowledge base is essential. Lenat's 
EURISKO is the forerunner of such machine learning systems. 
A mention must be made here of Quinlan's Interactive 
Dichotomizer 3 (ID3) algorithm as an example of a learning 
mechanism. When presented with a set of training examples the 
program operates as follows : 
1) Select a subset of the training examples 
2) Repeatedly sub-divide the training examples according to 
the variable with the greatest discriminatory power. Each 
subset as defined by the most discriminatory variable is 
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sub-divided again by the next most discriminatory variable 
and so on. The process of sub-division stops when a subset 
contains only one class of data. This sub-division gives a 
decision tree for a new rule. 
3) Scan the entire set of training examples to find exceptions 
to the latest rule. 
4) If there are exceptions insert some of the exceptions into 
the subset of (1) and repeat from (2). If there are no 
exceptions stop and display the rule. 
There are also a number of other learning mechanisms that are 
either data driven, model driven or heuristic driven. 
iv) The Explanation Facility 
Michie (32] has warned about the dire consequences of 
expert systems that do not operate within the "human' cognitive 
window". The explanation facility is essential. 
The explanation facility is the user interface. The user 
should be able to enquire, at any time, why the system has 
made a particular deduction or asked a particular question. 
Classic expert systems such as MYCIN have had enormous care 
exercised over the user interface. Forsyth (311 says "a 
reasoning method that cannot be explained to a person is 
unsatisfactory, even if it'performs better than a human 
expert". 
2.1.3 Languages 
The requirements of a general purpose programming 
language with which to build expert systems are listed below. 
i) Readability 
ii) Manageability 
iii) Speed and memory 
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iv) Sufficiently high level to speed up the development 
- process and enable extensions to be added easily 
The criteria listed above could be applied to the selection of 
a language for any computational problem. The fourth item of 
the list, however, has special significance for the expert 
systems application of a language. There are now many high- 
level or fifth generation languages that claim to best fit the 
list above. Some of the more popular of these languages are 
described in turn. 
2.1.3.1 LISP 
The language, List Processing (LISP), originated from 
research establishments in the U. S. A. in the 1960s. LISP has 
therefore been around for many years and as a consequence there 
are several LISP dialects. The different dialects. differ 
primarily in the features offered as standard. The dialects 
can be divided into two main sub-groups; variants of MACLISP 
or of INTERLISP. LISP has been used in the implementation of a 
number of AI products and expert systems. The more notable 
products in LISP are MYCIN and its offshoots. LISP has 
developed strongly in the U. S. A. where it, is currently the 
favoured language for AI applications. 
There are two different types of machines that run LISP. 
The first type is the ordinary computer that has a front-end 
interpreter/compiler that enables programming in LISP. The 
second type are a special class of machines called symbol 
manipulating machines. In the latter category the machines 
usually run LISP and nothing else. The difference between the 
two categories is that the specialist machines offer extra 
speed, memory and special features but cost a great deal more. 
LISP goes through a standard cycle whenever an entry is 
made at the terminal. It READS what has been typed, EVALUATES 
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it and then PRINTS the result. This is universally referred to 
as the READ-EVAL-PRINT loop. This is not dissimilar to the 
conventional languages such as FORTRAN or BASIC but is rather 
different from the PROLOG process described in the next 
section. Where LISP differs from the conventional languages is 
the manipulation of symbols. This is a design feature of LISP 
whereas FORTRAN or BASIC specialise in handling numbers. 
2.1.3.2 PROLOG 
The language, Programming in Logic (PROLOG), had its 
origins in Europe in the early 1970s. Clocksin and Mellish 
1331, of Edinburgh have established a standard PROLOG. PROLOG 
is now being used by many programmers for applications of 
symbolic computation and AI. Prolog is, in Europe, the major 
AI language. 
PROLOG is a powerful alternative to LISP as an approach 
to symbol manipulation, because it is also particularly useful 
for knowledge representation. PROLOG differs from languages 
like BASIC and C in that it is declarative rather than 
procedural. This means that a'PROLOG program consists of items 
of information and rules rather than a series of instructions. 
Unlike LISP's READ-EVAL-PRINT loops, PROLOG programs consist 
of sets of clauses, where each clause is either a fact about 
the given information or a rule about the how the solution may 
be inferred from the given facts. These basic units of PROLOG 
are also referred to as HORN clauses which can be either 
assertions such as 
Jack is Jill's brother 
or implications such as 
IF x is male AND y is male AND x and y have the same parents 
THEN x and y are brothers 
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The use of these implications and rules, declarative 
programming, can serve the development of a-knowledge base 
built up in PROLOG. Thus, PROLOG is naturally suited to 
problems of knowledge representation. This advantage of PROLOG 
has resulted in its gathering impetus-as a language for expert 
systems applications. Coelho et. al. (34) have' demonstrated 
PROLOG solutions to an extremely wide range of knowledge 
representation problems. There are now available a 
considerable number of different versions, both interpreted 
and compiled, of PROLOG. 
2.1.3.3 POPLOG 
POPLOG is a multi-language system that was initially 
developed in the Cognitive Studies Programme at Sussex 
University. POPLOG provides integrated facilities for 
developing and mixing programs in different languages. The 
core language of POPLOG*is POP-11 (described in the next 
section) but it also 'contains incremental compilers for 
PROLOG, LISP and for other utilities. It is also possible to 
link programs dynamically in languages such as PASCAL, FORTRAN 
and C. 
2.1.3.4 POP-il 
POP-11 is derived from POP-2, a language originally 
invented at Edinburgh University for research in AI. POP-11 is 
fully interactive and like LISP and PROLOG does not require 
separation of data and program, allowing the user to mix 
factual assertions with program instructions. The syntax and 
structure of POP-11 is similar to that of the more 
sophisticated versions of LISP. The main drawback of POP-11 
when compared to PROLOG is that POP-11 is not suited to 
declarative programming, the main strength of PROLOG. 
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2.1.4 Expert System Shells 
There are a number of expert system shells on the market 
at the moment. Shells are essentially expert system building 
tools. They contain all the components of the expert system 
bar the domain specific knowledge base. The best known shell 
is EMYCIN (or Empty-MYCIN) which is MYCIN without the 
bacterial infections knowledge of MYCIN. The obvious advantage 
of using an expert system shell is that there is less to 
implement. There is a ready-to-run system that only needs the 
domain specific knowledge added. Shells also ease the task of 
adding this domain specific knowledge. The disadvantage of 
shells is the balance between generality and completeness that 
is struck by the designer of the shell. The designer of an 
expert system. shell will naturally want to build a general 
purpose tool that will be applicable to a wide range of 
problems. However, this is done at the expense of efficiency 
and the number and importance of the features of-the shell. 
Thus, the choice of shell for a particular application will be 
determined largely by the nature of the application. 
Some of the more significant commercially available 
shells are discussed below. 
1) EMMYCIN 
EMYCIN is the domain independent version of MYCIN. EMYCIN has 
been used in the production of PUFF, a lung disfunction 
diagnostic tool. EMYCIN needs the domain specific information 
supplied in the form of production rules (see 2.1.1 for an 
example of a MYCIN production rule). The basic control 
strategy employed by MYCIN is backward-chaining. EMYCIN is 
also able to handle uncertainties in the form of certainty 
factors. 
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2) KAS 
PROSPECTOR is an expert system developed for geological 
diagnosis during mineral exploration. KAS (Knowledge 
Acquisition System) is the PROSPECTOR program without the 
domain specific knowledge. KAS allows the use of both forward 
and backward chaining and also uses a heuristic evaluation of 
functions to choose the most promising rules. This combination 
of search techniques has been employed at the expense-of 
limiting the flexibility of the database. 
3) HEARSAY-III 
The main difference between HEARSAY-III and EIAYCIN and KAS is 
that HEARSAY-III is able to represent and manipulate competing 
solutions. HEARSAY-III can also reason about partial 
solutions. The inference engine for HEARSAY-III is extremely 
complex - it needs to trigger, manage and execute each rule 
and also needs to schedule in a sensible manner the many 
different rules that may be vying for attention. 
4) AGE 
AGE differs from the above tools in that its objective is to 
provide an environment in which theýuser specifies the, 
knowledge representation and processing methods. There is a 
selection of such methods offered by the shell. 
5) MICRO-EXPERT 
Micro-Expert is a shell based on the PROSPECTOR model. It is 
therefore a well-tried tool. Micro-Expert is a product of ISI 
Ltd. 
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6) SAVOIR 
Savoir is a Micro-Expert type shell and also comes from ISI 
Ltd. Savoir has been used by ICI to develop an expert system, 
COUNSELLOR, for advising arable farmers on fungal disease 
control. 
The list given above is intended only to be illustrative 
and not exhaustive. There are new shells launched every month 
and thus it would be impossible to do a complete review. The 
major points about expert system shells are that there is a 
great variety available and that the choice of shell will be 
determined by its compatibility with the application in 
question. 
2.2 Knowledge Representation Techniques 
This section deals with the techniques available for 
representing the knowledge associated with a problem. This is 
often the most critical part" of obtaining a solution. ' 
Designing a good representation is often the key to turning 
difficult problems into simple ones. There are many forms of 
knowledge representation that we could choose: propositional 
logic, predicate logic, semantic networks, analogue 
representations, frames, semantic triples, production rules, 
to mention but a few. Three of the above list have found 
popularity with AI researchers and are described in greater 
detail in the following sections. 
It is advantageous to consider the types of knowledge 
required by an expert system. Simons 1351 describes the 
various types as 
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- knowledge of objects (knowing that ... ) 
- knowledge of actions and events 
- knowledge about performance (knowing how to ... ) 
- meta-knowledge (knowing the limitations of our knowledge) 
It is important to note that whatever representational scheme 
is chosen, its suitability for all the types of knowledge 
related to the problem must be checked. 
2.2.1 Semantic Nets 
Semantic nets or networks are really acyclic graphs 
containing nodes and arcs. Nodes represent objects, concepts 
or situations and the arcs represent the relations between the 
nodes. 
Let us consider an example. The fact that Fred is a boy 
could be represented by the semantic network of Figure 2.2. 
Note that the nodes "Fred" and "boy" are connected by the 
relationship are "is-a". If we wanted to express the fact that 
"boy" is an instance of "human", then we could connect the 
nodes "boy" and "human" with the are "instance-of". The human 
attribute "walks on two legs" can be ascribed to "human" with 
the are "has-attribute". This network is shown in Figure 2.3. 
Now, what happens when we have another boy, John, to be added 
to the knowledge base? We define the node "John" and link it 
to "boy", using the are "is-a". The attributes that Fred 
possessed by virtue of being a boy are now possessed by John 
as well (Figure 2.4). This illustrates the ease with which the 
network can be expanded. 
One disadvantage of semantic nets is that for complicated 
systems the networks become unmanageable. Another disadvantage 
is illustrated by referring back to our last example. What if 
John was a baby? We may not want the attribute "walks-on-two- 
legs" ascribed to John but we may want to express the fact 
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that John is a boy. This would require some restructuring of 
the network. In a large network such restructuring may prove 
impossible. 
In summary, semantic nets are powerful representational 
tools (as evidenced by their use in PROSPECTOR) but they do 
have limitations that preclude their use for certain 
applications. 
2.2.2 Frame Systems 
Minsky [36] suggested that auseful way to organise a 
knowledge base was to break it into modular chunks, called 
frames. A frame is a data structure for representing a 
situation. Attached to each frame are several kinds of 
information including information on which frame to call up 
next. Minsky pointed out that the human mind operates along 
lines much like a frame system. This is best demonstrated with 
the use of an example. 
Consider the thought processes of a retailer as he 
conducts a sale. His knowledge or frame of "conduct a sale" 
may call up the frames "payment option", "ring up sale" and so 
on. Now, "payment option" may, if triggered, call up frames on 
how to deal with a particular kind of credit card, for 
instance. Thus, the thinking of the human mind can be seen to 
be fairly easily modelled by a frame system. 
As with semantic nets, a frame system comprises a network 
of nodes and relationships. There is one critical difference, 
however. Frame systems refer also to the processes involved in 
performing tasks. This is part of the knowledge base. Frames 
will often also carry default assignments. These are assumed 
true unless contradicted. Referring back to the previous 
example, the retailer may have the "cash" frame as the default 
to the "payment option" frame. This would be true unless the 
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customer proffered a credit card. 
The advantages of frame systems are their flexibility and 
the ease with which human knowledge can be modelled. 
2.2.3 Production Systems 
Much problem solving knowledge can be packaged into small 
forms called productions. Production systems are often said to 
model closely human problem solving processes. Production 
systems consist of a set of conditional statements (rules), a 
collection of given and derived facts (database) and an 
interpreter or control strategy that schedules the invocation 
of the rules. Each rule is regarded essentially as a "pattern- 
action" or a "situation-action" pair where the pattern or 
situation is a specified combination of facts. 
The rules comprising the knowledge base can have many 
different formats. The most common format is the IF-a 
condition-THEN-an action. The THEN section need not be an 
action; it may be an inference or an assertion. The IF section 
may contain more than one condition that needs to be 
satisfied. 
The classic example of a production rule system is the 
much quoted animal identification program. The problem is to 
discriminate between different zoo animals. The 'expert 
system' should be able, after querying the user, to identify 
the particular animal. The production rules to discriminate 
between the example set of four animals are 
1 IF the animal has hair THEN it is a mammal 
2 IF the animal gives milk THEN it is a mammal 
3 IF the animal is a mammal AND it eats meat THEN it is a 
carnivore 
4 IF the animal is a mammal AND it 'has pointed teeth AND it 
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has claws AND its eyes point forward THEN it is a 
carnivore 
5 IF the animal is a mammal AND it has hoofs THEN it is 
ungulate 
6 IF the animal is a carnivore AND it has a tawny colour AND 
it has dark spots THEN it is a cheetah 
7 IF the animal. is a carnivore AND it has a tawny colour AND 
it has black stripes THEN it is a tiger 
8 IF the animal is ungulate AND it has a long neck and long 
legs AND it has dark spots THEN it is a giraffe 
9 IF the animal is ungulate AND it has a white colour AND it 
has black stripes THEN it is a zebra 
Note that there is no need, in this example of four 
animals, to include the fact that all the animals are mammals 
or that both the carnivores are tawny coloured. This 
information is redundant provided that no further animals are 
to be added to the database. However, there is no requirement 
insisting that the information in the productions be minimal. 
It is better to focus on the individual production and include 
all the facts that seem relevant. Note also that in the 
example we have two rules for identifying a mammal. This is 
desirable because it increases the possibility that we may be 
able to identify an animal as a mammal. Although not 
illustrated in the example, it is possible to have production 
rules with multiple conclusions. 
Now, if an animal with a tawny colour and dark spots is 
observed, rules 6 and 8 are suggested or 'triggered'. If the 
animal is further observed to be hairy and to be eating meat, 
rules 1 and 3 'fire' establishing the animal as first a mammal 
and then a carnivore. This fact leads rule 6 to 'fire' showing 
the animal to be a cheetah. This is forward chaining. The 
investigation could have been conducted the other way round. 
For instance, rule 1 would have resulted in the user being 
asked if the animal had hair (in order to establish the animal 
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as a mammal). This is backward chaining, i. e. assuming a 
hypothesis and then attempting to prove it. 
In the event of many matching productions requiring 
attention, there needs to be a way of deciding which one to 
choose. This is termed conflict resolution. There are a great 
many number of way's in which to determine which of many viable 
productions to act on next. Listed below are four of the more 
popular methods. 
i) Use the matching production that is first in the list 
ii) Use the matching production with the longest list of 
constraints, i. e. the most discriminatory production 
iii) Use the matching production that was most recently used 
iv) Use the matching production that contains the greatest 
number of situations with predefined priority 
The advantages of production systems are 
i) They provide a good model of basic human problem solving 
ii) They allow incremental growth through the addition of 
individual productions 
iii) They are easy to update because productions are easily 
added or removed 
iv) They are a very flexible form of knowledge representation 
v) It is possible to include heuristic information 
The disadvantages of production systems are 
i) The program execution is inherently inefficient 
ii) In large systems, overlaps may develop between different 
productions 
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2.3 Construction of an Expert System 
There are two parallel approaches to the construction of 
an expert system. The two approaches, identical for most 
stages, differ in that one involves the use of an expert 
system shell while the other involves building the expert 
system from scratch, The stages of constructing an expert 
system are 
i) Identifying the requirements of the expert system 
ii) Acquisition-of the knowledge pertaining to the problem 
iii) Selection of either an expert system shell or a knowledge 
representation technique 
iv) Formalising of knowledge 
v) 'Feeding' of knowledge to system 
vi) Evaluation-of expert system 
vii) Improvement of expert system 
Each of these stages is discussed in more detail below. 
i) Identifying the requirements of the system 
The first hurdle is to identify a likely application for 
an expert system. The pertinence of expert systems technology 
to the problem must be assessed. The scope and extent of the 
expertise of the problem must be defined. The domain of the 
expert system must be specified. Let us say we are to develop 
an expert system to identify zoo animals. What should our 
expert system be able to do? What range of animals should the 
system know about? Should the system be able to differentiate 
between a leopard and a cheetah or an African and an Indian 
elephant? Is identifying the particular animal all that is 
likely to be required of the system? Should the system also be 
able to identify all animals that require a particular 
habitat? Questions like these will need to be asked in order 
to define the requirements and domain of the system. 
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ii) Acquisition of the knowledge pertaining to the problem 
The problem-solving knowledge of the human expert needs 
to be collected in a sensible form. This knowledge will 
include the concepts, relations and information flow 
characteristics of the problem. All strategies, subtasks, 
constraints, etc. of the problem solving activity will also 
need to be specified. 
Knowledge acquisition is sometimes performed by a 
specialist knowledge engineer who elicits the knowledge from 
the expert. This process of elicitation is accomplished by the 
knowledge engineer interviewing and interrogating the expert. 
iii) Selection of either an expert system shell or a knowledge 
representation technique 
Having decided on the requirements of the system and 
gathered together all of the knowledge related to the problem, 
the next step is to decide on an implementation. The 
advantages and disadvantages of expert system shells have 
already been discussed (see 2.1.4). If no expert system shell 
is deemed appropriate, then a technique to represent the 
knowledge must be decided on (see 2.2). It is also important 
to decide what explanation facilities are required. 
Note that considerations of cost-and hardware also have a 
part to play. It may be that a more expensive shell may be 
more suitable but that the extra financial outlay is not 
justified. It'is possible that the most suitable shell may not 
be suited to the hardware that is available. 
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iv) Formalising of knowledge 
In the light of the decision of (iii) above, the 
knowledge of the problem must be converted into a form 
amenable to the system. This is quite important because subtle 
parts of the knowledge may need careful formalising. The 
process of förmalisation must also not distort the original 
bit of knowledge. 
v) 'Feeding' of knowledge to the system 
This involves the transfer of knowledge to the expert 
system. Each bit of the knowledge should be checked on entry 
to ensure the formalisation process has been correct and 
exact. 
vi) Evaluation of expert system 
Once the knowledge of the expert system is complete it 
can be tested. The expert system may require some fine tuning. 
The evaluation may turn up inconsistencies or deficiencies in 
the knowledge. Probabilistic information may require 
alteration in the light of the conclusions to test cases. 
vii) Improvement of-expert system 
As the system is exposed to real situations, it may be 
found that the domain needs to be, increased to cover a 
particular area. Additional heuristic information may become 
obvious. Additional rules or facts may become known. These 
additional items of knowledge will need to be assimilated by 
the expert system, preferably automatically. 
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3 HAZOP Studies 
3.0 The Expertise of HAZOP Studies 
The techniques involved in a HAZOP study have already 
been extensively described in Chapter 1. This chapter will 
examine the expertise or the knowledge required to perform a 
HAZOP study and the skills required to manipulate this 
knowledge. 
The results of a HAZOP study are only as good as the 
knowledge that the HAZOP study team put into it. The fact that 
the team is formed of -members of different disciplines guards 
against gaps or deficiencies in the knowledge of the 
individual members. 
3.1 The Different Types of Knowledge 
There are seven types of knowledge required to perform a HAZOP 
study. These are: 
i) Knowledge 
ii) Knowledge 
iii) Knowledge 
iv) Knowledge 
considera 
v) Knowledge 
vi) Knowledge 
vii) Knowledge 
of 
of 
of 
of 
do 
of 
of 
of 
the procedures of HAZOP studies 
process equipment 
process material 
the particular system under 
n 
hazards 
probabilities 
costs 
3.1.1 Knowledge of the Procedures of HAZOP Studies - 
This knowledge may be termed "knowledge of control 
techniques" i. e. how to go about the solving the problem. 
Included in this category are the following :- 
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i) Order of examination 
ii) Meaning and use of the guide words 
iii) Presentation of the results of the HAZOP study 
This knowledge has already been detailed, in some depth, in 
Chapter 1. 
3.1.2 Knowledge`of Process Equipment 
Process equipment can be divided into two broad classes. 
i) Common or everyday items 
ii) Uncommon or unusual items 
The knowledge of the more common items of equipment will have 
been built up as a result of the experience of the team 
members with those items of equipment. Included in this class 
of common items are: 
- piping; different grades and materials 
- pumps; different types and brand names 
- compressors; different types and brand names 
- valves; different functions and types 
- non-return valves; different types 
- control loops and valves; different functions and types 
- instruments and sensors; different functions, types and 
brands 
The above list consists of fairly basic units. The action 
or function of these units is simple and therefore the 
malfunction of the units is correspondingly simple. For 
instance, consider the simplest unit, a section of pipe. The 
function of a pipe is to carry flow at the expense of a 
relatively small pressure drop. The malfunction is thus that 
the pipe is not able to carry the flow or only able to carry 
the flow at a high pressure drop. The causes of this 
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malfunction may be that the pipe is fractured or blocked, and 
so on. Although the information may not seem to be as simply 
structured as that in the example above, the team will have 
built up, as a result of their experience, models of these 
basic units in their minds. 
Equipment that the HAZOP team is not closely acquainted 
with is usually fairly specialist or else incorporates new or 
unfamiliar technology. Particular designs of the following 
items will fall into this category: 
- Tanks, vessels and associated ancillary equipment 
- Heat exchangers 
- Distillation columns 
- Reaction vessels 
- Settlers 
- Scrubbers 
The members of the HAZOP study team will combine their 
knowledge of any similar unit with details on the particular 
unit. These details will be gleaned from the P&IDs, the 
written design intention, mass and heat balances etc. The 
study team will thus extend their knowledge to cover the 
particular application. 
The interrogation, during a HAZOP study, of common or 
basic units and the uncommon units is essentially the same. 
Each time a unit is considered for causes and consequences of 
a particular set of guidewords, the role model of the unit is, 
almost unconciously, consulted. This consultation consists of 
questions asked of the models. Examples of such queries are 
shown below. 
"What fault could result in this set of guidewords? " 
"What could go wrong with the unit that could result in this 
set of guidewords? " 
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"What would be the consequences of this set of guidewords on 
the unit? " 
For the uncommon units, closer attention may need to be 
focused on the interaction of the unit with the process 
deviation under consideration. 
Knowledge of process equipment is also assumed to include 
knowledge of the materials of construction. Included in this 
class will be, for example, the knowledge of the deleterious 
effects of chlorides on stainless steels. 
Knowledge of process equipment is defined, in this 
instance, 'as including knowledge of intended operating 
procedure and knowledge of design intent. The importance of 
these categories of knowledge is illustrated by the examples 
below. 
i) There is no point in considering the provision of proper 
isolation of and manholes for entry into a vessel if is 
not intended for the vessel to be entered. 
ii) It is important to know the basis for sizing of the 
pressure relief for a process vessel. 
3.1.3 Knowledge of Process Material 
This knowledge is critical. There is no point in 
considering fire as one of the consequences of a major leak if 
the process material is water. An illustrative list of the 
important properties of process materials has already been 
given in Table 1.2, Chapter 1. It is to be expected that the 
physical properties of the process material will have been 
taken into account when designing the process. It is the 
effect of process deviations on the material that could lead 
to hazards. For example, a material may be prone to 
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polymerisation when static. Thus, no flow could result in 
polymerisation. The list of Table 1.2 should be supplemented 
with the items relating to the effects of process deviations 
on the process material. 
3.1.4 Knowledge of the Particular System under Consideration 
This knowledge can be passed on to the HAZOP study team 
in one or more of the following ways. 
i) written description 
ii) flow diagram 
iii) mass and heat balances 
iv) logic diagrams (for control and trip systems and for 
emergency procedures) 
The modes of transfer of knowledge given above differ markedly 
in manner and procedure. Thus, the different modes differ also 
as to their suitability for the transfer of the various types 
of knowledge or information. 
Written descriptions are useful especially for the 
transfer of knowledge relating to, among others, the following 
issues. 
- operating procedures 
- sequencing operations 
- material specification 
- design intention 
-philosophy of design 
On the other hand, a written description would not be 
particularly suited to conveying information about the flow 
scheme. 
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The flow diagram is by far the best method of 
transferring the knowledge relating to the configuration of 
the process units. Consider the diagram in Figure 3.1. The - 
flow scheme is simple and yet to transfer the same knowledge 
using a written description would be impracticable. The 
situation would be considerably worsened by the addition of 
the instrumentation information that a P&ID would normally 
contain. 
Figure 3.1 Simple Flow Scheme 
Mass and heat balances and logic diagrams are obviously 
fairly specialised and are designed to cope with a specific 
type of information. 
3.1.5 Knowledge of Hazards 
This knowledge is actually knowledge of what constitutes 
a hazard. This type of knowledge is essential to the 
evaluation of the consequences of any process fault. For 
instance, consider the heated storage of crude oil. In the 
absence of recirculation and the presence of water there is 
the possibility of boilover or slopover. This knowledge is 
gained through experience, either direct or indirect. Included 
in this class of knowledge is the expertise that allows the, 
almost probabilistic, sorting of consequences into probable 
and improbable hazards. For instance, fire protection against 
direct flame impingement may be considered necessary with 
certain light or pressurised hydrocarbons. 
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Knowledge of hazards can, if so desired, be considered, as 
slightly more specialist knowledge of the three previous types 
of knowledge i. e. 
i) Knowledge of process equipment 
Knowledge of process material 
iii) Knowledge of the particular system under 
consideration 
3.1.6 Knowledge of Probabilities 
This type of knowledge is needed to determine the 
likelihood of the realization of any hazard potential. 
Knowledge of probabilities includes statistical knowledge of 
failure rates, knowledge of the factors influencing the 
failures (e. g. corrosive process fluids) and the knowledge of 
how to manipulate individual item failure rates in order to 
obtain a system failure rate. An example of the use of this 
knowledge is given below. 
Consider a vessel protected against overpressure by a 
trip. Let us assume the demand rate on the trip is 1/year and 
the failure to danger rate of the trip is 0.5/year. If the 
trip is tested monthly the hazard rate is calculated to be 
once in 48 years. Now, if this is felt to be too high, the 
test interval may be reduced or some or all of the components 
of the trip system may be duplicated. 
3.1.7 Knowledge of Costs 
Cost is a major factor in all decisions about process 
design and safety in process design. Alternative solutions to 
a particular problem are usually compared on the basis of 
cost. Decisions on loss prevention are also subject to such 
comparisons. Expenditure on containment and prevention of loss 
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must, in the majority of cases, be justified on the basis of 
return. Even human life is quite often compared in this way. 
The "value of a life" criterion is used to compare marginal 
reductions in the rate of fatal accidents. 
Consider again the example of 3.1.6. If the pressure 
vessel were sited in an extremely remote location where the 
hazard potential to humans was negligible and the cost of a 
duplicated trip system outweighed the cost of replacing the 
vessel then a simple trip system should be chosen. 
3.2 The Interaction of Different Types of Knowledge 
The seven classes of knowledge listed above each have a 
central and reasonably well-defined core. The edges of the 
various classes are, however, rather blurred and there is a 
considerable degree of overlap between the different classes. 
For instance, the knowledge of hazards can be readily broken 
up into specialist knowledge of process equipment, process 
material, and the particular process configuration. An example 
of this is the case of boilover or slopover cited in 3.1.5 
which can be readily broken down as follows. 
Knowledge of process material: 
i) Crude oil has water impurity 
ii) Water and oil are immiscible 
iii) Water is more dense than oil. 
iv) Water has a lower boiling point than oil. 
Knowledge of process equipment: 
i) This crude oil tank is heated by a high pressure steam 
coil at the base of the tank. 
ii) There is a recirculation loop for the oil in the tank. 
Knowledge of the particular system: 
i) The recirculation loop is inoperative. 
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The different sets of knowledge above could lead to the 
following line of reasoning. 
Recirculation inoperative AND 
crude oil has water impurity AND 
water is denser THUS 
water settles out. 
water settles out AND 
water has a lower boiling point than oil AND 
high pressure steam coil at base of the tank THUS 
temperature of the water raised to boiling point resulting in 
boilover. 
The above example illustrates how a lot of the specialist 
knowledge of hazards can be broken down. What has been '- 
neglected in the above example is the vital role of common- 
sense knowledge. This has been used at a number of points. 
e. g. 
1) immiscibility and a density difference lead to "settling 
out" 
2) boiling produces large amounts of vapour 
3) steam at "high pressure" will be at a temperature that is 
higher than the boiling point of water. 
The decomposition process as shown above is *much simpler with 
the benefit of hindsight and this is because of the importance 
of seemingly minor bits of common-sense knowledge. 
3.3 The HAZOP Checklist 
Most HAZOP study leaders employ an "aide-me moire" to 
ensure that they spark off the thinking of the study team in 
all the possible directions. These aids are very similar to a 
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checklist in intention, namely that they attempt to ensure 
that nothing is omitted. The main difference is that the 
checklists mentioned in 1.1 are usually meant to be exhaustive 
whereas HAZOP "checklists" are an open-ended reminder of 
points, to watch out for. 
The author has compiled one of these HAZOP checklists by 
noting the salient points of a number of real-life HAZOP 
studies. This checklist is shown in Table 3.1. Sitting in on a 
HAZOP study is the only way to build up expertise of this sort 
because the documentation of a HAZOP study will not be a 
complete record of all the discussion. When considering the 
checklist of Table 3.1 the following points are to be noted. 
i) For all the categories apart from OTHER-THAN the 
intention is to provide a basic list of how the deviation 
may arise. The consequences of the deviation are not 
detailed. This is-because of-the fact that consideration 
of the consequences is not readily amenable to a 
checklist form. It is difficult to create a checklist 
where DEVIATION leads to CONSEQUENCE IF there are 
ADDITIONAL FACTORS. 
ii) The category OTHER-THAN is a guide to the points of note 
relating to specific items. For instance, under the 
category of "relief" there is the item "location of 
discharge". This is intended to mean that where relief is 
employed for the protection of the process equipment care 
must be taken over the route of the discharge. If the 
discharge is to atmosphere, is it pointing away from 
spots where operators may be affected, and so on. 
The American Institute of Chemical Engineers (371 has 
referred to just such a checklist type approach for HAZOP 
studies. This particular checklist is, unlike that of Table 
3.1, broken down into sections by process unit and process 
deviation. Separate parts of the checklist refer to pumps, 
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Table 3.1 HAZOP Checklist 
HIGH FLOW 
More than 1 pump, pump racing, control loop failure,, increased 
suction pressure, other routes, exchanger tube leaks, greater 
density. 
LOW FLOW 
Pump failure or loss of pump efficiency, partial blockage, 
vessel failures, valve leaks, fouling of delivery, low suction 
pressure, heat exchanger leaks, control loop failure. 
NO FLOW 
Wrong routing, blockage, slip plate, faulty non-return valve, 
pipe burst, control loop or pump or vessel failure. 
REVERSE FLOW 
(As for no flow), emergency venting, possibility of 2-way 
flow. 
HIGH PRESSURE 
Pressure surge, hammer, inadequacy of relief, leakage from 
high pressure connection, temperature rise, too high a rate of 
pressuring up. 
LOW PRESSURE 
Generation of vacuum, pumping/draining out too rapidly, 
condensation of gases, gases dissolving in liquid, blocked in 
pump or compressor suction. 
HIGH TEMPERATURE 
Fouled cooler tubes, cooling water failure, higher rate of 
reaction, failed exchanger tubes. 
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Table 3.1 (contd. ) 
LOW TEMPERATURE 
Winter conditions, loss of pressure, loss of heating, failed 
exchanger tubes. 
HIGH VISCOSITY 
Change of material/material specification, temperature change. 
LOW VISCOSITY 
(As for high viscosity) 
(PART-OF) 
COMPOSITION CHANGE 
Passing isolations, leaking exchanger tubes, wrong or off- 
specification feed, phase change. 
(MORE-THAN) 
CONTAMINATION 
Passing isolations, leaking exchanger tubes, off-specification 
feed, air ingress, shut-down and start-up conditions. 
(OTHER-THAN) 
RELIEF 
Location of discharge, fire relief. 
INSTRUMENTATION 
Control loops, pressure, temperature and flow measurement, 
trips and testing of trips, alarms, set-points. 
SAMPLING 
Type of sampling, cooling of samples, response time. 
CORROSION/EROSION 
Material specification, fluid velocities, baffles, pipe- 
guides, hangers and anchors, external attack. 
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Table 3.1 (contd. ) 
SERVICE FAILURE 
cooling water, instrument air, steam, nitrogen, power to 
machines, control circuits and computers. 
MAINTENANCE 
Isolation, drainage, purging, cleaning, drying, slip-plating, 
access, catalyst change, start-up, foundations and supports. 
STATIC 
Earthing, low conducting liquids, insulated conductors, fine 
strainers, relaxation times, pouring and sieving of dusts. 
SPARES 
One-off items, catalyst charge, by-passes, stand-by items. 
SAFETY 
Lagging, fire-fighting, TLVs'of process materials, safety 
showers, noise and noise protection. 
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compressors, reactors, furnaces and so on. Consider an excerpt 
of the checklist shown below. -This deals with overtemperature 
in fixed bed single phase and stirred tank reactors. 
"Overtemperature (Often with accompanying overpressure) 
* Excessive preheat 
* Exothermic reaction 
- Quench failure or loss of external cooling 
- Excess or deficiency of one reactant ? 
- Can loss of agitation in cooled stirred reactor lead 
to excessive temperature/pressure ? 
- Could loss of agitation in heated jacketed reactor 
lead to localised overheating at liquid surface and 
subsequent runaway ? 
- Local hot spot due to partial bed obstruction ? 
- Excessive point or surface temperature lead to thermal 
decomposition or runaway ? 
- Delayed onset of batch reaction while continuing 
reactant addition ? 
- Would leakage into reactor of coolant from jacket or 
internal coil react exothermically ? 
Could backflow of a reactant through a depressuring 
system lead to or exacerbate a runaway ? 
- Excessive preheat drives reaction further ? 
- Appropriate normal control/emergency instrumentation 
provided ? 
- Provision for on-line test of emergency 
cut-off/dump/isolation ? 
* Regeneration (in place) 
- Maximum regeneration temperature provided for ? 
- Too much burn medium i. e. too high concentration ? 
* (Sufficient TI/THA coverage in beds ?)" 
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It is to be noted that, as in the checklist of Table 3.1, 
the above checklist is open-ended and utilises a multiplicity 
of forms. Some of the points deal with the possible causes of 
overtemperature whilst others deal with the provision of 
adequate instrumentation and protective devices. 
3.4 HAZOP Pruning 
This chapter has so far dealt with the knowledge required 
to successfully complete a HAZOP study. There has, however, 
yet been no mention of the knowledge required to collate the 
relevant results of the HAZOP study into a concise form. This 
"pruning" of the results takes place not at the end of the 
study but whilst the study is in progress. 
One half of the pruning process is, rather obviously, to 
make a distinction between those points that are noteworthy 
and those that are not. This is accomplished by utilising 
knowledge of hazards and knowledge of probabilities to 
highlight the not improbable hazards. 
The second half of the pruning process is the actual 
trimming of the results. There are two basic types of trimming 
or rationalisation. 
i) Rationalisation by process line 
ii) Rationalisation of process units 
3.4.1 Rationalisation by Process Line 
This process, in essence, is the collecting together of 
all the causes and effects of process deviations on the 
sections of pipe between the process units in one process 
line. This eliminates the duplication that would result if 
each of the sections of pipe were considered individually. 
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This may seem an extremely basic point but is actually a very 
salient one. The process line is thus studied as a collection 
of units connected together. This is important because in a 
HAZOP study the objects of study are either process vessels or 
process lines. 
There is one major problem in this type of 
rationalisation and that is the absence of differentiation 
between upstream and downstream. Consider the case of a pump 
with suction and discharge isolation valves. On searching for 
the causes of high pressure we find that this may be the 
result of having the discharge valve shut. One consequence of 
this would be the rupture of the discharge pipe were it not 
able to withstand the shut-in pressure of the pump. This 
situation does not arise at the suction end of the pump. 
Rationalisation by line discards these distinctions in order 
to present concise output. 
3.4.2 Rationalisation of Process Units 
This type of rationalisation is the lumping together of 
the same type of process units within the same process line. A 
typical process line may contain, say, 20 isolation valves. In 
searching for the causes of no flow it would be rather tedious 
to consider "isolation valve closed" at each of the 20 valves. 
Thus, it is expedient to recognise that there are 20 such 
process units in the line and the fault "isolation valve 
closed" could occur at any one of these units. 
This type of rationalisation is very similar to that of 
3.4.1 and exhibits the same problem with directional 
information being discarded. Fortunately, this is not 
critical. 
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Computer Aid for Hazard Identification 
4.0 Overview 
This chapter deals with the method adopted to tackle the 
problem of hazard identification. Here and hereafter hazard 
identification refers to the techniques of hazard 
identification as used in a HAZOP study. Chapter 2 has 
detailed the different forms that expert systems can take and 
Chapter 3 has detailed the knowledge requirement of a computer 
aid in the field of HAZOP studies. It is clear that expert 
systems technology, rather than conventional programming, is 
the area of promise in the development of a computer aid for 
hazard identification. 
The process of conducting a hazard identification using 
this computer method is, briefly, as follows :- 
i) The "model maker" program is used to develop a library of 
models; one for each of the different process units. 
ii) The "material-modeller" program is used to develop a 
library of models of the different process materials. 
iii) The "configurator" program is used to create a datafile 
containing all the configuration information pertaining 
to the plant under study. 
iv) The "identifier" program is then run. This will call up 
the configuration datafile and the relevant models from 
the libraries of unit and material models in order to 
produce the raw results of the hazard identification. 
v) The "compacter" program is then used to process the raw 
results of the "identifier" program to produce a hazard 
identification table similar to that produced by a 
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conventional HAZOP study. 
Each of the above stages is described in greater detail in 
section 4.3. 
4.1 The Different Approaches to Developing a Computer Aid for 
Hazard' Identification 
There are many different ways in which to approach the 
problem of how to perform the hazard identification using a 
computer method. These different approaches will all have 
their respective advantages and disadvantages. The suitability 
of any one approach can be determined by assessing the 
particular problems that hazard identification presents. 
Identifying hazards is an application of expert systems 
technology quite unlike those discussed in Chapter 2. Some of 
the peculiarities of this application are listed below. 
i) The nature of the goal put to the computer aid is 
"Identify the hazards on this plant"! This is unlike the 
sort of goal that most expert systems are set. The 
conventional form of goal put to an expert system 
consists of one fairly well defined core. The goal put to 
a hazard identification program is again well defined but 
consists of a hierarchy of sub-tasks that are to be 
performed in a sequence controlled by the inference 
engine. The main point is that these are sub-tasks and 
not sub-goals as in a conventional expert system. 
ii) The knowledge required to identify the hazards on a plant 
is not easily divisible into a problem specific knowledge 
base and a separate control technique/knowledge 
(inference engine) applicable to a range of tasks in 
addition to performing the hazard identification. The 
generality of the control technique has already been 
referred to (in Chapter 2) as one of the characteristics 
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of expert systems. An example of this is the expert 
system "PUFF" which is the combination of "E-mycin", the 
"Mycin" shell, with a different set of rules. Although 
this property of generality of the control technique is 
not a characteristic of all expert systems, it still 
remains a desirable characteristic - one that is a 
distinctive feature of many commercial expert systems. 
Separating the knowledge from the reasoning in hazard 
identification is a rather complicated task. The 
reasoning part of the problem constitutes a large 
proportion of the total knowledge required. Thus, it is 
only to be expected that the inference engine for hazard 
identification is inapplicable to any other problem. 
iii) Chapter 2 says an expert system should be able to deal 
with uncertainties in data. This means that an expert 
system should be able' to cope with a "DON'T KNOW" answer 
to a question. This problem does not manifest itself in a 
computer aid for hazard identification. The knowledge is 
either present or assumed to be irrelevant. For instance, 
if no rules match the search for causes of low 
temperature at a centrifugal pump then it is assumed that 
there are no causes of low temperature at the pump. 
iv) The majority of conventional expert systems are designed 
to be run interactively, with explanations when required 
and the possibility of supplying additional information 
on the satisfaction of each goal. Performing a hazard 
identification is a problem on a much grander scale. 
Although one can envisage an interactive hazard 
identification session, consider the following points 
a) If the quality of the modelling of the process units 
and process materials is good, there would be no need 
for the expert system to query the user because the 
user would not be able to provide any new information. 
b) An explanation of the search is not really necessary 
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(see (v) below and section 4.5 for a fuller 
explanation of this point) 
c) The results of the hazard identification are most 
often studied on the completion of the study. There is 
little need to examine each stage of the search. 
v) The search for causes and effects is not one that 
develops through a great number of levels. The 
connections between the levels are also relatively 
obvious. For example, searching for causes of no flow, at 
a centrifugal pump results in the development of "pump 
fails". This cause of no flow when further developed 
leads to, say, "impeller failure". The connection between 
these various levels of the search is immediately 
apparent. 
The peculiarities listed above are some indication of the 
unusual nature of the application of expert systems techniques 
to a computer method for hazard identification. Some of the 
more appropriate approaches to developing such a computer 
method are listed in in the following sections with their 
inherent advantages and disadvantages. 
4.1.1 A Frame System 
It is not difficult to imagine an expert system for 
hazard identification that is based on knowledge frames. The 
advantages are that such a system would mimic more closely the 
thought processes of a human expert. The disadvantage of this 
approach is that it is speculative. A great deal of 
information would have to be processed into different frames. 
There are also a great many ways to structure a frame system 
such as this. One of the peculiarities of hazard 
identification listed in 4.1 was that the control knowledge of 
the problem represented a large proportion of the total 
knowledge required. One of the disadvantages of frame systems 
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is the difficulty of representing control information. Thus, a 
system based purely on frames is considered to be not ideally 
suited to the task of hazard identification. 
4.1.2 A Production System 
This would be the purists' approach to the problem. An 
expert shell would be fed with the rules, or productions, 
gleaned from a set of conventionally performed HAZOP studies. 
These productions would then be applied to subsequent hazard 
identification sessions. The main problem with this approach 
is that breaking down the results of conventional" HAZOP 
studies and formulating that knowledge into productions is an 
enormous task. Consider the cases of isolation valves either 
side of a pump. Possible productions for this system might be 
as follows. 
IF isolation valve shut 
AND isolation valve downstream of pump 
THEN overheating of pump 
AND pressure in line upto isolation valve taken up to 
end-of-curve pressure of pump. 
IF isolation valve shut 
AND isolation valve upstream of pump 
THEN possible cavitation of process fluid in pump 
As the above example illustrates, productions for every 
eventuality would result in a huge number of rules. Also, the 
nature of hazard identification is such that predetermination 
of the extent of the knowledge base is not really feasible. 
There are infinite variations in the situations proposed by a 
HAZOP study, so is it really possible to get production rules 
to cover every eventuality? The answer is that ultimately, 
yes, it should be possible. The difficulties that can be 
foreseen are that the development of such a system would take 
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many, many man-years of effort and that the knowledge base 
would contain so many rules that control of the rules would 
pose grave problems. 
Production systems have a great many strengths relevant 
to hazard identification but a system based purely on 
production rules would be difficult to formulate and utilise 
efficiently. 
4.1.3 Semantic Networks 
It may be possible to use a semantic network for hazard 
identification, but the size of the network so developed would 
be immense. Controlling and managing the knowledge contained 
within the network would be impossible. The use of a semantic 
network is not really viable. 
4.2 Selection of an Approach for a Computer Aid for Hazard 
Identification 
It has been illustrated, in 4.1, that the hazard 
identification problem is unusual. It has also been argued, 
again in 4.1, that the conventional approaches to developing 
expert systems are not particularly suited to this task. The 
solution must be to use the best attributes of the different 
conventional approaches and, somehow, combine them. 
The biggest advantage of production systems is the ease 
with which control knowledge can be represented. Control 
knowledge in the case of hazard identification is the 
knowledge of how to identify the hazards given knowledge of 
the plant configuration, the process units and the process 
materials. The major advantage of frame systems, on the other 
hand, is the ability to encapsulate a frame of knowledge about 
one particular object. Thus, it is plain to see that frames 
could be used to represent the knowledge on each of the 
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process units, on the plant configuration and the process 
materials. 
-Fo 
The solution thus seems to be, (employ a production system 
that knows how to perform the hazard identification calling up 
and referring to frames that know about the different process 
units, process materials and the plant configuration. This is 
the approach that has been taken in this work. 
4.3 Knowledge Representation Problem 
After having decided, in section 4.2, on a technique to 
adopt, the next stage is to develop a strategy to implement 
the technique. 
Let us examine the demarcation of the various types and 
forms of knowledge. Consider, first, the frames that know 
about the different process units and process materials. Most 
of these frames will not be peculiar to the study of just one 
particular plant. These frames will be used in different 
combinations for different studies. Thus, it would seem that 
the creation of a library of such frames to be used as and 
when necessary is the logical next step. Next, consider the 
frame that contains the knowledge of the process plant 
configuration. This configuration frame is, stating the 
obvious, unique and refers only to the plant configuration of 
the one particular study. 
The control knowledge, or knowledge of how to perform the 
hazard identification is, of course, generic to all the 
studies. This control knowledge calls up the various frames 
already referred to, in order to produce the results of the 
hazard identification. This flow of knowledge, for a HAZOP 
study, is represented by the schematic diagram of Figure 4.1. 
The boxes in the diagram denote the different types of 
knowledge. The "Control Knowledge" box denotes the program 
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that contains the control knowledge. In this computer method, 
this program is termed "identifier". 
There is one major problem in the creation of the frames 
that are used by the control knowledge. The user would have to 
ensure that the knowledge contained in the frames obeys all 
the rules of grammar and syntax demanded by the control 
knowledge. It is in order to reduce the tedium of following 
these rules of grammar and syntax that programs were developed 
to take in knowledge written in a simple way and "translate" 
this into knowledge written in the desired form. There are 
three of these programs. 
- "unit model_maker" to help create the frames containing 
the knowledge of the process units 
- "material modeller" to help create the frames 
containing the knowledge of the process materials 
- "configurator" to help create the frame containing the 
knowledge of the process plant configuration under 
study 
There is also a program to convert the results of the 
hazard identification as produced by the "identifier" program 
into a form closer to that of a conventional HAZOP document. 
This program, termed "compacter", has the function of 
translating between the "identifier" and the end user. The 
interaction of all these programs and the frames of knowledge 
is best illustrated by the schematic diagram of Figure 4.2. 
The arrows represent the flow of knowledge. The computer 
programs are indicated in italics. 
Although the main function of the programs 
"unit-model-maker".. "material modeller", "configurator" and 
"compacter" is that of translation they do perform other 
important tasks. These tasks are described fully in the 
following sections. 
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4.3.1 Knowledge Embodied in "unit model maker" 
The "unit-model-Maker" program is one that is essentially 
a translator. The program encompasses the following items of 
knowledge. 
i) There are three basic types of information on a 
process unit: 
a) propagation equations 
b) initial event (fault condition) statements 
c) terminal event (effect) statements 
ii) The procedure for translating each of the three 
types of information in (i) above into rules 
acceptable to the "identifier" program". 
The function of the "unit model_maker" program is thus to 
query the user for the different types of information and then 
to translate them into rules. These rules are written to an 
ASCII file to be called up by "identifier". 
The first of the three different types of information is. 
the propagation equation. This describes the propagation of 
process deviations through the unit. For example, one would 
expect that the deviations in level in a tank would be of the 
same sign, positive or negative, as the deviations in flow 
into the tank but be of the opposite sign to the deviation in 
flow out of the tank. This point is better demonstrated by 
using the diagram below. 
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Figure 4.3 Tank 
Note that the points 1,2 and 3 in the diagram are hereafter 
referred to as ports 1,2 and 3. 
We would expect the following : 
flow high at port 1 gives level high at port 3 
flow high at port 2 gives level low at port 3 
flow low at port 1 gives level low at port 3 
flow low at port 2 gives level high at port 3 
The four transitional statements above could be re-written as 
one propagation equation. 
13=f (ql, -q2 ) 
The above statement is read as "deviations in level at port 3 
are (a function) of the same sign as deviations in flow at 
port 1 and of the opposite sign to deviations in flow at port 
2". This example will have demonstrated the simplicity of 
using propagation equations to represent the propagation of 
process deviations through process units. 
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The two other types of information are initial event 
statements and terminal event statements. These two categories 
of information are identical in their structure and will be 
jointly referred to as event statements. The difference 
between an initial event statement and a terminal event 
statement is that the former describes how a fault in the unit 
initiates a process deviation and the latter describes how a 
process deviation terminates in a fault at the unit. This 
point is explained in rather greater detail in Chapter 5. 
Consider, as an example, the modelling of a centrifugal pump 
as shown below. 
O 
O 
Figure 4.4 Centrifugal Pump 
In the modelling of this pump we may wish to express the 
following information. 
i) no flow will have as causes the failure of the pump motor 
or the pump impeller (an initial event statement) 
ii) low suction pressure will result in cavitation (a 
terminal event statement) 
The two statements above can most easily and clearly be 
expressed in the following manner. 
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motor failure, impeller failure>q2 NONE 
pl LO>cavitation 
The one problem of using propagation equations and event 
statements as in the examples above is their unintelligibility 
to the control knowledge, the "identifier" program. There are 
two ways to overcome this. The first is to build' an equation 
parser into the control knowledge. The second is to perform 
the parsing, or translation, in the "unit-model-maker" 
program. This second alternative is preferable for the 
following reasons. 
i) The logical alternative is to translate the equations and 
statements into rules as soon as they are input by the 
user. 
ii) (i) also means that errors in inputting the equations and 
statements are spotted at the earliest possible stage in 
the process. 
iii) The translation routine is rather easier to program into 
"unit-model-maker" than into "identifier". 
Thus, it has proved expedient to build the equation parser 
into "unit-model-maker". 
In summary, this section has detailed the function of the 
"unit-model-maker" program and has demonstrated the 
convenience of using propagation equations and event 
statements in the modelling of process units. Chapter 5 
discusses, in greater detail, the modelling of process units. 
4.3.2 Knowledge Embodied in Process Unit Model Library 
The process unit model library is the term for the 
collection of the ASCII files created by the 
"unit 
_model _maker". 
Each file represents the sum total of the 
knowledge on that particular unit. 
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It is prudent, at this stage, to note the advantages of 
using such a library. These advantages are listed below. 
i) Knowledge on the process units, the models, is retained 
indefinitely. 
The models are called up only as needed by the 
"identifier" program. The alternative would be to place 
all the information into one file and have it all called 
up. This is obviously a ludicrous waste of computer 
memory and time. Note that this would also vastly 
increase the search space for "identifier" resulting in 
greater use of computer time. 
iii) The process of addition of new models or amendment of 
existing models is simple. 
The models in the library contain, as stated in 4.3.1, 
the rules in a form that is comprehensible to the control 
knowledge. An illustration of this form is given, by 
considering the examples of 1.3.1. The correct form of the 
propagation equations given for the tank of 4.3.1 as viewed by 
"identifier" are is follows. 
rule(tank, p, [1,31, [[q, l]1, [[q, 2]1). 
The syntax of the rule conforms to that for PROLOG, the 
language that "identifier" is programmed in. It is easy, by 
inspection, to ascribe the various elements of the PROLOG rule 
to the propagation equation . Given below is the relation 
between the propagation equation and the elements of the 
PROLOG rule. 
tank - the name of the process unit model 
11,31 -a two element list giving the resultant process 
variable. 
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[[q, 11I -a list containing two element lists of all the 
deviations that will give rise to deviations of 
the same sign in the resultant process variable. 
[[q, 211 -a list containing two element lists of all the 
deviations that will give rise to deviations of 
the opposite sign in the resultant process 
variable. 
The two event statements of 4.3.1 are as follows. 
motor failure, impeller failure>q2 NONE 
pl LO>cavitation 
These statements when translated are converted into the PROLOG 
rules shown below. 
rule (pump, functional, [ ['motor failure', ' ['impeller 
failure', ' ', '']l, ([ q, 2, none ]I). 
rule(pump, effect, [ [p, l, low l ], [ ['cavitation', ' 
Again, by inspection, it is easy to determine the function of 
each of the elements of the PROLOG text rules. Consider the 
second of the two PROLOG text rules shown above. 
pump - the name of the process unit model 
effect - the category that this particular rule falls 
into 
Ifp, l, low]] -a list containing three element lists giving 
the causes 
(('cavitation', ' ', ' ']] -- 
-a list containing three element lists giving 
the consequences 
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4.3.3 Knowledge Embodied in "configurator" and the 
Configuration File 
Basically, the configuration file contains all the 
configuration information pertinent to the current study 
whilst the "configurator" program allows the user to create 
the configuration file. 
The program "configurator" first queries the user for the 
names assigned to the process units of the configuration and 
the process unit models assigned to those units. For each 
unit, the existence of the model is verified. The model will 
not be accepted by the "configurator" program unless it exists 
in the model library. Once the names and models of the process 
units have been input, the program asks for information on the 
connections between those units. This information is input in 
the form of links, one at a time, between the inlet and outlet 
ports. For instance, the fact that the outlet of a pump (port 
2) is connected to the inlet of a non-return valve (port 1) is 
expressed by the link below. 
pump 2 non-return valve 1 
After all this information is input, "configurator" 
divides the units into process lines and process vessels. The 
purpose of this division is to replicate the manual HAZOP 
study which proceeds on a line-by-line basis. The foundation 
of the division into process lines and process vessels is the 
definition of a process line. For the purposes of this 
computer method the definition of a process line is as 
follows. A process line is a number of in-line units connected 
together and bound at either end by a vessel. Vessels are 
defined, in this computer method, as units that either contain 
an inventory or have other than just one inlet and one outlet. 
Thus, a divider is considered to be a process vessel on the 
basis of its two outlet ports. This is illustrated by Figure 
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4.5. According to a manual HAZOP study this diagram would be 
considered to have one process line; the one from the tank to 
the sinks. For this computer method the diagram is said to be 
composed of three process lines. These are listed below. 
i) from the tank to the t-piece (divider) 
ii) from the t-piece (divider) to sink 1 
iii) from the t-piece (divider) to sink 2 
sinks 
2 
Figure 4.5 Flow Scheme - Tank to Two Sinks 
The "configurator" program calls up files containing 
information on the process unit models in the library and uses 
this to convert the keyed-in information into process lines. 
This simplifies and reduces, considerably, the information 
that the user needs to provide to "configurator". 
"configurator" also queries the user for the process 
material carried within each process line and for information 
relating to the materials of construction. The materials of 
construction information is treated as part of-the generic 
pipe unit (see 4.3.5 (v)). Information on the different 
impurities referenced in the configuration is also requested. 
This just requires the user to type in the impurities that may 
occur in the configuration. 
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Summarising, the "configurator" program embodies the 
knowledge required to perform the following functions. 
i) Query the user for and accept information on the process 
units and the links between those units. 
ii) Convert the information gleaned in (i) above into 
knowledge of the process lines in the configuration. 
iii) Query the user for knowledge on the process material 
carried in the process lines. 
iv) Query the user for the consequences of process deviations 
on the materials of construction. 
v) Translate the knowledge of (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) 
above into a form amenable to "identifier" and write this 
to a configuration file. 
4.3.4 Knowledge Embodied in Process Materials Properties 
Models 
Each of the process materials properties models contains 
all the knowledge relevant to that particular process fluid. 
The advantages of using a library of models as opposed to just 
a single file containing the knowledge of all process fluids 
are analogous to the advantages concerning a library of 
process unit models. These have already been expounded on in 
4.3.2. 
The importance of process material models is easily 
demonstrated. Let us say the "identifier" program is searching 
for the consequences of a leak of the material. It would be 
possible for "identifier" to have a prepared list of the 
consequences of a leak; say, fire hazard, explosion hazard 
etc. Now, this would be fine if the process material under 
consideration is propylene. But, say the process material was 
water. It would be totally wrong to flag the consequences of a 
leak of water as a fire or explosion hazard. The problem of 
differentiating between the two cases is obviously best 
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overcome by the use of models of the process materials. 
Each of the material models contains the information on 
the consequences, on the material, of each of the process 
deviations. Thus, for example, the following items of 
knowledge would be contained in the process material models. 
- low temperature on water may lead to freezing 
-a leak of gasoline may lead to fire 
- low pressure on liquid propane may lead to the flashing off 
of the propane 
- blockage in a line containing olefin may be the result of 
polymerisation 
- blockage in a line containing sea-water may be caused by 
entrained sea-weed 
It is important to note that the items above form two 
different types of rules. The first three examples are those 
of the effects of a process deviation on the process material. 
The last two examples are those of the properties of the 
material which may result in one of a predefined set of 
conditions. This predefined set of conditions is described 
later in this section. The above examples demonstrate that 
process material models do perform an essential role. 
The process material models need, as do the process unit 
models and the configuration file, to be in a form legible to 
"identifier" and in a form acceptable to PROLOG, the language 
that "identifier" is coded in. As before, to save the user 
having to follow unfamiliar rules of syntax and grammar, a 
FORTRAN program, "material_modeller" has been developed. This 
will prompt the user for the definition of the relevant 
properties of the material and output these, in the correct 
form, to an ASCII file. This file is then called up by 
"identifier". 
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The "material modeller" program contains the following 
items of knowledge. 
i) Knowledge of 'a set of keywords. This is the predefined 
set of conditions referred to above (see also 8.2.1). An 
illustrative list of keywords is given below: 
- blockage 
- cavitation 
- flashing 
- boiling 
- freezing 
- vaporisation 
These keywords are used by "identifier" in the following 
way. When searching for causes of a particular deviation 
each cause is checked to see if it belongs to the set of 
keywords. If the cause does belong to the set then the 
material model is checked for causes of the keyword. Note 
that the list of keywords can be changed readily by 
adapting "identifier" and "material modeller". 
ii) Knowledge of the process deviations that are studied by 
"identifier". This knowledge is used to prompt the user 
for the effects of those deviations on the process 
material. 
iii) Knowledge of how to convert the information input by the 
user into a form suitable for "identifier". 
Modelling of process materials is discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter 5. 
11 
89 
4.3.5 Knowledge Embodied in "identifier" 
The program "identifier" represents the control knowledge 
of the hazard identification problem. This is the "how to do 
it" knowledge of the problem. In theory, "identifier" should 
contain simply the knowledge associated with the process of 
identifying the hazards. In practice, "identifier" also 
contains bits of knowledge that enable it to perform the 
identification in a rather more efficient manner. These 
additional bits of knowledge could, thus, be termed-heuristics 
or rules of thumb allied to the control knowledge for the 
hazard identification. Note that some of these heuristics are 
actually concerned with modifying the approach of the 
conventional HAZOP study procedure for use in a computer 
method. The significant items of knowledge embodied in 
"identifier" are listed below. 
i) The process of performing the hazard identification. 
Conventional HAZOP studies adopt the approach where 
first, a vessel is selected, then all the lines off the 
selected vessel are studied and then the selected vessel 
is studied. Now a human team may drop this systematic 
approach if they happen on one particularly hazardous or 
notable event. Consider the diagram below. 
Figure 4.6 Schematic of Reactor Unit 
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If, in a conventional HAZOP study, the team were 
examining the glycol line to the reactant preheater then 
under NO FLOW the team would cite as possible 
consequences the following :- reactant stream 
temperature low, poor conversion in reactor, high 
concentration of reactant in product stream. Notice that 
the study team have jumped from line to vessel to line 
in their consideration of the consequences. This is 
because the team have spotted something important and 
followed it through. After the documentation of this set 
of consequences the team revert to the original point of 
study, the glycol line to the preheater. On the other 
hand, a computer program cannot, realistically, be 
expected to mimic this behaviour. The procedure followed 
by the computer method is to save the consequences at 
the point at which they propagate from the current scope 
of study to another line or vessel. Referring back to 
the above example, this logical approach would proceed 
as follows. 
Considering the glycol line to the preheater 
no flow has consequences no flow through heat exchanger 
and low temperature of reactant in heat exchanger 
Considering the heat exchanger : 
low temperature out of reactant stream has cause no flow 
in glycol line 
Considering the reactant line between the heat exchanger 
and the reactor : 
low temperature has cause low temperature out of 'heat 
exchanger 
low temperature has consequence low temperature in 
reactor 
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Considering the reactor : 
low temperature has cause low temperature in inlet to 
reactor 
low temperature has consequences poor conversion and 
high concentration of reactant 
Thus, "identifier" has a facility that allows it to save 
the consequences at the ends of process lines and the 
outlets of process vessels. These saved effects are 
called up when the corresponding line or vessel is being 
studied. This process of saving and recalling the 
consequences is further described in (vi) below. In 
summary, this item of knowledge allows "identifier" to 
break down and systematically study the lines and 
vessels of a process plant configuration. 
ii) The knowledge of what files or models to call up. This 
applies to both process material models and to process 
unit models. Strictly speaking, this knowledge is 
actually transferred to "identifier" in the 
configuration file. The user is prompted by "identifier" 
for the title of the current study. "identifier" then 
calls up the configuration file for that study. The 
configuration file is then consulted for the lists of 
models, process unit and process material, to call up. 
iii) Knowledge of process deviations. This exists in the form 
of a list of the process deviations that "identifier" is 
to use in the HAZOP study. The process deviations are 
divided into two types: those that are applied to just 
process vessels and those that are applied to process 
lines as well as process vessels. In the first category 
are the deviations concerned with level; "level high" 
and "level low". In the second are the deviations 
dealing with flow, pressure and temperature. 
"identifier" actually distinguishes between these two 
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types of deviation in their application. Clearly, "high 
level" cannot be applied to a process line. The full 
list of process deviations that "identifier" goes 
through is given below. 
Vessel process deviations Vessel and line process 
deviations 
level high 
level low 
pressure high 
pressure low 
flow none 
flow low 
flow high 
pressure high 
pressure low 
temperature high 
temperature low 
escape 
The above list contains an immediately noticeable item - 
one that is not present in the conventional lists of 
process deviations. "Escape" is not a process deviation 
as such but is used in this computer method to overcome 
the problem of modelling leaks. Leaks can have two 
effects. One is to reduce flow in the containment and 
the other is to contaminate the low pressure side, 
usually the atmosphere. Leaks that are large enough to 
cause "flow none" or "flow low" can be dealt with by the 
appropriate process deviation. However,, the handling of 
the contamination effects of leaks is not 
straightforward with the standard set of process 
deviations. Here, there is a distinction between 
contamination of another process fluid and contamination 
of the atmosphere. The former should be built into the 
equipment model for any equipment where there is 
potential for such contact - heat exchangers are the 
obvious example. For the latter, a new deviation, 
"escape", is the solution. The causes of "escape" are, 
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thus, the leak faults in the equipment models. The 
consequences for the deviation "escape" are on the 
process material itself. For instance, if the material 
is flammable, the consequences of escape would be 
"possibility of fire". 
iv) How to search for causes and consequences. This 
knowledge is that required to search through the rules 
on a particular process unit for causes and consequences 
of a process deviation. This includes the knowledge of 
the structure of the rules in the models of the process 
units and the process materials. Note that there are 
differences in the way that different process deviations 
are handled. This point has already been touched upon in 
the previous section but it is profitably reiterated 
here. The deviations in level can only sensibly be 
applied to vessels and thus the application of the level 
deviations is so restricted. Considering the deviation 
"escape" it is readily apparent that although the causes 
of "escape" are to be found in the equipment models, the 
consequences will be found in the appropriate process 
material model. Thus, the search for the consequences of 
"escape" is restricted to the process material model. 
The search for the causes or consequences develops 
through as many levels as necessary. For instance, in 
the search for causes of "low flow" at a pump we may go 
through the following stages. 
"pump efficiency loss" leads to "flow low" 
"pump blockage, impeller damage, motor damage" leads to 
"pump efficiency loss" 
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v) The use of a generic pipe unit. This counters the 
problem of how to deal with the causes and consequences 
that are general to the process line as a whole. For 
example, a cause of low temperature in a process line 
may be cold weather. However, this is a cause of low 
temperature also at every other unit in the process 
line. There is no point in flagging this cause at every 
unit and swamping the output with needless duplication. 
A generic unit, the pipe unit, takes care of causes and 
consequences that are common to the process line. The 
unit model library contains a generic pipe unit. Note 
that "identifier" automatically consults the pipe unit 
for every single process line studied (see (vi) below). 
vi) The search along a process line. This section deals with 
the procedure that is followed when searching a selected 
process line. The source vessel is first considered for 
causes and consequences of the process deviation. The 
source vessel is also checked for any effects of 
deviations in previously studied process lines that may 
have been saved at the source vessel. Next, the search 
down the process line itself. This commences with the 
search on the generic pipe unit. This will take care of 
any causes and consequences common to the whole process 
line (see (v) above) and to the materials of 
construction model (see 1.3.3). Then, the units in the 
process line are studied, in turn, all the way down to 
the drain vessel. At the drain vessel, the vessel is 
first searched for causes and consequences of the 
deviation, then the propagation rules at the vessel are 
used to save those effects of the process deviation that 
are themselves process deviations. These saved effects 
will be called up by a later search. The final element 
of the search on a process line is a check on whether or 
not the process deviation will have any consequences on 
the process material contained within the line (see 
95 
(viii) below). 
vii) Keywords for causes. There is a set of keywords that is 
used to model the process material (see 4.3.4 and 
8.2.1). If, during the search for causes of a particular 
process deviation at a unit, a cause is matched to one 
of the keywords then the process material model for that 
line is consulted. This consultation consists, of a 
check for any properties of the process material that 
may give rise to that particular keyword. 
viii) Searching for the consequences of the process deviation 
on the process material. Part of the search on the 
process line (see (vii) above) is a check on the 
possible effects of the process deviation on the process 
material. The process material model (see 4.3.4) is 
. consulted for the existence of rules that identify the 
effects of the process deviation on the material. 
ix) Output of the results of the search. There are three 
output options available. These are 
a) Output to the terminal for the immediate perusal of 
the user 
b) Output to a file to be used by "compacter" 
c) Combination of (a) and (b) above 
Options (b) and (c) result in the creation of a file 
that is used by "compacter" to produce a HAZOP-like 
document (see 4.3.6). Options (a) and (c) allow the 
results of each stage of the search to be printed out 
directly after each stage is completed. The output to 
the terminal is intended only as a tool for development 
and debugging. Option (b) is the usual choice. 
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4.3.6 Knowledge Embodied in. "compacter" 
The program "compacter" converts a file produced by 
"identifier" into a document closely resembling a HAZOP 
worksheet. This conversion to a HAZOP-type document involves 
considerable pruning and manipulation of the raw results 
produced by "identifier". These pruning operations are more 
extensively described below. 
i) Deleting items that appear more than once. Due to the 
nature of the search strategy employed by "identifier", 
it is quite often the case that the same entry is 
repeated under a list of causes or consequences of a 
process deviation. This is obviously undesirable and 
"compacter" checks the list of causes and consequences of 
each process deviation and deletes the duplicated items 
in each list. 
ii) Sorting each list of causes or consequences so that units 
that are of the same type or model have only one entry in 
the list. This point is clarified as follows. A process 
line may, along its length, have a number of units that 
are exactly the same. The best illustration of this is 
the fact that a process line may have a great many 
isolation valves built into it. There is no point in, 
say, flagging the cause of the deviation "no flow" as 
"isolation valve shut" at every single one of the valves. 
It is better to collect together all the valves and print 
them out with the one entry "isolation valve shut". This 
is done by "compacter" not only for "no flow" and 
isolation valves but also for the other sets of variable 
deviations and the different types of process units. 
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4.4 Overview of the Computer Method 
This computer method is actually a suite of programs. 
Consider again the diagram of Figure 4.2. There are two model 
generation programs: "unit 
- 
model-maker" and 
"material modeller". The first receives the unit model data 
from the user and generates a set of rules for the 
hazard identification program "identifier". This set of rules 
is stored in a library of such models. The second performs a 
similar task, but for the process material. The program 
"configurator" receives from the user the plant configuration 
data, including the specification of. the unit models and 
process material models. Data on the materials of construction 
is also entered into "configurator". 
"configurator" produces as its output a configuration 
file for use by the hazard identification program 
"identifier". "identifier" calls up the unit and process 
material models from the libraries and generates as output, 
lists of variable deviations and associated causes and 
consequences. This hazard identification data is used by the 
program "compacter" to produce the hazard identification 
table. 
"identifier" is written in PROLOG and the other programs 
in FORTRAN 77. The programs have been developed and run on a 
Honeywell Multics DPS8. 
Listings of all the programs can be found in the 
appendices. 
4.5 Expert System Features 
Even though this chapter has concentrated on an expert 
systems type approach to producing an aid to hazard 
identification, this computer method has not been developed 
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explicitly as an expert system. Following expert systems 
philosophy has resulted in this computer method displaying 
some of the features of an expert system, albeit of a special 
type. Chapter 3 describes an expert system as comprising, 
typically, the following :- 
i) Knowledge base 
ii) Inference engine 
iii) Knowledge acquisition facility 
iv) Explanation facility 
These features are discussed in turn. 
i) Knowledge base : Yes, there is a knowledge base although 
it exists in a rather unusual form. The knowledge base 
consists of the model library and the plant 
configuration. 
ii) Inference engine : Yes, an inference engine does exist. 
This is actually the "identifier" program which contains 
the rules and procedures for the manipulation of the 
knowledge base. 
iii) Knowledge acquisition facility : This computer method 
does not have a direct way of increasing its knowledge 
about the problem. New heuristics for the manipulation of 
the knowledge base cannot be "acquired" by the program 
itself. However, there does exist a facility for 
expanding or renewing the knowledge base, the library of 
unit models. New models can be added to the library and 
old models may be changed. Thus, there is a knowledge 
acquisition facility, of sorts. 
iv) Explanation facility : There is no overt explanation 
facility. Once the hazard identification table is 
produced, the reasons for the listings of causes and 
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consequences are usually fairly clear. The search for 
causes and consequences of the process deviation is a 
simple one; one that does not employ a great depth of 
search. The process variable deviation is also the 
explanatory link between the tables of causes and 
consequences. Thus, it is highly improbable that the 
results of the search would need further explanation or 
justification especially if, as in this case, the 
intended audience is knowledgeable about the domain. 
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5 Modelling 
This chapter deals specifically with the philosophy of 
the modelling of all the different components required by this 
computer method. The actual practicalities of modelling, using 
the different modelling programs, are described in the User 
Manual, Chapter 8. There are four different types of models. 
These are process units, process materials, materials of 
construction and plant configuration. 
5.1 Modelling of Process Units 
Process units are divided into two classes, in-line units 
and vessels. For the purposes of this computer method in-line 
units are defined as having only one inlet and one outlet and 
have negligible inventory. All the units that cannot be 
classified as in-line are termed process vessels. The 
peculiarities of process vessels will be discussed in a later 
section of this chapter (5.1.3). 
The model of a process unit describes the propagation of 
process variable deviations through the unit and the 
initiation and termination of these deviations at the unit. 
The transmission of process deviations through a healthy unit 
is described by the use of propagation equations. The 
initiation and termination of process deviations at the unit 
are described by a set of event statements. 
The modelling of fault propagation involves the 
representation of the propagation of input process variable 
deviations and also of the initiation and termination of these 
deviations. Generally, fault initiation involves the relation 
Initial fault : Process variable deviation 
fault propagation the relation 
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Process variable deviation : Process variable deviation 
and fault termination the relation 
Process variable deviation : Terminal fault 
The initial and terminal faults are respectively the cause and 
consequence events. 
Process units may have one or more inlets and one or more 
outlets. These inlets and outlets, or ports, need to be 
uniquely identified. Thus, each port is assigned a number. In- 
line units normally have port 1 assigned to the inlet and port 
2 assigned to the outlet. The numbering of ports for process 
vessels is discussed in 5.1.3. 
5.1.1 Propagation Equations 
Propagation equations are functional equations that 
describe the relation between an output process variable of a 
unit and the other output and inlet process variables. This 
relationship is described, not in terms of exact mathematical 
equations but just positive and negative deviations. For 
example if z is an output variable and if x and y are the two 
input variables which affect z such that an increase in z is 
caused by an increase in x or a decrease in y (or vice versa), 
the functional equation is 
z=f(x, -y) 
The above equation has been simplified by the omission of the 
port numbers. If the unit was an in-line unit with port 1 as 
its inlet and port 2 as its outlet then we would have the 
propagation equation 
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z2=f(xl, -yl) 
Propagation equations for in-line units are used in this 
computer method to describe the propagation only in the 
direction of flow. The reason for this is that when searching 
for causes and consequences of process deviations the process 
line is treated as a whole. It does not matter whether the 
unit where the fault was initiated, unit x, is upstream or 
downstream of unit y. The link between the causes and 
consequences listed for a particular process variable 
deviation is the variable deviation itself. In general, most 
of the causes result in most but not all of the consequences 
and most of the consequences result from most but not all of 
the causes. This point is clarified with the aid of an 
example. Consider the section of process line shown in Figure 
5.1. 
><OII 
Figure 5.1 Section of Process Line 
The search for causes and consequences of no flow along the 
line will result in the following lists. 
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Causes Consequences 
valve directed shut pump overheats 
pump stopped 
orifice blocked 
pipe fracture 
Now, clearly, if no flow was due to "pump stopped" we 
would not have the consequence "pump overheats". If the line 
fracture was upstream of the pump, then we may have the 
consequence "pump overheats" but not if the line fracture was 
downstream of the pump. The link between the causes and the 
consequences is the deviation itself. There are no direct 
links between items in the two lists. The fault, "valve 
directed shut", is simply one cause of no flow and "pump 
overheats"-is-simply one consequence of no flow. Thus, there 
is no need to propagate upstream or downstream the process 
deviations resulting from each individual fault. However, the 
propagation equations in the direction of flow do perform two 
useful functions. The first is that they indicate whether or 
not the unit is open to the process variable. Consider the 
case of a process line that contains a closed isolation valve. 
Here, no flow is the NORMAL state. The unit is not open to 
flow or any other process deviation. (In fact, the only faults 
relate to flow leaking through the valve). Thus, the model for 
a closed isolation valve will not contain any propagation 
equations. This will indicate that the valve will not transmit 
flow or any other process variable. The second function of the 
propagation equations is to indicate the effect on the outlet 
variables of deviations in the inlet variables. This can be 
useful when an in-line unit is such that an outlet variable is 
dependent on some other process variable. For example, 
consider a gas compressor where the flow and pressure energy 
of the gas is increased by the work done on it by the 
compressor. In such a unit, it may be that at high flows, this 
process becomes more inefficient resulting in more of the 
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energy going to raise the temperature in the gas. This 
relationship could be expressed as 
t2=f(tl, ql) 
i. e. an increase in temperature out will result from an 
increase in either the temperature in or from an increase in 
flow in. 
The propagation of faults from one process line to 
another is treated rather differently. The bridge between two 
process lines is the process vessel. Here, the propagation of 
faults is extremely important. The special points relating to 
process vessels will be dealt with in 5.1.3. 
5.1.2 Event Statements 
Event statements describe the initiation of a fault in an 
unhealthy unit or a termination of a fault in a unit which is 
thereby rendered unhealthy. Thus, there are two types of event 
statements, initial event statements and terminal event 
statements. 
5.1.2.1 Initial Event Statements 
An initial event statement is used to model the 
initiation, by a fault, of a set of variable deviations and 
takes the form 
Initial fault : Process variable deviation 
The completeness of the identification of causes depends on 
the completeness of the set of initial events. In configuring 
a model it is helpful to refer to the characteristics of a 
process unit listed below : 
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- Function 
- Hydraulics 
- Containment 
- Environment 
A process unit has a particular function. For example, it 
is the function of the pump, shown in Figure 5.2, to increase 
the pressure and thus cause flow in a process line. 
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Figure 5.2 Pump 
One function fault in such a unit is that a motor fault 
results in no flow and low pressure. This fault can be 
represented by the initial event statement 
motor fault>q2 NONE, p2 LO 
This is equivalent to the statement that if a motor fault 
occurs then q2 NONE and p2 LO may result. 
A process unit also has a hydraulic function. For 
example, it is the function of the pipe, shown in Figure 5.3, 
to transmit the fluid flowing through it. 
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Figure 5.3 Pipe 
Thus, one hydraulic fault in such a unit is that blockage 
causes both the inlet and outlet flows to be zero. This is 
represented by the initial event statement 
blockage>ql NONE, q2 NONE 
Another function of a process unit is containment. For 
example, it is the function of the pipe shown in Figure 5.3 to 
contain the fluid flowing in it. Thus, one containment fault 
is that a leak causes the inlet flow to be high and the outlet 
flow to be low. This is represented by the initial event 
statement 
leak>ql HI, q2 LO 
There may be a transfer of heat between a process unit 
and the environment. For example, it is the function of a pipe 
to transmit the fluid flowing through it without change of 
temperature. Thus, one environment fault is that cold weather 
causes the outlet temperature to fall. This is represented by 
the initial event statement 
cold weather>t2 LO 
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5.1.2.2 Terminal Event Statements 
Information on how a fault terminates at a process unit 
is provided by the terminal event statements. A terminal event 
is used to represent the termination of a variable deviation 
in an undesired event, often a hazard, and takes the form 
Variable deviation : Terminal event 
Most terminal event statements relate to a serious excursion 
of a process variable such as pressure, temperature or level. 
A typical terminal event statement is 
13 HI>overfilling 
A terminal event statement may be made conditional on some 
property of the process materials in the unit or of the 
materials of construction of the unit. Thus, the terminal 
event statement 
t2 LO>undertemperature 
and hence brittle fracture may be made conditional on the 
material of construction. 
Some events, notably leak and blockage, can be both 
initial and terminal events. 
5.1.3 Process Lines and Process Vessels 
This section deals with the differences in the way that 
process lines and process vessels are handled. 
The first point of difference between in-line units and 
process vessels is the assignation of numbers to the ports, 
the inlets and outlets. Process vessels in this computer 
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method are by definition process units that have other than 
just one inlet and one outlet or process units that have a 
significant inventory. Thus, for example, a heat exchanger is 
considered a vessel and so is a binary header. Unlike the case 
of in-line units, there is no convention for the numbering of 
ports of vessels. The creator of a model will assign port 
numbers, starting from 1, as is deemed logical. It is 
important to note that where it is intended to refer to 
process variables inside a vessel, a port number be assigned 
to the inside. Of course, this is not an inlet or outlet, but 
an internal port is essential when propagation equations and 
event statements are to refer to say the level or pressure 
inside a vessel. For example, consider the vessel of Figure 
5.4. 
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Figure 5.4 Vessel 
It may be concluded that an increase in the level in the 
vessel will be due to either an increase in the flow in or a 
decrease in the flow out. The propagation equation for this 
relationship is thus 
13=f(ql, -q2) 
We may also wish to flag the terminal event "loss of'level" as 
a result of low level in the vessel. This would be done by the 
terminal event statement 
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13 LO>loss of level 
Internal ports are thus of critical importance in the 
modelling of a process vessel. 
Propagation equations for in-line units have already been 
discussed in 5.1.1. For process vessels, propagation equations 
have a special significance. They are the means by which 
deviations in one process line are transmitted to another 
process line. Thus, a fault may be initiated in one process 
line, propagated to another process line through a vessel and 
terminated in a unit in the second process line. 
There is only one difference between the formulation of 
event 'statements for process vessels and for in-line units. 
This is that for process vessels, event statements may refer 
to internal ports and to the process variables pressure and 
level. 
5.1.4 The Generic Pipe Model 
A process line as defined in a conventional HAZOP 
contains minor units such as handvalves and major units such 
as pumpsets. Since each unit will have in its cause list the 
common faults "leak (major)" and "blockage" a mechanistic 
modelling of the units and generation of the cause lists will 
lead to an excessive proliferation of these faults. The fault 
"leak (major)" is one that will lead to the consequence "flow 
low" or "flow none". Clearly, we can have "leak (major)" or 
"blockage" at any unit. The excessive proliferation of these 
faults is overcome by the use of the generic pipe model. The 
common faults are not entered in the models of the minor units 
and are entered instead in the generic pipe model. The common 
faults are, however, retained in the models of the major 
units. 
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At this stage, it is necessary to distinguish between 
"leak (major)" and "leak". The former has as consequence a 
deviation in flow whereas the latter is simply a cause of the 
deviation "escape". It is felt that unlike "leak (major)", 
leak should be entered as a cause of escape in every process 
unit. This is so that all the units are considered for all the 
different sorts of leak, e. g. a bonnet leak at a valve or a 
seal leak at a pump. 
Consultation of the generic pipe unit is automatically 
performed by the computer method. There is no need for the 
user to specify the inclusion of the pipe model in a process 
line. The computer method will include a pipe model in every 
single one of the process lines in the generation of causes 
and consequences. 
5.2 Modelling of Process Materials 
A process material model is created for each process 
material. This model defines the characteristics of the 
material in terms of its 
i) Properties 
ii) Susceptibilities 
A property is defined in this context as a characteristic 
which may lead unconditionally to a consequence without having 
to be activated by a process variable deviation. For example, 
a fluid may contain gunk which results in the unconditional 
consequence blockage. A susceptibility is defined as a 
characteristic which may lead to a consequence but only if it 
is activated by a process variable deviation. For example, a 
fluid may be susceptible, if the temperature is high, to 
polymerisation which thus results in the conditional 
consequence blockage. 
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When a generic fault such as blockage is encountered in 
the initial events in a unit model it is entered in the cause 
list. Unless, however, there are specific realisations, the 
fault has little credibility. A search is therefore made for 
credible specific realisations. 
It is convenient to enter specific realisations of faults 
in the consequence list rather than the cause list. This is 
primarily because, as just described, some of the realisations 
are conditional on process variable deviations. For example, 
polymerisation can be both a cause of blockage and a 
consequence of high temperature. If polymerisation can occur 
unconditionally then of course it is correct that it is 
entered as a property, a cause of blockage. If, on the other 
hand, polymerisation can only occur if the temperature is high 
then polymerisation is not a property but a susceptibility, a 
consequence of high temperature. 
Process materials also have one other type of 
characteristic. This is the set of attributes relevant to the 
escapes from containment of the process material. These 
attributes, the noxious results of escape, are treated as 
susceptibilities of the process deviation escape (The process 
deviation escape was introduced in Chapter 4 as a special 
feature of this computer method). For example, a certain 
hydrocarbon may be susceptible to fire or explosion on escape. 
Thus the deviation escape will have as consequence, a 
flammability hazard. 
For a process material, two searches are made in each 
process line. The first search is for any property of the 
material which results unconditionally in a specific 
realisation. These realisations are entered in the cause list. 
The second is for any combination of susceptibility and 
process variable deviation which results, due to fulfilment of 
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the deviation condition, in a specific realisation. Any such 
realisations are entered in the consequence list. 
Information on the process material carried within each 
process line is entered as part of the configuration data. 
5.3 Modelling of Materials of Construction 
A materials of construction model is created for each 
configuration. This model defines the characteristics of the 
material in terms of its susceptibilities. A susceptibility is 
defined, as before, as a characteristic which may lead to a 
consequence but only if it is activated by a process variable 
deviation. For example, a material of construction may be 
susceptible to leak by brittle fracture if the temperature is 
low. Thus, a search is made in each process line as part of 
the search on the generic pipe unit. This search is for any 
variable deviation which activates a susceptibility and 
results in a specific realisation. Any such realisations found 
are entered in the consequence list. 
Information on the materials of construction is entered 
as part of the configuration data. 
5.4 Modelling of the Process Plant Configuration 
Strictly speaking, the data file of the plant 
configuration is not a model. However, it does deserve a 
mention here because the process of system decomposition is in 
a sense modelling. 
System decomposition may be done at various levels of 
detail. These different levels may be illustrated by reference 
to a control loop. In a coarse decomposition the control loop 
is treated as a single item. At a finer level of detail, the 
loop may be decomposed into constituent parts such as sensor, 
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controller and control valve. A yet finer decomposition may 
involve considering the elements of the sensor such as the 
orifice plate and isolating valves in a flowmeter. 
In this computer method, the level of decomposition is at 
the coarser end of the spectrum. For example, a control loop, 
including its bypass, is treated as a single unit. 
The modelling of the plant configuration involves the 
following : 
i) Decomposition of the system. This will include the 
selection of the appropriate unit models to represent the 
units of the configuration. 
ii) Selection of process materials. This is simply the input 
of information regarding the process materials that are 
carried in the different process lines. 
iii) Selection of materials of construction. Again, this is 
simply the input of the model of the materials of 
construction. 
iv) Input of the impurities referenced. This is the keying in 
of the different impurities that will be referred to in 
the configuration. 
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6 Evaluation of Computer Method 
This chapter seeks to evaluate the performance of this 
computer method by running test cases through it. The process 
is to take HAZOP examples from the literature, run them 
through the computer method and then compare the results so 
produced with those published. 
The literature cases chosen to be used in this comparison 
had to satisfy a number of criteria. These were 
i) The processes involved had to be continuous. The method 
is restricted to continuous processes (see Chapter 7). 
Thus, all examples of batch or semi-batch operation were 
excluded. 
ii) The examples had to be manageable. Examples involving 
very large configurations would have required greater 
resources in planning, time and computing. This would 
have detracted from the emphasis on development that was 
the main aim of this work. 
iii) It would be advantageous to be able to perform 
comparisons on examples that were widely known. 
Two of the examples cited in Chapter 1 fitted the above 
criteria. These were 
1) HAZOP study on the feed section of a proposed olefin 
dimerisation plant (see 1.3.1). The main process unit in 
this plant is a vessel to separate the water from the 
olefin feed to a reactor. Hereafter this example is 
referred to as the water separator example. 
2) HAZOP study of a liquid propane transfer and vaporisation 
unit (see 1.3.4). This plant has the function of 
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transferring large quantities of propane to a buffer tank. 
Hereafter this example is referred to as the propane 
pipeline example. 
It is important to note here that the published records 
of these examples were intended purely for tutorial purposes. 
The records are not a complete account of the HAZOP study. 
They do not indicate what the HAZOP team actually discussed, 
what items they discarded as irrelevant or trivial, and so on. 
6.1 Water Separator Example 
The plant system is shown in Figure 6.1. The process 
description is 
"An alkane/alkene fraction containing small amounts of 
suspended water is pumped continuously from bulk 
intermediate storage via a half-mile pipeline section 
into a buffer/settling tank where residual water is 
settled out prior to passing via a feed/product heat 
exchanger to the reactor section. The water which has an 
adverse effect on the dimerisation reaction, is run off 
manually from the settling tank at intervals. Residence 
time in the reaction section must be held within closely 
defined limits to ensure adequate conversion of the 
alkene and to avoid excessive formation of polymer" 
6.1.1 Plant Configuration 
The plant system is given in the diagram of Figure 6.1. 
This is converted to the configuration diagram shown in Figure 
6.2. The individual units are joined by links and the vessels 
(including sources and sinks) by process lines. The links and 
line numbers are shown plain and circled respectively. The 
links of the configuration are converted into tabular form for 
input to the "configurator" program. This is shown in Table 
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6.1. 
The unit models are shown in Tables 6.2 and 6.3. Table 
6.2 lists the complete set of library models used, many of 
which appear several times. Table 6.3 identifies the unit 
models used for particular units in the configuration. 
All of the above information is entered into the 
"configurator" program. The program divides up the 
configuration into process lines and vessels and assigns the 
line numbers as indicated in Figure 6.2. After the input of a 
materials of construction model and the list of impurities, 
the program produces the configuration file. This 
configuration file "Water_sep. conf" is shown in its entirety 
in Appendix F. The unit and process material models referenced 
in this example are given in Appendix G. 
6.1.2 Hazard Identification 
The complete hazard identification table for the system 
is given in Appendix H. Table 6.4 gives a comparison of the 
results in Appendix H with those obtained by the industrial 
HAZOP team. 
There is reasonably good agreement between the two sets 
of results. There are, however, several points to be noted. 
These points are listed in the order in which they are 
demonstrated by the comparison. 
1) The causes and consequences generated by the computer 
method are restricted to the line under consideration and 
the vessels connected to it. The program does not look 
forward to consequences beyond the vessels. Thus, 
examination of "No flow" in Line 1 does not generate the 
consequence that polymerisation may occur in the heat 
119 
Table 6.1 Configuration Links for Water Separator Example 
Link UPSTREAM DOWNSTREAM 
No. UNIT PORT UNIT PORT 
1 sourcel 1 pumpt 1 
2 pump2 2 nrv3 1 
3 nrv3 2 meter/ 1 
4 meter4 2 pipelines 1 
5 pipelines 2 cntrl vl6 1 
6 cntrl_vl6 2 valve? 1 
7 valve? 2 settler8 1 
8 settler8 2 pump9 1 
9 pump9 2 dividerlO 1 
10 dividerlO 3 orificell 1 
11 orificell 2 valvel2 1 
12 valvel2 2 settler8 3 
13 dividerlO 2 cntrl v113 1 
14 cntrl v113 2 exchangl4 1 
15 exchangl4 2 sinkl5 1 
16 sourcel6 1 exchangl4 3 
17 exchangl4 4 sinkl5 1 
18 settler8 4 valvel8 1 
19 valvei8 2 sinkl9 1 
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Table 6.2 Library Models used for Water Separator Example 
hyd source 
pumpset_a 
nrv 
f q_c bypas 
pipeline 
cv c bypas 
valve 
settler 
divider 
orifice 
ht_exchg_a 
sink 
source 
1 21 
Table 6.3 Units and Models of the Water Separator Example 
UNIT 
sourcel 
pump2 
nrv3 
meter4 
pipeline5 
entrl_v16 
valve? 
settler8 
PUMP 9 
dividerlO 
orificell 
valve12 
cntrl viii 
exchangl4 
sinkl5 
sourcel6 
sinkl7 
valve18 
sinkl9 
MODEL 
hyd_source 
pumpset a 
nrv 
fq_c bypas 
pipeline 
cv_c bypas 
valve 
settler 
pump seta 
divider 
orifice 
valve 
cv_c bypas 
ht_exchg_a 
sink 
source 
sink 
valve 
sink 
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Table 6.4 
Comparison of Results for 
Water Separator Example 
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exchanger. This consequence is identified but not until 
examination of "No flow" in Line 4. Another example of 
this is that the item regarding loss of feed to reaction 
section appears in the output of the computer method as a 
loss of outflow from the settler. 
2) In the case of the results of the industrial HAZOP team 
there is interaction between the causes and consequences. 
The process that the HAZOP team follow is to identify a 
cause of the variable deviation and then to identify all 
the consequences that result. With the computer method, 
the link between causes and consequences is the deviation 
itself. This does not mean that the computer method is any 
less comprehensive. All the causes and consequences are 
picked up but are listed under the most appropriate 
deviation. Consider the example of "No flow" in Line 1. 
The industrial HAZOP team's results, with the interaction 
between the causes and consequences, *can be summarised as 
shown in the diagram of Figure 6.3. The arrows indicate 
which consequences stem from which causes. 
3) Consideration of "No flow" in Line 1, the diagram of 
Figure 6.3 and the output of the computer method leads one 
to conclude initially that although the list of causes is 
comprehensive, the list of consequences lacks the item 
referring to the material discharge onto the highway. 
However, this item is actually picked up under the 
deviation escape. Escape lists as one cause leak at the 
pipe and as a consequence the point that the material is 
olefin and that it has the noxious property of 
flammability. 
4) Interaction of the process materials models is illustrated 
by the list of causes of "No flow" in Line 1. One of the 
causes listed for the pump is "cavitation". This is one of 
the keywords referred to in 4.3.4. The computer method, on 
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CAUSES CONSEQUENCES 
Figure 6.3 
Interaction of Causes and Consequences in a HAZOP Study 
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encountering this keyword searches the model of the' 
process material for causes of "cavitation". This search 
results in "low b. pt. material" and "gassy material". 
5) The lists of causes generated by the computer method are 
more exhaustive than the lists generated by the industrial 
HAZOP team. This may be due to a number of reasons. It may 
be that the industrial HAZOP team will have discounted 
certain items on the basis of improbability or redundancy. 
It'may also be that certain items will have been 
considered inappropriate. Consider "No flow" in Line 1, 
the line from the intermediate storage to the buffer tank. 
An example of the discounting by probability may be the 
computer method cause at the pump "standby fail on 
demand". The pumps may be reliable enough and tested often 
enough to make this very improbable. An example of 
discounting by redundancy are the causes "control valve - 
isolation valve closed" and "valves - valve directed 
shut". The first item refers to the isolation valves 
either side of the control valve and the second item 
refers to the hand valves in the line. 'These two items are 
condensed to just "isolation valve closed" by the 
industrial'HAZOP team. Discounting on the basis of 
inappropriateness is shown by the computer method cause 
"pump - loss of NPSH". This may have been rejected by the 
HAZOP team on the basis that NPSH is irrelevant to this 
problem. - 
Regardless of the criticism afforded by the paragraph 
above, it is felt that the computer method is correct in 
flagging all possible causes. ' It is obviously better for 
example to list all the different modes of pump failure 
rather than to just flag "pump fails". One is looking for 
credible specific realisations of "pump fails", especially 
those connected with process fluid properties etc. This 
point applies also to the case of the isolation valves. It 
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is advisable to inform the user that there are isolation 
valves either side of the control valve which may cause no 
flow. Specific faults with their locations are better than 
a statement such as "isolation valve closed" which may 
lead to some valves being overlooked. 
6) Concerning the deviation "More temperature" in Line 1, the 
industrial HAZOP team have indicated the consequence 
"higher pressure in transfer line and settling tank". This 
consequence comes from the properties of the process 
material; a higher temperature would lead to a higher 
vapour pressure. The process model for the olefin 
indicates that higher. temperature will lead to a higher 
pressure, and thus this consequence of high temperature. is 
listed for the olefin. 
7) The industrial HAZOP team have listed, as a consequence of 
"Less temperature", "water sump and drain line freeze-up". 
The computer method, in its search at the settler, as part 
of the search on Line 1 (the settler is the drain vessel 
for Line 1), picks up this consequence. 
8) Considering the list of consequences, it is readily 
apparent that the computer method is more rigorous than 
, 
the industrial HAZOP team when listing the consequences of 
the deviation on the process material and the material of 
construction. For instance, according to the computer 
method "More temperature" in Line 1 has as a consequence 
the warning that the olefin is liable to polymerisation. 
The industrial HAZOP team do not flag this as a 
consequence. However, the computer method is not wrong 
because the only cause of high temperature the industrial 
HAZOP team have listed is that the source temperature is 
high. Maybe, the HAZOP team also recognised that the 
polymerisation process needs time and therefore discarded 
polymerisation. The process material model for olefin 
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indicates the fact that the olefin may polymerise if the 
temperature is deviated high. 
9) The deviation escape is one special feature of the 
computer method. Escape allows the highlighting of the 
noxious characteristics of the process material, the 
characteristics that would be realised if the process 
material were to escape from containment. In the case of 
olefin, flammability is the noxious characteristic. 
Note that the causes of escape are leaks at all the 
different units in the process line. It would be possible 
to specify the different sorts of leak the the different 
sorts of unit e. g. bonnet leaks at valves, seal leaks at 
pumps. This'has not been done here because distinguishing 
between the different leaks is not critical in this 
example. 
10) The points relating to the high concentrations of water 
and lower alkanes/alkenes and the presence of organic 
acids have been treated by the computer method as 
deviations high in the impurities water, lower 
alkanes/alkenes and organic acids. These three materials 
are referred to as impurities a, b and c respectively. The 
causes and consequences of these high impurity levels 
compare well with those of the industrial HAZOP team. 
11) The computer method does not have a facility to deal with 
the item regarding maintenance. Thus, the fact that Line 1 
cannot be completely drained or purged is not picked up 
(see Chapter 7). 
12) The computer method is not able to deal with the deviation 
reverse flow (see Chapter 7). 
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13) More flow in the line from the settling tank to the heat 
exchanger (Lines 2 and 4 in the computer method) 
demonstrates clearly the use of propagation equations. The 
heat exchanger has as consequences of more flow the 
deviations more flow out, lower temperature out and lower 
temperature out of the other stream. These points were not 
indicated by the industrial HAZOP team. 
14) The line from the buffer/settling tank to the'feed/product 
heat exchanger is considered by the computer method as 
Lines 2 and 4. This illustrates another point. The 
computer method will invariably divide the configuration 
into more process lines than the industrial HAZOPýteam. 
The basis of sectioning into process lines is essentially 
the same for both but is more rigorously followed by the 
computer method. The industrial HAZOP team do not consider 
a divider as the end of a process line whereas the 
computer method does. This difference is unavoidable if 
the computer method is to proceed with the hazard 
identification in a logical manner. 
Another example of this point is given by considering the 
sump drain line out of the settling tank. The industrial 
HAZOP team consider this as part of the settling tank but 
the computer method sees it as Line 8, leading from 
settler8 to sinkl9. 
15) There are a number of points that seem to be omitted by 
the computer method but are'actually listed elsewhere. An 
example of this occurs in the list of causes of "Less 
temperature" for the line from the buffer/settling tank to 
the heat exchanger. One cause listed by the industrial 
HAZOP team is fouling of the heat exchanger. The computer 
method does not have this listed for that section of line. 
However, the cause "tube fouling" is listed for 
"temperature low" for Line 5, the line out of the heat 
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exchanger. Clearly, Line 5 is the more logical point to 
flag the cause because that is where the deviation occurs. 
6.2 Propane Pipeline Example 
The plant system is shown in Figure 6.4. Refrigerated 
liquid propane is pumped from an atmospheric pressure storage 
tank via the tube side of a heater, where the temperature of 
the propane is raised to about +15 deg. C, through a 10-mile 
pipeline to a buffer tank at the consumer plant. The shell 
side of the propane heater contains glycol which is circulated 
by a group of pumps. The glycol passing to the propane heater 
is heated by LP steam via a heater situated just upstream of 
the propane heater. The temperature of the propane export is 
controlled by means of a 3-way valve in the glycol circulation 
system which permits bypassing of the propane heater as 
required. 
6.2.1 Plant Configuration 
The plant system given in the diagram in Figure 6.4 is 
converted to the configuration diagram shown in Figure 6.5. 
The links and line numbers are shown, as before, plain and 
circled respectively. The tabular form of the links of the 
configuration diagram is shown in Table 6.5. 
The unit models used in the configuration are shown in 
Tables 6.6 and 6.7. Table 6.6 lists the complete set of 
library models used, many of which appear several times. Table 
6.7 identifies the unit-models used for particular units in 
the configuration. 
All of the above information is entered into the 
"configurator" program along with the information on the 
materials of construction and impurities. The "configurator" 
program then produces the configuration file which, for this 
140 
6 -Q 
JI 
W 
1' 
`i 
bo`1 
JZý. 
J4O ý. 
Wx 
Z. < Ir Q6ifý 
Q 
a+ 
W1 x~ +Wi 
1 JJ 
t 
O' 
J 
a 
w 
Vtr 
_ 
az 
nYý 
Iw 
r 
º 3u 
r ww 
PrO fýFý 
f -1 
r-i 
E 
cc k 
a, 
a) 
A 
0 as c. a, 
0 
ao ;4 
"a 
w 
c. 
0 
6 
a) 
4Z 
Ea 
43 
A 
cc 
a 
w 
,jN 
lL N 
QrOýG 
X11 ý h. ý 
ýY 
ýr Y 
lz öu "2 
pý 
r=i 
G c: Ný 
WJN 
Z cc 0< 15 
2W_ u, l ýwN <I 
I. wJ 
` 
ý- Iy 
3ý 
r 
_. J 
ix 
SS.: IN 
'ýN 
,,, 
N9l 
i` 
ri_ 
:. tzI 
141 
0-^ 
f>,. ýD >Iý 
Ca0 
Q1 
N 
> Jy O 
.. C^ Q^ > 
C "-" p "ý N 
> 
O 
29(0 
. N ý 
L^ 
O 
(p i ;; 
C 
u O 
N 
N 
_ n 
7N 
O 
«N rn 
'Q u 
N N N 
CN 
tA 
IM Ord 
L 
C 
ýC"ý 
u 
LN 
u 
cl axi 
r4 
2: 0 
M 0 
M 
>M fý 
C C 
1M 
op 
N O 0 
Q- 
a 3 
"r"1 
,ý 
n O 
a 
N 
ý 
Y4 
O 
O 
L 
CN O >N 
QM 
>M 
ÖM ý. 
y^ 
N " ýlO 
O 
it O 
a 
M Oi 
I 
O 
N XM 
M 
C1ý 
N d 
Eoo QD W M ýN aN C v 
. [Tr 
M 
M 
(i 
CO 
Co 
"r 
u X A 
O 
47 
O 
Os 
; 
^ 
L. 
rý y 
> 
O 
> 
> 
9.4 
IC 
C 
M 
O 
a 
EM N W 
ý ,Y N Lý C^ 
r4 O 
^ > 
142 
Table 6.5 Configuration Links for Propane Pipeline Example 
Link UPSTREAM DOWNSTREAM 
No. UNIT PORT UNIT PORT 
1 tankl 2 valve2 1 
2 valve2 2 pumP3 1 
3 pumP3 2 nrv4 1 
4 nrv4 2 dividers 1 
5 dividers 3 cntrl v16 1 
6 cntrl vl6 2 tankl 1 
7 dividers 2 valve7 1 
8 valve? 2 exchang8 1 
9 exchang8 2 nrv9 1 
10 nrv9 2 triplO 1 
11 triplO 2 blck bidll 1 
12 blck bldll 2 pipelinel2 1 
13 pipelinel2 2 blck_bldl3 1 
14 blck bld13 2 cntrl v114 1 
15 cntrl v114 2 tripl5 1 
16 tripl5 2 nrvl6 1 
17 nrvl6 2 valvel7 1 
18 valvel7 2 tankl8 1 
19 tankl8 2 valvel9 1 
20 valvel9 2 sink20 1 
21 source2l 1 cntrl v122 1 
22 cntrl vl22 2 exchang23 3 
23 exchang23 4 drum24 1 
24 drum24 2 cntrl v125 1 
25 cntrl v125 2 sink26 1 
26 tank27 2 pump28 1 
27 pump28 2 nrv29 1 
28 nrv29 2 exchang23 1 
29 exchang23 2 valve30 1 
30 valve30 2 tw valve3l 1 
143 
Table 6.5 (contd. ) 
Link UPSTREAM 
No. UNIT PORT 
31 tw valve3l 2 
32 valve32 2 
33 exchang8 4 
34 tw valve3l 3 
35 valve33 2 
36 mixer34 3 
DOWNSTREAM 
UNIT PORT 
valve32 1 
exchang8 3 
mixer34 1 
valve33 1 
mixer34 2 
tank27 1 
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Table 6.6 Library Models used for Propane Pipeline Example 
storg tnk 
valve 
pump set b 
nrv 
divider 
cv_c bypas 
ht_exchg b 
ht_exchg_c 
trip valve 
d blck bld 
pipeline 
buffer tnk 
sink 
source 
conds_drum 
surge tnk 
thr_way vl 
mixer 
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Table 6.7 Units and Models of the Propane Pipeline Example 
UNIT 
tankt 
valve2 
PumP3 
nrv4 
dividers 
ontri_v16 
valve7 
exchang8 
nrv9 
triplO 
blek bldll 
pipelinel2 
b lck b ldl3 
cntrl v114 
tripl5 
nrvl6 
valvel7 
tankl8 
valvel9 
sink20 
source2l 
entr1_v122 
exchang23 
drum24 
entrl v125 
sink26 
tank27 
pump28 
nrv29 
valve30 
MODEL 
storgtnk 
_ 
valve 
pumpset b 
nrv 
divider 
cv_c bypas 
valve 
ht_exchg_b 
nrv 
trip valve 
d blck bld 
pipeline 
d blck bld 
cv_c bypas 
trip valve 
nrv 
valve 
buffer_tnk 
valve 
sink 
source 
cv_c bypas 
ht_exchg_c 
conds_drum 
cv_c bypas 
sink 
surge_tnk 
pumpset b 
nrv 
valve 
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Table 6.7 (contd. ) 
tw valve3l thr_way_vl 
valve32 valve 
valve33 valve 
mixer34 mixer 
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example, is given in Appendix I. The unit and process material 
models referenced in this example are given in Appendix J. 
6.2.2 Hazard Identification 
The complete hazard identification table for the system 
is given in Appendix K. Table 6.8 gives a comparison of the 
results in Appendix K with those obtained by the industrial 
HAZOP team. 
As with the comparison of 6.1.2 there is good agreement 
between the two sets of results. The points made in 6.1.2 
will, of course, apply to the results here although the 
specific examples will be different. The following further 
points arise from this set of results. 
1) The industrial HAZOP team flag as a cause of no flow, "New 
remote isolation valve closes spuriously". This was not 
modelled in the computer method because the isolation 
valve was added to the design by the HAZOP team to counter 
against "Major pump seal failure". 
2) The point relating to an increase in sulphur content is 
not picked up. Unlike the industrial HAZOP team, the 
computer method is not able to look beyond the boundaries 
of the configuration. The method can cope with the effects 
of impurities within the system, but not outside it, since 
the 'outside' is not modelled. 
3) The point relating to the contamination by nitrogen could 
have been inserted into either the pipe or pipeline model. 
However, it is felt that it would be inappropriate to do 
so. This is a complex fault, involving two different modes 
of operation of the plant: pressuring up and normal day- 
to-day operation. 
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Table 6.8 
Comparison of Results for 
Propane Pipeline Example 
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This problem may be seen as equivalent to a problem in a 
batch operation. The computer method is not designed to 
deal with this. 
4) The start-up, shutdown and testing operations are similar 
to the maintenance point of 6.1.2 i. e. the computer method 
is not designed to pick these up. 
6.3 Conclusions of the Comparison 
In the comparisons of 6.1.2 and 6.2.2, the emphasis has 
been on finding the differences between the two sets of 
results and thus exposing any deficiences in the computer 
method. However, terminology apart, there are considerably 
more points of agreement but these are obvious and do not 
require declaration. 
There are a number of general points about the 
deficiences of the computer method that are raised by, the two 
sets of results. These are : 
1) Concentration. This is a variable unlike pressure or flow 
in that it refers to the concentration of a particular 
component. In 'this respect it is similar to impurity. 
However, ' concentration differs from impurity in two 
respects. The first is that impurity is assumed to be 
always deviated high. The very term implies that there is 
no low level of impurity. The second difference is 
illustrated with the aid of an example. If two fluids, a 
and b, are mixed by a binary header, then the 
concentration of a in the mixed stream is deviated high if 
the flow of a is deviated high or if the flow of b is 
deviated low (and vice versa). An impurity in either inlet 
stream, on the other hand, simply results in that impurity 
in the outlet stream. 
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Although this computer method is able to deal with '' 
concentration on a simple basis (i. e. pure components 
mixing at vessels) it needs to be developed further. 
Note that it is possible to deal with some concentration 
type problems on the basis of impurity. 
2) Operability and Maintenance. At this stage, the computer 
method lacks the facility to deal with items of this 
nature. 
3) Reverse flow and reverse pressure gradient. Again, this 
computer method lacks the facility to deal with these 
variable deviations. 
4) Batch operation. The computer method lacks the facility to 
deal with modes other than the continuous operation mode. 
5) Materials of construction. Although the comparison of 
results has not high-lighted this problem, it is 
convenient to discuss this point here. In this computer 
method, only one materials of construction model has been 
specified for the entire plant configuration. Clearly, 
this is not very realistic. In a plant design, many 
different materials of construction may be specified. 
However, it was felt that restriction to one materials of 
construction model would both demonstrate the use of such 
a model and reduce the complexity of the plant 
configuration data. As is evidenced by the comparison of 
results, this has not significantly detracted from the 
conclusions of the computer method. 
It must be stated that the advantage of any computer 
method is that it will perform the set task thoroughly, time 
and time again, without fatigue or error. There is always the 
danger, with a human HAZOP team that they may omit to look at 
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a particular deviation or omit to consider a process line and 
so on. These problems do not arise with a computer method. The 
human HAZOP team also has difficulty in following a process 
line from one P&ID to the next: This problem does not exist 
with a computer method. The whole plant is always on one 
"diagräm". 
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7 Conclusions 
This computer method, as has been demonstrated, performs 
a useful function in the process of identifying potential 
hazards in the design of process plant. 
The method can be used as it stands or further developed 
to form a system that could be referred to as truly expert. In 
the latter case, it would form the core of the expert system. 
It already embodies some of the features of an expert system 
and so enhancement in the same philosophy could result in a 
credibly expert system. 
The method does not attempt to deal with the 
recommendations that are made by the HAZOP study team. It is a 
tool purely to aid the process of the identification of 
hazards. 
There are -two generalpoints to be noted. The - first is 
that an extensive model library needs to be developed. The 
approach to this has been to create a model only when there is 
a use for it in a particular problem, thus ensuring that the 
model has been tested in use before it is put into the 
library. The second point is that the method needs further 
development in the area of the filtering/pruning of the 
results. 
The conclusions are now divided into two sections. The 
first deals with the applications of the method with little or 
no modification and the second deals with the significant 
changes that could be made to the method., 
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7.1 Applications 
There are a number of possible applications, but these 
are mainly variants on one of two themes: 
1) Use by a process design team 
2) Use by a HAZOP team 
These categories are discussed in greater detail below. 
7.1.1 Use by a Process Design Team 
It is easy to envisage this computer method operating 
with an interface on the process design as it is being 
developed by the design team. 
The procedure that is envisaged is that the design team 
would send on to the draughtsman the details on the design. 
These days, more often than not, the design is entered into a 
CAD package by the draughtsman. The CAD package is used to 
produce the P&IDs. The information utilised by the CAD package 
is almost all the information that is required by this 
computer-aided hazard identification method. Thus, an 
interface between the CAD package and this computer method 
would allow hazard identification on the design. This would be 
done overnight and the output would be delivered to the design 
team the following morning. The design team would make the 
necessary alterations and then proceed with the design. 
The procedure suggested here would attempt to iron out the 
problems at' the design stage. This is a cheaper and more 
convenient solution. Once the design is finalised, alterations 
to it may prove time consuming and expensive. 
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7.1.2 Use by a HAZOP Team 
The output of the computer method could be used by the 
HAZOP team as a starting point for discussion. It is possible, 
though, that this may lead to the study team developing blind 
spots. Blind spots may-take two forms. They may lead to the 
team either dismissing, out of hand, the results of the 
computer method or the team may rely too heavily on the 
results. One way of countering this may be to let only one of 
the HAZOP team, say the secretary, see the results of the 
computer method. These results can then be used to aid and 
spark off the discussion of the study team. 
There is increasing demand in the chemical industry for a 
'cheap' HAZOP study. Here,, the HAZOP team consists of just one 
person. This one-man HAZOP is usually performed by someone who 
would fit the requirements of the leader of the more usual 
HAZOP team. These one-man HAZOP studies are not desirable in 
that they compromise the, principles of HAZOP studies. However, 
they do offer a cost benefit. In this sort of cheap HAZOP the 
computer method would quickly prove a valuable aid. The 
results would be used by'the person performing the HAZOP to 
ensure that the study is as comprehensive as possible. 
7.2 Improvement and Enhancement 
There are a few points relating to the improvement and 
enhancement of the computer method. These points will be 
discussed in turn. 
1) Concentration 
The utilities to handle concentration are already 
available but these need to be improved. Currently, the 
method can deal with simple concentration problems (two 
pure fluids mixing at a binary header, for example). 
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Improvements to the concentration utilities would include 
being able to handle mixing of fluids that contain more 
than one component and being able to follow the 
concentration change through the plant. It is felt that 
the structure of the method will be quite able to support 
the suggested improvements. 
2) Materials of Construction 
It has always been intended to allow the materials of 
construction facility to take a materials of construction 
model for each of the different units in the plant 
configuration. This is a relatively minor change. 
3) Reverse Flow and Reverse Pressure Gradient 
Reverse deviations are rather more complex. Unlike the 
other deviations, the causes of reverse deviations will 
generally be ANDed i. e. they will have the form "IF cause 
x AND cause y AND cause z THEN reverse flow". (Other 
deviations generally take the form "IF cause x OR cause y 
OR cause z THEN no flow"). 
Utilities to deal with these reverse deviations need to be 
developed. 
4) Maintenance and Operability 
It is felt that this section can be dealt with within the 
current framework. It would be possible to define a set of 
rules regarding the maintenance and operability aspects. 
For example, a rule could be added to check for the 
existence of drain and purge points in each process line. 
The drain points would also be checked to ensure that they 
were at the lowest point in the line. The purge points 
would be checked to ensure that there was access to purge 
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gas at that point. 
Similar rules could be developed for the provision of 
positive isolation of process lines and vessels, the 
provision of manholes for vessels and so on. 
5) Observability 
Although this point is one that has not been raised 
previously, it is felt that this computer method could be 
improved by the addition of facilities to check the 
observability of process deviations. This would check on 
the instrumentation on the plant. 
The form of the utilities for observability would be quite 
similar to those for maintenance and operability described 
above. 
6) Batch Operation 
This computer method is not designed for nor suited to 
batch operations. 
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8 User Manual 
8.0 Introduction 
This User Manual has been divided into five sections, 
each of which deals with one particular aspect of the computer 
method. These different aspects have already 'been described in 
Chapter 4 and are illustrated by the schematic diagram of 
Figure 4.2 in Chapter 4. Much of the material of this User 
Manual refers to the chapter on Modelling, Chapter 5. 
8.1 The Creation of Process Unit Models 
8.1.1 Developing a Process Unit Model 
First, a unique and meaningful name is picked for the 
unit model. The name assigned to the unit model can be any 
length up to a maximum of 10 characters. 
The next step is the actual modelling of the process 
unit. The modelling consists basically of four stages. 
1) Assign port numbers to the different ports of the process 
unit 
2) Develop propagation equations for the process unit 
3) Develop initial event statements for the. process unit 
4) Develop terminal event statements for the process unit 
These stages are described in greater detail below. 
1) Assign port numbers to the different ports of the process 
unit. Ports are generally the points of connection to other 
process units. The convention followed here is that units 
with only one inlet and one outlet have port 1 as their 
inlet and port 2 as their outlet. Process vessels may, in 
addition to the points of connection to other process 
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units, need a port number assigned to the inside of the 
vessel. This is so that propagation equations and initial 
and terminal event statements can refer to the internal 
conditions of the process vessel. This point is dealt with 
in greater detail by the following three sections. It is' 
envisaged that considerations of level or pressure will be 
the most frequent use of internal ports. 
2) Develop propagation equations for the process unit. This is 
done by considering each process variable at each internal 
and outlet port and deliberating the effect, on that 
process variable at that port, of deviations in other 
process variables as they pass through the unit. This is 
probably best illustrated by an example. Consider a simple 
open isolation valve. Following the convention described in 
(1) above , the port numbers are assigned 
1 to the inlet 
and 2 to the outlet as shown in the diagram. 
o --ý--- o 
Figure 8.1 Open Isolation Valve 
If the variable under. consideration is pressure and the 
port under consideration is the outlet port, port 2 (there 
is no internal port) Then all the process variables are 
examined for any effect they may have on pressure at port 
2. Clearly, the only variable affecting pressure at port 2 
is pressure at port 1. Furthermore, the relation between 
these is that a deviation in pressure at port 1 will result 
in a deviation in pressure at port 2 of the same sign. A 
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more precise form of words is that deviations in pressure 
at port 2 are a function only of deviations of the same 
sign in pressure at port 1. The same reasoning can be 
applied to the variables flow and temperature with the same 
result. These propagational relationships are more briefly 
expressed by the use of propagation equations. Propagation 
equations for the relationships discussed above are as 
follows. 
p2=f (pl ) 
q2=f (ql ) 
t2=f (tl) 
The procedure for defining propagation equations for 
impurities is slightly different. Impurity needs to be - 
expressed as that of a particular substance. The convention 
in this computer method is to use single letters of the 
alphabet to denote each one of the impurities. In this 
case, we may wish to express the fact that the impurity 
level of a at port 2 is a function of the impurity level of 
a at port 1. The propagation equation is 
ia-2=f(ia-1) 
Clearly, it is not very desirable to have to type in a 
propagation equation such as this for each of the 
impurities. Thus, it is possible to use a mnemonic to 
represent any of the impurities. This mnemonic is the 
underscore character. Thus, the general propagation 
equation for each of all the impurities is 
i -2=f(i -1) 
Let us now discuss a rather more complicated unit, a binary 
header. The port numbers are assigned as shown in the 
diagram below. 
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Figure 8.2 Binary Header 
This time, for pressure at port 3 we conclude that it is a 
function of both the pressure at 1 and the pressure at 2. 
The same applies to the process variables flow and 
temperature. The propagation equations for these 
relationships are 
P3=f(pl, p2) 
q3=f(g1, q2) 
t3=f(tl, t2) 
In the case of the propagation equations for impurities, it 
is clear that an impurity in either inlet will lead to the 
impurity in the outlet. The propagation equation for this 
relationship is 
i_-3=f(i_-1, i_-2) 
What about the process variable concentration? In the 
example of the isolation valve consideration of 
concentration was simple: the concentration out was a 
function of the concentration in. However, in the case of a 
binary header there may be two different fluids being 
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combined together and so consideration of concentration is 
rather more important. The definition of propagation 
expressions relating to concentration is complicated by a 
need to express concentration as that of a particular 
component. This problem has been overcome by the definition 
of the component as the component from inlet port 1 (or 2). 
Thus, we have the propagation expression :- deviations in 
concentration of the component from port 1 at port 3 are a 
function of deviations of the same sign in concentration of 
the component from port 1 at port 1 and in flow at port 1 
and of the opposite sign to deviations in flow at port 2. 
This expression is perhaps made slightly clearer by the 
propagation equation form of the expression. 
xl-3=f(xl-1, ql, -q2) 
The same reasoning also applies to the concentration at 
port 3 of the component from port 2. This results in the 
propagation equation 
x2-3=f(x2-2, q2, -ql) 
This example of ä binary header has demonstrated two 
points. The first point is the proposed way of dealing with 
the process variable concentration and the second is-the 
use, in propagation equations, of a negative sign to denote 
deviations of the opposite sign. 
The use of internal port numbers is illustrated in the case 
of a simple closed tank witli one inlet and one outlet. Port 
numbers are assigned as shown in the diagram below. 
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Figure 8.3 Simple Closed Tank 
Port 3 has been assigned to the level within the tank. With 
internal ports such as this, we also introduce the process 
variable level. When considering the variable level, we 
conclude that deviations in level are a function of 
deviations of the same sign in flow at port 1 and of the 
opposite sign to flow at port 2. This statement translates 
to the propagation equation below. 
13=f(q1, -q2) 
If the flow out of the vessel is gravitational then we may 
also conclude that deviations in flow at port 2 are a 
function of deviations of the same sign in level at port 3. 
i. e. 
q2=f (13) 
3) Develop initial event statements for the process unit. 
Initial event statements are the means by which the causes 
of process deviations are attributed to faults within 
process units. The procedure to be followed is to consider 
all the possible faults that could arise within the unit 
and decide what process deviations would result from each 
of these faults. For example, let us consider the faults 
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that may arise in a centrifugal pump with ports numbered as 
shown in the diagram. 
aQ 
0 
ciiiii Figure 8.4 Centrifugal Pump We could propose the possible set of faults given below. 
loss of NPSH 
rotation fault 
impeller fault 
cavitation 
blockage 
delivery shut in 
pump overheats 
The next step is to write down, for each one of this set of 
fault conditions, all the process deviations that may be 
caused by the fault condition. Note that each of these 
resultant process deviations should actually be assigned to 
a specific port. In the case of the fault condition 
"delivery shut in" the resultant process deviations are 
"pressure at 2 high" and "flow at 2 none". The full set of 
fault conditions together with all of their respective 
resultant process deviations is 
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Fault Condition 
loss of NPSH 
rotation fault 
impeller fault 
cavitation 
blockage 
delivery shut in 
pump fluid overheats 
Resultant Process Deviations, 
q2 low, q2 none 
q2 low, g2 none 
q2 low, g2 none 
q2 low, q2 none 
q2 low, q2 none, p2 high 
q2 none, p2 high 
t2 high 
It is clear from the above table that, because their sets 
of resultant process deviations are the same, the first 
four fault conditions could be lumped together. A more 
concise way of noting the information given in the table is 
in the form of initial event statements. These are 
loss of NPSH, rotation fault, impeller fault, cavitation> 
q2 LO, g2 NONE 
blockage>q2 LO, q2 NONE, p2 HI 
delivery shut in>q2 NONE, p2 HI 
pump overheats>t2 HI 
Note that the left hand side of the equation (the cause) is 
separated from the right hand side (the effect), by It 
is possible to have further causes of the fault conditions 
given above. If we had wanted to express the fact that 
"delivery shut in" could be a result of "operator error" 
then all that is required is the additional fault condition 
rule 
operator error>delivery shut in 
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In order to aid the user, the initial event statements are 
referred to by the following categories: 
- Function 
- Hydraulic 
- Containment 
- Environment 
These categories have already been discussed in Chapter 5. 
4) Develop terminal event statements for the process unit. 
Terminal event statements are the means by which the 
effects of process deviations on the process unit are 
expressed. The procedure to be followed is to consider all 
the relevant process deviations in turn and decide what the 
effects, if any, of each of the process deviations on the 
process unit would be. The relevant process deviations for 
process line units and for process vessels are discussed in 
4.3.5. 
Consideration of the centrifugal pump of (3) above gives a 
ready example of an effect rule. If the pump is running and 
there is no flow through it then the pump fluid is liable 
to overheat. This terminal event statement can be expressed 
in the usual manner as shown below. 
q2 NONE>pump fluid overheats 
Another example is that of an electrically heated steam 
kettle. This is illustrated with the appropriate port 
numbers below. 
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Steam 
Make-up 
Water 
0 
Figure 8.5 Steam Kettle 
If the level should fall greatly, the heating element would 
be exposed, an obvious hazard. The terminal event statement 
in this case would be 
13 LO>exposure of heating coil 
8.1.2 Running the "unit mödel maker" Program 
Once the process unit-has been modelled on paper, 'the 
"unit_model_maker" program can be used to add the new process 
unit to the model library. 
On running the program the following items of-information 
are requested in order 
i) Name of the unit model 
ii) The propagation equations, one at a time 
iii) The initial event statements, one at a time 
iv) The terminal event statements, one at a time 
Note that all the equations and statements must be entered 
enclosed in quotation marks. 
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The rules of syntax for the equations and statements are 
i) Variables are denoted by the letters p, q, t, 1, i, x 
ii) All variables including i and x are immediately followed 
by a port number 
iii) All occurrences of x, concentration, are followed by a 
port number, then a minus sign and then another port 
number. The first port number refers to the port through 
which the component, whose concentration is being 
defined, enters the unit. The second port number is the 
port at which the concentration is being defined. 
iv) All ocurrences of i, impurity, are followed by a letter 
denoting the impurity, then a minus sign and then the 
port. number. - The mnemonic for any substance, "", can be 
used to replace the impurity letter. 
v) For propagation rules, the form of the equation is a 
variable/port combination followed by "=f(" followed by 
any number of items. (Variable/port combinations are 
described by (i), (ii) and (iii) above). Each term 
consists of an optional minus and a variable/port 
combination. Note that all negative terms should be 
placed together at the end of the equation. All terms 
are-separated by commas and the equation is closed by 
UPI, 
vi) For initial and terminal event statements, the form of 
the equation is left hand side, ">", right hand side. 
Each side of the equation consists of any number of 
terms separated by commas. Each term consists of either 
a piece of text (of maximum length 20 characters) or a 
variable/port combination followed by a space followed 
by a deviation code (LO, HI or NONE). 
vii) Extra spaces will not be tolerated. 
viii) Port numbers are restricted to numbers between 1 and 9 
inclusively. 
179 
The examples of incorrect syntax given below will reinforce 
the rules described above. 
q2 =f(ql) Extra space between "2" and "=" 
xl=f(gl, q2) Concentration term incorrect 
xl-l=f(-ql, q2) Negative term should appear after all 
positive terms 
q NONE>overheating No port number after q 
blockage>Q2LO Lower case q and space required 
between port number and deviation 
code 
The following limitations have been declared on the 
variables used in the program. 
i) The length of the name is restricted to a maximum of-10 
characters* 
ii) The length of all the equations typed in is restricted to 
a maximum of 160 characters 
iii) There is a maximum of 30 equations in total that can be 
entered 
iv) The text terms in the event statements are limited to a 
maximum length of 20 characters 
These limitations can be changed by altering the relevant 
declaration statements in the program. 
8.1.3 Entering the Model in the Model Datafiles 
Whenever a unit model is created, its details must be 
entered into one of two datafiles, "In_line units_file" or 
"Vessels_file". The choice of datafile will depend on the 
classification of the process unit as an in-line unit or a 
vessel. These datafiles are used by the "configurator" program 
to divide up the plant configuration into process lines and 
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process vessels. 
The process of entering the details of a unit is the same 
for both datafiles. The user steps to the end of the datafile 
and on a new line types in the name of the unit model, the 
number of inlet ports and the number of outlet ports. These 
three -items -are separated by spaces. On the line below this, 
the user enters the actual numbers assigned to all the inlet 
ports, again separated by spaces. If there are no inlet ports 
then a blank line is inserted. The actual numbers of the 
outlet ports are entered on the next, line. If there are no 
outlet ports then a blank line is inserted. This is best 
illustrated with the aid of an example. Let us say we have 
modelled a. heat exchanger, a process vessel, with two inlet 
ports, 1 and 3, and two outlet ports, 2 and 4. The name 
assigned to this model is, say, "hx". The relevant entry in 
"Vessels-file" will be as shown below. 
hx 22 
13 
24 
8.2 The Creation of Process Material Models 
8.2.1 Developing a Process Material Model 
The first thing to do (as with developing a process unit 
model) is to decide on a unique name for the model. This name 
can be any length up to a maximum of 10 characters. 
The actual modelling of the process material consists of 
two stages: 
1) Designation of the causes of keywords, its properties 
2) Designation of the effects of process deviations, its 
susceptibilities 
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These stages are described in greater detail below. 
1) Designation of the causes of keywords. This deals with 
the characteristics of the process material that will 
give rise to any of the set of keywords referred to in 
4.3.4. The procedure to be followed is to consider each 
of the keywords in turn and decide which, if any, of the 
characteristics of the material being modelled can cause 
the keyword in question. All the relevant characteristics 
are noted and then the next keyword is reviewed. 
Let us look at the modelling of a particular olefin. For 
the keyword BLOCKAGE it may be concluded that 
"polymerisation" of the olefin is possible and would 
cause BLOCKAGE. Similarly, "low boiling point impurity" 
may be deemed a possible cause of CAVITATION. 
2) Designation of the effects of process deviations. This 
means the effects of process deviations upon the process 
material being modelled. Here, the procedure is to 
consider each process deviation in turn and decide what 
the effects of that process deviation on the process 
material would be. Attention must also be paid to the 
deviation "escape". In the case of "escape" the task is 
to decide what effects a leak of the material would have 
on the material itself and also the effects of the leak 
on the environment. 
In the case of developing a model for liquid propane, the 
effects of "escape" on the material may be defined as 
"flashing off of liquid" and "fire/explosion hazard". If 
The material being modelled was water, the effect of the 
'deviation "low temperature" would be defined as 
"freezing". More examples can be found in 4.3.4. 
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8.2.2 Running the "material modeller" Program 
Running "material modeller" will cause the user to be 
prompted for the following information. 
i) Name of'the process material model 
ii)' The causes, one at a time, of each of the keywords in 
turn 
iii) The effects on the process material of each of the 
process deviations in turn 
Note that the causes and effect input in (ii) and (iii) above 
must be enclosed in quotation marks if use is made of spaces. 
There is 'a declared limitation of a maximum of 20 
characters on the length of the causes and effects input by 
the user. The name assigned to the process material model is 
similarly limited to a maximum of 10 characters. These 
limitations can be changed by altering the relevant 
declarations in the program. 
8.3 The Creation of a Process Plant Configuration 
8.3.1 Producing a' Process Plant Configuration 
This section deals with the information required to 
create a file on the process plant configuration. Conventional 
HAZOP studies use a P&ID as the basis of the study (see 
Chapter 1). This computer method, however, is not 
sophisticated enough to be able to use the instrumentation 
information available on a P&ID. Although some control loops 
have been modelled and used (see Chapter 6), these have been 
rather simple. The quality of information required in the 
configuration file is reasonably basic. Thus, the input to 
this configuration file need not be as complex as that 
provided by a P&ID. 
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The information required by this computer method is 
1) The name assigned to this particular study 
2) Names of-the units and the models representing those units 
3) The links between the units 
4) The process material contained in each process line 
5) Model of the materials of construction 
6) List of the impurities that are referenced 
These different items of information are described in greater 
detail below. 
1) The name assigned to this particular study. This name will 
be used to reference all three files pertaining to the 
study. The three files are the configuration file, the 
"identifier" output file and the "compacter" output file. 
These will all have the same name but will be followed, 
respectively, by the suffixes ". conf", ". pro-out" and 
". compact". The length of the name can be up to a maximum 
of 10 characters. 
2) Names of the units and the models representing those units. 
The user is asked to name, uniquely, all the process units 
in the configuration. The user is also asked to assign 
process models to represent each of the units in the 
configuration. It is prudent to reiterate, at this stage, 
that this computer method automatically assigns a generic 
pipe unit (see 4.3.5 and 5.1.4) to each process line. This 
enables the user to dispense with the need to enter a unit 
and a model for each of the sections of piping between the 
process units. 
The links between the units. The user needs to define all 
the links or connections between the process units. Each 
link is of the form Unit A port x is connected to Unit B 
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port y. These links need to take no account whatsoever of 
the-generic pipe unit referred to in (2) above. 
4) The process material contained in each line. The user needs 
to look at the flowsheet and decide on what process 
materials are flowing in which process lines. The process 
materials will, of course, have their corresponding models 
in the process material model library. 
5) Model of the materials of construction. The user needs to 
enter a set of terminal event statements that model the 
materials of construction of, the plant. These terminal 
events indicate the characteristics of the material in 
terms of its susceptibilities. For instance, if a material 
is susceptible to brittle fracture if the temperature is 
low, the the following terminal event statement is 
required. 
tl LO>brittle fracture 
These terminal-event statements are used as part of the 
generic pipe unit. 
6) List of impurities that are referenced. This is used by 
"identifier" to only run searches on the impurities that 
are actually referenced in the configuration. Note that the 
impurities are always denoted by the same letter, whether 
in the configuration or in the unit models. 
8.3.2 Running the "configurator" Program 
Running "configurator" will cause the user to be prompted 
for the following information. 
i) The name assigned to the study 
ii) The names, one by one, assigned to each of the various 
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units together with the unit model representing each 
unit. Note that the process models that are referenced 
must exist in "In line units file" or "Vessels file" for 
them to be accepted. 
iii) The links between the units. These need to be entered as 
upstream unit, upstream port number, downstream unit, 
downstream port number. 
iv) The process materials contained in each process line. 
"configurator" will have, from the information entered in 
(i), (ii) and (iii) above, worked out the routing of the 
various process lines. The user is asked, for each 
process line in turn, for the process material carried in 
that line. 
v) The terminal event statements for the materials of 
construction 
vi) The list of impurities that are referenced by the 
configuration 
Note that the process unit datafiles, 
"In_line units_file" and "Vessels_file" will be consulted in 
order to divide up the plant configuration into process lines 
and process vessels. 
The configuration file created by "configurator" will 
have the suffix ". conf". 
The following limitations have been declared on the 
variables used in the program. 
1) The length of the filename to a maximum of 10 characters 
ii) The length of the unit and model names to a maximum of 
10 characters 
iii) The number of units in the configuration to a maximum of 
40 
iv) The number of different models referenced to a maximum 
of 40 
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v) The number of vessels to 20 
vi) The number of process lines to 20 
vii) The number of links to 40 
viii) The number of different process materials referenced to 
20 
ix) The number of different impurities referenced to 20 
X). The number of materials of construction terminal event 
statements to 20 
These limitations can be easily altered by changing the 
relevant declarations in the program. 
8.4 Performing a Computer Hazard Identification; Running the 
"identifier" Program 
The only user inputs at this stage are the entry of the 
name assigned to the study and the selection of an output 
option. The different output options have already been 
described in 4.3.5. 
The running of "identifier" is a very simple matter. The 
user enters the PROLOG environment, loads up and runs 
"identifier". "identifier" will first prompt the user for the 
name assigned to the study and then, after loading the 
configuration file, will ask for an output option. The normal 
output option is "b", that is, output only to a file. 
"identifier" takes just over 20 cpu minutes on a 
Honeywell Multics DPS8 to run the water separator example. 
Thus, it is suggested that "identifier" is run overnight by an 
absentee request. 
In the cases of the output option selected as "b" or "c", 
"identifier" produces a file with the suffix ". pro-out". This 
file can then be used as input by "compacter". 
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8.5 Producing a HAZOP-like Document; Running the "compacter" 
Program 
The "configurator" program needs as input, the file 
produced by "identifier". This file will not have been 
produced if output option a was chosen on running 
"identifier". 
The only user input at this stage is the entry of the 
name of the study. The "compacter" program then calls up the 
"identifier" output file (suffix ". pro_out") and the 
configuration file (suffix ". conf") and uses these to create a 
HAZOP-like document in a file with suffix ". compact". This 
file can then be printed out. 
The limitations on the variables are the same. as those in 
the other FORTRAN programs, "unit-model-maker".. 
"material modeller" and "configurator". 
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unit_model_maker. fortran 
program unit_model_maker 
c. 
c Set up and declare variable types 
c 
character*10 Uname 
character*1 Var(6) 
character*14 Var_name(6) 
character Rule_type(6) 
character*14 Rlname(6) 
character Reply 
character*160 Egn, Eqnarray(30) 
character*200 Prolog_egn, Prolarray(30) 
logical Flag 
integer Rlnumber, Egn_count, j, l 
character*80 Description 
integer P_egn_count, I_event_count, T_event_count 
C 
c Set up common blocks 
c 
common /Variables/ Var 
common /prop-text/ Uname, Egn, Prolog_eqn 
common /prop_logl/ Flag 
common /text_rule_text/ Var_name, Rlname 
common /text-rule-nos/ Rlnumber 
c 
c Set up and initialise arrays 
c 
Var(1)="p" 
Var(2)="c1" 
Var(3)="t" 
Var(4)="l" 
Var(5)="x" 
Var(6)="i" 
c 
Var_name(1)="pressure" 
Var_nanme(2)="flow" 
Var_name(3)="temperature" 
Var_name(4)="level" 
Var_name(5)="concentration" 
Var_name(6)="impurity" 
c 
Rule-type(l)="f" 
Rule-type(2)="h" 
Rule_type(3)="c" 
Rule type(4)="i" 
Rule_type(5)="e" 
Rule-type(6)="effect" 
C 
Rlname(1)="functional" 
Rlname(2)="hydraulic" 
Rlname(3)="containment" 
Rlname(4)="environmental" 
Rlname(5)="impurity" 
Rlname(6)="effect" 
c 
c Read in model name 
1010 write(0, '("Type in the name of the unit model 
read (0, *) Uname 
open(8, file=Uname, status='NEW', err=9000) 
write(0, '(/, "Type in a line of descriptive text (enclosed in quotes) \c)') 
read(0, *) Description 
Egn_count=1 
1040 write(0, '(/, "Define a propagation rule ? (y 
read(0, *) Reply 
if(Reply. eq. "n") goto 1480 
if(Reply. eq. "y") then 
write(0, '("Type in propagation equation 
read(0, *) Eqn 
call propagation 
print*, Flag 
print*, Prolog_eqn 
if(Flag) then 
Egnarray(Eqn_count)=Eqn 
Prolarray(Egn_count)=Prolog_eqn 
Egn_count=Egn_count+l 
end if 
end if 
goto 1040 
1480 P_egn count=Egn_count 
write(0, '(/, "Initial Event Statements")') 
write(0,1('* -------------------------- )I) 
1500 do 1600, Rlnumber=1,5 
1=Length(Rlname(Rlnumber)) 
1520 write(0, '(/, "Define a ", a, " rule ? (y or 
\c)(: l) 
or n) ... ", $)') 
(enclosed in quotes) ... ")') 
n) ... ', $)') Rlname(Rlnumber 
read(0, *) Reply 
if(Reply. eq. "n") goto 1600 
if(Reply. eq. "y") then 
write(0, '("Type in the equation (enclosed in quotes) 
read(0, *) Eqn 
call text-rules 
print*, Flag 
print*, Prolog_eqn 
c **** 
if(Flag) then 
Egnarray(Eqn_count)=Eqn 
Prolarray(Egn_count)=Prolog_egn 
Egn_count=Eqn count+l 
end if 
end if 
goto 1520 
1600 continue 
I_event_count=Egn_count 
c 
write(0, '(/, "Terminal Event Statements")') 
write(0, '("------- 
1620 write(0, '(/, "Define an effect rule ? (y or n) ... read(0, *) Reply 
if(Reply. eq. "n") goto 1650 
if (Reply. eq. "y") then 
write(0, '("Type in the equation (enclosed in quotes) ... ")') read(0, *) Eqn 
call text-rules 
c 
print*, Flag 
print*, Prolog_egn 
c **** 
if(Flag) then 
Egnarray(Eqn_count)=Eqn 
Prolarray(Egn_count)=Prolog_egn 
Egn_count=Eqn count+l 
endif 
endif 
goto 1620 
c 
1650 T_event_count=Egn_count 
0 
write(0, '(/, "Writing to file ... ")') 
write(8, '("/*")') 
write(8, *) 
write(8, '("Model : ", a)') Uname 
write(8, '(//)') 
write(8, '(a)') Description(1: Length(Description)) 
write(8, '(/, "Propagation Equations")') 
write(8, '(* ------------------------ )I) 
do 1700, j=1, P_egn count-1 
write(8, '(/, a)') Egnarray(j)(1: Length(Egnarray(j))) 
1700 continue 
write(8, '(/, "Initial Event Statements")') 
write(8, '(.. -------------------------- ), ) 
do 1702, j=P_egn_count, I_event_count-i 
write(8, '(/, a)') Egnarray(j)(1: Length(Egnarray(j))) 
1702 continue 
write(8, '(/, "Terminal Event Statements")') 
write(8, '("-------------------------")') 
do 1704, j=I_event_count, T_event_count-1 
write(8, '(/, a)') Egnarray(j)(1: Length(Egnarray(j))) 
1704 continue 
write(8, *) 
write(8, '("*/")') 
write(8, *) 
do 1720, j=1, Egn count-1 
write(8, '(/, a)') Prolarray(j)(1: Length(Prolarray(j))) 
1720 continue 
write(8, *) 
close(8) 
write(0, '(/, "Finished Write ! ")') 
1750 stop 
9000 write(0, '("This model already exists ! ")') 
stop 
end 
subroutine propagation 
c 
c Set up and declare variable types 
c 
character*5 Variable, Port*1 
character*10 Uname 
character*1 Var(6) 
character*160 Eqn 
character*200 Prolog_egn 
logical Flag 
character Pos_flag, Neg_flag 
integer i, il, i2, ie, i9 
c 
c Set up common blocks 
c 
common /Variables/ Var 
common /prop_text/ Uname, Egn, Prolog_eqn 
common /prop_logl/ Flag 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
1000 
\0000 
C 
Initialise main flags 
First_pos="y" 
First neg="y" 
Flag=. false. 
i8=1 
Set up the first part of the Prolog equation 
Prolog_egn(1: 5)="rule(" 
i2=Length(Uname)+5 
Prolog_eqn(6: i2)=Uname(l: Length(Uname)) 
i1=i2+1 
i2=il+3 
Prolog_egn(il: i2)=", p, [" 
il=i2+1 
Get the resultant variable and port 
call get_variable(Variable, Egn, i8, Flag) 
if(. not. Flag) goto 4100 
i2=i1+Length(Variable)-1 
Prolog_eqn(il: i2)=Variable(1: Length(Variable)) 
i1=i2+1 
i2=il 
Prolog_egn(il: i2)=", " 
il=i2+1 
call get-port(Port, Egn, i8, Flag) 
if(. not. Flag) goto 4100 
i2=il 
Prolog_egn(ii: i2)=Port 
il=i2+1 
i2=i1+2 
Prolog_egn(il: i2)="], [" 
il=i2+1 
i9=i8+2 
if(Egn(i8: i9). ne. "=f(") then 
Flag=. false. 
goto 4100 
endif 
i8=i9+1 
Start the collection of the positive terms of the equation 
Check if either the end of the equation or the start or the negative items has been reached 
if(Egn(i8: i8). eq. ')'. or. Egn(i8: i8+1). eq. ', - . or. Egn(i8: i8). eq. -') goto 2 
Check if there is a need 
if((First-pos. eq. "y". and. 
Flag=. true. 
if(. not. (First_pos. eq. 
if(Egn(i8: i8). eq. ", 
Flag=. true. 
i8=i8+l 
else 
Flag=. false. 
end if 
endif 
else 
Flag=. false. 
endif 
if(. not. Flag) goto 4100 
to read a comma in the original equation 
First_neg. eq. "y"). or. Egn(i8: i8). eq. ", ") then 
"y". and. First neg. eq. "y")) then 
") then 
a 
c Collect a positive term 
call get variable(Variable, Egn, i8, Flag) 
if(. not. Flag) goto 4100 
call get_port(Port, Egn, iB, Flag) 
if(. not. Flag) goto 4100 
c The first item of the list does not need a comma preceeding it 
if(First_pos. eq. "y") then 
i2=il 
Prolog_egn(il: 12)="[ 
il=i2+1 
First-pos="n" 
else 
i2=i1+1 
Prolog_egn(il: i2)=", [" 
il=i2+1 
end if 
i2=i1+Length(Variable)-1 
Prolog_eqn(il: i2)=Variable(1: Length(Variable)) 
il=i2+1 
i2=il 
Prolog_egn(i1: i2)=", " 
il=i2+1 
i2=i1 
Prolog_egn(il: i2)=Port 
il=i2+1 
i2=i1 
Prolog_egn(il: 12)="]" 
il=i2+1 
C 
c Go back and collect another positive term if possible 
goto 1000 
c 
c Close list of positive items and open list of negative items 
2000 i2=i1+2 
Prolog_egn(i1: i2)="], [" 
il=i2+1 
c 
c Start collecting negative items 
c First, check if there are any negative items 
2200 if(Egn(i8: i8). eq. ")") goto 4000 
c 
c Read the comma and the negative sign preceeding the term. Note that the 
c comma will not be present if there have been no positive terms and this 
c is the first negative term. 
if((First pos. eq. "n". and. First_neg. eq. "y"). or. First neg. eq. "n") then 
if(Egn(i8: i8). eq. ", ") then 
i8=i8+1 
else 
Flag=. false. 
goto 4100 
end if 
endif 
if(Egn(i8: i8). eq. "-") then 
i8=i8+1 
Flag=. true. 
else 
Flag=. false. 
goto 4100 
endif 
c 
c Collect a variable and a port 
call get variable(Variable, Egn, i8, Flag) 
if(. not. Flag) goto 4100 
call get_port(Port, Egn, i8, Flag) 
if(. not. Flag) goto 4100 
'r. 
C 
c The first negative term does not need a comma preceeding it 
if(First neg. eq. "y") then 
i2=il 
Prolog_egn(il: 12)="[" 
il=i2+1 
First_neg="n" 
else 
i2=i1+1 
Prolog_egn(i1: i2)=", [" 
i1=i2+1 
end if 
C 
c Write the variable and term into the equation 
i2=i1+Length(Variable)-1 
Prolog_eqn(il: i2)=Variable(1: Length(Variable)) 
il=i2+1 
i2=il 
Prolog_egn(i1: i2)=", " 
il=i2+1 
i2=i1 
Prolog_egn(il: i2)=Port 
i1=i2+1 
i2=i1 
Prolog_egn(i1: i2)="]" 
il=i2+1 
C 
c Go back and collect another negative item if possible 
goto 2200 
c 
c Close list of negative items 
4000 i2=i1+2 
Prolog_egn(i1: i2)="]). ' 
il=i2+1 
c 
c Blank out the rest of the prolog equation if the translation succeeded. 
c If the translation failed blank out the whole equation. 
4100 if(Flag) then 
do 4200, i=il, 200 
Prolog_egn(i: i)=" 
4200 continue 
else 
c Tab to the correct spot and point to syntax error 
do 4300, i=1, i8 
write(0, '(a, $)') 
4300 continue 
write(0, '(a)') 
write(0, '("Translation failed 
do 4400, i=1,200 
Prolog_egn(i: i)=" 
4400 continue 
end if 
return 
end 
subroutine text-rules 
c 
character*10 Uname 
character*1 Var(6), Variable*5, Deviation*4, Text*20, Port 
character*14 Var_name(6) 
character*14 Rlname(6) 
character*160 Eqn 
character*200 Prolog_egn 
logical Flag 
integer Rinumber, 1, i8, orig_i8 
C 
common /Variables/ Var 
common /prop text/ Uname, Egn, Prolog_eqn 
common /prop_logl/ Flag 
common /text_rule_text/ Var_name, Rlname 
common /text-rule-nos/ Rlnumber 
c 
c Start the counter for the Equation at 1 
i8=1 
C 
c Dump the header of the rule into the Prolog equation 
Prolog_egn(1: 5)="rule(" 
i2=5+Length(Uname) 
Prolog eqn(6: i2)=Uname(1: Length(Uname)) 
i1=i2+1 
i2=il 
Prolog_egn(il: i2)=", 
il=i2+1 
i2=il+Length(Rlname(Rlnumber))-1 
Prolog_eqn(il: i2)=Rlname(Rlnumber)(1: Length(Rlname(Rlnumber))) 
il=i2+1 
i2=il+l 
Prolog_egn(i1: i2)=", [" 
il=i2+1 
C 
c Collect the items on the left hand side of the equation 
1000 orig_i8=i8 
call get variable(Variable, Egn, i8, Flag) 
c If the flag is false go to the text collection section 
if(. not. Flag) then 
i8=orig_i8 
goto 2000 
end if 
call get_port(Port, Egn, i8, Flag) 
c If there is no port then backspace and then go to the text collection 
c section 
if(. not. Flag) then 
i8=orig_i8 
goto 2000 
end if 
c Check for a space separating the port and the deviation. If a space does 
c not exist then backspace over the two items that were read and go to the 
c text collection section. 
if(Egn(i8: i8). eq. " ") then 
i8=i8+1 
else 
i8=orig_i8 
goto 2000 
endif 
call get deviation(Deviation, Egn, ia, Flag) 
if(. not. Flag) goto 6000 
Prolog_egn(il: il+4+Length(Variable)+Length(Deviation))="["//Variable(l: Le 
\cngth(Variable))//", "//Port(1: 1)//", "//Deviation(1: Length(Deviation))//"]" 
i1=i1+5+Length(Variable)+Length(Deviation) 
c Check if a comma follows. If it does then advance equation counter by 
c one, insert a separating comma into the Prolog equation and go and 
c collect another item for this side of the list. 
if(Egn(i8: i8). eq. ", ") then 
i8=i8+1 
i2=il 
Prolog_egn(il: 12)=", " 
i1=i2+1 
goto 1000 
endif 
c Check if there is a> sign at the end of this list. If there is then 
c go and collect the items on the r. h. s. If there is no > sign then fail. 
if(Egn(i8: i8). eq. ">") then 
i8=i8+1 
goto 3000 
else 
goto 6000 
endif 
C 
c Text collection 
2000 call get_text(Text, Egn, i8, Flag) 
if(. not. Flag) goto 6000 
Prolog egn(il: il+11+Length(Text))="["'//Text(l: Length(Text))//"', ' 
\c" 
i1=il+12+Length(Text) 
c Check if a comma follows. If it does then advance equation counter by 
c one, insert separating comma in the Prolog equation and go and collect 
c another item. 
if(Egn(i8: i8)"eq. ", ") then 
i8=i8+1 
i2=il 
Prolog_egn(i1: 12)=", " 
i1=i2+1 
goto 1000 
end if 
c Check if there is a> sign. If there is, go and collect the items on the 
c r. h. s. If there is no > then fail. 
if(Eqn(i8: i8). eq. ">") then 
i8=i8+l 
goto 3000 
else 
goto 6000 
end if 
c 
c Close l. h. s. list and open r. h. s. list. 
3000 i2=i1+2 
Prolog_egn(i1: i2)="], [" 
il=i2+1 
c 
c Start collecting the right hand side items. 
3200 orig_i8=i8 
call get_variable(Variable, Egn, i8, Flag) 
c If the flag is false go to the text collection section 
if(. not. Flag) then 
i8=orig_i8 
goto 4000 
end if 
call get_port(Port, Egn, i8, Flag) 
c If there is no port then backspace and then go to the text collection 
c section 
if(. not. Flag) then 
i8=orig_i8 
gate 4000 
endif 
c Check for a space separating the port and the deviation. If a space does 
c not exist then backspace over the two items that were read and go to the 
c text collection section. 
if(Egn(i8: i8). eq. " ") then 
id=i8+1 
else 
i8=orig_i8 
goto 4000 
endif 
call get_deviation(Deviation, Egn, i8, Flag) 
if(. not. Flag) goto 6000 
Prolog_eqn(il: i1+4+Length(Variable)+Length(Deviation))="["//Variable(1: Le 
\cngth(Variable))//", "//Port(1: 1)//", "//Deviation(1: Length(Deviation))//"]" 
il=il+5+Length(Variable)+Length(Deviation) 
c Check if a comma follows. If it does then advance the equation counter 
c by one go, insert a separating comma into the Prolog equation and 
c collect another item for this side of the list. 
if(Eqn(i8: i8). eq. ", ") then 
i8=i8+1 
i2=il 
Prolog_egn(i1: i2)=", " 
il=i2+1 
goto 3200 
end if 
c Check if this is the end of the list. If it is then go and close the 
c r. h. s. If it is not the end of the list then we have a failure. 
if(i8. ge. Length(Eqn)) then 
goto 5000 
else 
goto 6000 
endif 
C 
c Text collection 
4000 call get_text(Text, Egn, i8, Flag) 
if(. not. Flag) goto 6000 
Prolog_egn(i1: i1+11+Length(Text))="["'//Text(1: Length(Text))//"', ' ', ' '] 
\c.. 
il=il+12+Length(Text) 
c Check if a comma follows. If 
c by one, insert a separating 
c collect another item. 
if(Egn(i8: i8). eq. ', ") then 
i8=i8+1 
i2=i1 
Prolog_egn(ii: i2)=", " 
il=i2+1 
goto 3200 
endif 
a Check if this is the end of 
c r. h. s. If it is not the end 
if(i8. ge. Length(Egn)) then 
goto 5000 
else 
goto 6000 
endif 
it does then advance the equation counter 
comma into the Prolog equation and go and 
the list. If it is then go and close the 
of the list then we have a failure. 
C 
C Close the r. h. s. of the list. 
5000 i2=il+2 
Prolog_egn(il: i2)="]). " 
il=i2+1 
c Blank out the rest 
do 5500, i=il, 200 
Prolog_egn(i: i)=" 
5500 continue 
Flag=. true. 
goto 7000 
c 
c We have a failure 
6000 Flag=. false. 
c Blank out the whole equation 
do 6500, i=1,200 
Prolog_egn(i: i)=" 
6500 continue 
c Tab to the correct spot and point to the syntax error do 6600, i=1, i8 
write(0, '(a, $)') 
6600 continue 
write(0, '(a)') 
write(0, '("Translation failed 
c 
7000 return 
end 
C 
C 
subroutine get_variable(Variable, Egn, i8, Flag) 
character*1 Var(6) 
character Variable*5, Egn*160 
integer i, i8, i8_orig 
logical Flag 
common /Variables/ Var 
c 
c Initialise the variable to blank to avoid transferring ctl chars at the 
c end of the string 
Variable=" 
C 
c Save the value of the counter so that if this routine fails then the 
c counter can be rest to its original value 
i8_orig=i8 
0 
do 1000, i=1,6 
if(Egn(i8: i8). eq. Var(i)) then 
Flag=. true. 
Variable(1: 1)=Var(i) 
i=6 
i8=i8+1 
else 
Flag=. false. 
endif 
1000 continue 
c 
c Special treatment for the concentration variable 
if(Variable(1: 1). eq. "x") then 
Variable(1: 3)="[x, " 
if(ichar(Eqn(i8: i8)). ge. 49. and. ichar(Egn(i8: i8)). le. 57) then 
Variable(4: 4)=Egn(i8: i8) 
Variable(5: 5)="]^ 
Flag=. true. 
i8=i8+1 
c Read the minus sign following the concentration term 
if(Egn(i8: i8). eq. '-") then 
i8=i8+1 
Flag=. true. 
else 
Flag=. false. 
end if 
else 
Flag=. false. 
end if 
end if 
c 
c Special treatment for the impurity variable 
if(Variable(1: 1). eq. "i") then 
C 
C 
\c. le 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
Variable(1: 3)="[i, " 
Check that the impurity referred to is a lower case letter of the 
alphabet or that it is the generic dummy impurity 
_ if(Eqn(i8: i8). eq. "_". or. (ichar(Eqn(i8: i8)). ge. 97. and. ichar(Egn(i8: i8)) 
122)) then 
Variable(4: 4)=Egn(i8: i8) 
Variable(5: 5)="]" 
Flag=. true. 
i8=i8+1 
Read the minus sign following the impurity term 
if(Egn(i8: i8). eq. "-") then 
i8=i8+1 
Flag=. true. 
else 
Flag=. false. 
end if 
else 
Flag=. false. 
end if 
endif 
If this goal has failed then reset the value of i8 
if(. not. Flag) then 
i8=i8 orig 
endif 
return 
end 
subroutine getport(Port, Egn, i8, Flag) 
character*1 Port 
character Eqn*160 
integer i, i8 
logical Flag 
if(ichar(Egn(i8: i8)) 
Port=Egn(i8: i8) 
Flag=. true. 
i8=i8+1 
else 
Flag=. false. 
endif 
return 
end 
ge. 49. and. ichar(Egn(i8: i8)). 1e. 57) then 
subroutine get_deviation(Deviation, Egn, i8, Flag) 
character Eqn*160, Deviation*4 
integer i8 
logical Flag 
if(Egn(i8: i8+1). eq. "HI") then 
Deviation="high" 
i8=i8+2 
Flag=. true. 
goto 1000 
end if 
if(Egn(i8:! 8+1). eq. "LO") then 
Deviation="low" 
18=i8+2 
Flag=. true. 
goto 1000 
endif 
if(Egn(i8: i8+3). eq. "NONE") then 
Deviation="none" 
ROM 
Flag=. true. 
goto 1000 
end if 
C 
c There is no deviation 
Flag=. false. 
c 
1000 return 
end 
subroutine get_text(Text, Egn, i8, Flag) 
c 
character Eqn*160, Text*20 
integer i8, i9 
logical Flag 
c 
c Initialise Text to blanks so that no ctl chars 
c are sent through to main 
Text=" 
i9=i8+1 
200 if(Egn(i9: i9). eq. ", ") then 
Text=Egn(i8: i9-1) 
i8=i9 
goto 1000 
endif 
if(Eqn(i9: i9). eq. ">") then 
Text=Egn(i8: i9-1) 
i8=i9 
goto 1000 
end if 
if(i9. ge. Length(Egn)) then 
Text=Egn(18: ) 
i8=i9 
Soto 1000 
endif 
at the end of the text 
C 
c Advance counter by one and check again for the end of the text 
i9=i9+1 
goto 200 
c 
c End of text 
1000 Flag=. true. 
return 
end 
integer function Length(String) 
character String*(*) 
integer i 
i=len(String) 
1 if(String(i: i). ne. " ") goto 2 
i=i-1 
if (i. eq. 0) goto 2 
goto 1 
2 Length=i 
return 
end 
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material_modeller. fortran 
C 
C 
program material-modeller 
integer No_kw_cause, No_kw_effect, i 
character*20 Filename*10, Key_cause(10), Key_effect(10,2) 
character*20 Worda, First*3 
Key-cause(l)="blockage" 
Key_cause(2)="cavitation" 
No-kw-cause=2 
Key_effect(1,1)="escape" 
Key_effect(1,2)=" " 
Key_effect(2,1)="t" 
Key_effect(2,2)="high" 
Key_effect(3,1)="t" 
Key_effect(3,2)="low" 
Key_effect(4,1)="p" 
Key_effect(4,2)="high" 
Key_effect(5,1)="p" 
Key_effect(5,2)="low" 
No_kw_effect=5 
c 
write(0, '(/, "Type in material name 
read(0, *) Filename 
open(8, file=Filename, status="NEW", err=8000) 
do 1300, i=1, No kw_cause 
First="yes" 
write(8, '("material_cause(", a, ", ", a, ", [", $)') Filename(1: Length(Filena 
\cme)), Key_cause(i)(1: Length(Key_cause(i))) 
write(0, '(/, "Type in all the material characteristics giving rise to 
\c, a)') Key_cause(i)(1: Length(Key_cause(i))) 
write(0, '("( <CR> after each cause and "end"' to stop. )")') 
1200 read(0, *) Worda 
if(Worda. ne. "end". and. Worda. ne. "End". and. Worda. ne. "END") then 
if(First. ne. "yes") then 
write(8, '(", ", $)') 
endif 
write(8, '("[a, "", '' Worda(1: Length(Worda)) 
First="no" 
goto 1200 
endif 
write(8, '("]). ")') 
1300 continue 
do 1500, i=1, No_kw_effect 
First="yes" 
if(Key_effect(i, 1). eq. "escape") then 
write(8, '("material_effect(", a, ", escape, '' ", P, $)') Filename(1: Le 
\cngth(Filename)) 
else 
write(8, '( material_effect( ", a, , ['" $}') Filename(1: Len \cgth(Filename)), Key_effect(i, 1)(1: Length(Key_effect(i, 1))), Key_effect(i, 2)(1: L 
\cength(Key_effect(i, 2))) 
endif 
if(Key_effect(i, 1). eq. "escape") then 
write(0, '(/, "Type in all the effects on the material of escape")') 
else 
write(0, '(/, "Type in all the effects on the material of ", a, " ", a)' \c) Key_effect(i, 1)(1: Length(Key_effect(i, i))), Key_effect(i, 2)(1: Length(Key_eff 
\cect(i, 2))) 
endif 
write(0, '("( <CR> after each effect and "end" to stop )")') 
1400 read(0, *) Worda 
if(Worda. ne. "end". and. Worda. ne. "End". and. Worda. ne. "END") then 
if(First. ne. "yes") then 
write(8, '(", ", $)') 
end if 
Worda(1: Length(Worda) ) 
First="no" 
goto 1400 
endif 
write(8, '("]). ")') 
1500 continue 
stop 
8000 write(0, '(/, "Material file already exists ! ", /)') 
stop 
end 
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configurator. fortran 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
program configurator 
Unit(_) is the list of units in the configuration input by the user in the 
read_units subroutine. 
Model(_) is the unit model that Unit(_) refers to. This is also input in 
read_units subroutine. 
Link_unit(_, 
_) 
is a list of the upstream and downstream units of the links 
in the configuration. 
Link_port(_, 
_) 
is a list of the upstream and downstream ports of the links 
in the configuration. The ports refer to the units of Link unit(_, _). Line_vessel(_, 
_) 
is a list of the source and drain vessels of all the lines 
in the configuration. 
Line-port(_, 
_) 
is a list of the source and drain ports of all the lines in 
the configuration. The ports refer to the units of Line vessel(_, _). Vessel_list(_) is a list of all the unit models that are designated as 
vessels. 
Vessel_inlet_ports(x, y) 
Vessel outlet_ports(x, y) These are lists of the inlet and outlet ports of 
the vessel in Vessel_list(x). In position (x, l) is an integer giving the 
number of ports that are listed. 
J is the total number of units in the configuration. 
L is the total number of links in the configuration. 
M is the number of different unit models that have been referenced- 
Z is the number of lines calculated to be in the configuration. 
Proc_mat(x) is the name of the process material in process line x 
Listcro_mats(_) is a list of all the different material models referenced 
Imp_code(x) is the code for impurity x 
Imp_name(x) is the name of impurity x 
Number-imps is the number of impurities referenced 
Eqn(x) is the list of equations describing the material of construction 
Pipe_egn(x) is the list of prolog translated equations of Eqn(x) 
No_pipe_egns is the number of equations defined 
character*20 Filename*15, Inname*10, Date, User, Vers ion*2 
character*10 Unit(40), Model(40), Vessel_list(20), Line_vessel(20,2) 
character*10 Unit-list(40) 
integer Linkoort (2,40) , Lineoort (20,2 ) integer Vessel_inletoorts(20,6), Vessel_outletoorts(20,6), No_of_vessels 
integer Unit_inletoorts(20,6), Unit outletoorts(20,6), No_of units 
character*10 Link_unit(2,40) 
integer J, L, M, Z, i5 
character*10 Proc_mat(20), Listoroc_mats(20) 
integer No-of-mats 
character Imp_code(20)*1, Imp_name(20)*30 
integer Number_imps 
character Egn(20)*160, Pipe_egn(20)*200 
integer No_pipe_egns 
C 
common /Units-text/ Unit, Model 
common /Units numb/ J 
common /Links_text/ Link unit 
common /Links numb/ L, Link_port 
common /File data/ Filename, Version, Date, User 
common /List-models-text/ List-models 
common /List-models-numb/ M 
common /Vessel_data text/ Vessel_list 
common /Vessel_data numb/ Vessel_inlet_ports, Vessel_outlet_ports, No_oP ve 
\cssels 
common /Unit-data-text/ Unit-list 
common /Unit data_numb/ Unit_inlet_ports, Unit_outlet-ports, No_of_units 
common /Lines-text/ Line_vessel 
common /Lines_numb/ Line_port, Z 
common /Proc_materials_text/ Proc_mat, List_proc_mats 
common /Proc_materials_numb/ No_of_mats 
common /Imps-text/ Imp_code, Imp_name 
common /Imps-numb/ Number_imps 
common /Mat_cons text/ Egn, Pipe_eqn 
common /Mat_cons_numb/ No-pipe egns 
C 
c Read in the vessel and model datafiles 
c 
open(1, file="Vessels_file", status="OLD", err=8010) 
open(2, file="In_line_units_file", status="OLD", err=8020) 
rewind 1 
rewind 2 
c i5 is the counter for the number of vessels or units read in 
i5=1 
100 read(1, *, end=500) Vessel_list(i5), Vessel_inletoorts(i5,1), Vessel_outlet_ 
\cports(i5,1) 
if(Vessel_inlet. ports(i5,1). gt. 0) then 
read(1, *) (Vessel_inletoorts(i5, j+1), j=1, Vessel_inlet_ports(i5,1)) 
end if 
if(Vessel outletoorts(i5,1). gt. 0) then 
read(1, *) (Vessel_outletoorts(i5, j+1), j=1, Vessel_outletoorts(i5,1) ) 
end if 
No_of_vessels=i5 
i5=i5+1 
goto 100 
500 i5=1 
550 read(2, *, end=1000) Unit_list(i5), Unit_inletoorts(i5,1), Unit_outletoorts 
\c(i5,1) 
if(Unit_inletoorts(i5,1). gt. 0) then 
read(2, *) (Unit_inletoorts(i5, j+1), j=1, Unit_inletoorts(i5,1)) 
end if 
if(Unit_outletoorts(i5,1). gt. 0) then 
read(2, *) (Unit_outletoorts(i5, j+l), j=1, Unit_outletoorts(i5,1)) 
endif 
No_oP units=i5 
i5=i5+1 
goto 550 
e 
1000 write(0, '("Configuration filename ? 
read(0, *) Inname 
Filename=Inname(1: Length(Inname))//". conf" 
open(8, file=Filename, status="NEW", err=8000) 
write(0, '(" Version number ? ... 
read(0, *) Version 
write(0, '(" Date ? 
read(0, *) Date 
write(0, '(" User Id ? 
read(0, *) User 
call read units 
call list_unit_models 
call read-links 
call list-lines 
call process-materials 
call impurities 
call mats-of-construction 
call output configuration 
stop 
8000 write(0, '("File already exists 
goto 1000 
8010 write(0, '(/, "Unable to read vessel datafile 
stop 
8020' write(0, '(/, "Unable to read unit datafile ! ", /)') 
stop 
end 
c \014 
subroutine read-units 
c 
C 
character*10 Unit(40), Model(40) 
integer J 
logical Check 
common /Units_text/ Unit, Model 
common /Units_numb/ J 
C 
write(0, '(//, "Type in the units, one at a time, with the corresponding mo 
\cdel. Type")') 
write(0, '("END DATA to stop entering units. ")') 
write(0, '(/, " Unit name Model name")') 
J=1 
1000 write(0, '(i2, " ", $)') J 
read(0, *) Unit(J), Model(J) 
if(Unit (J). ne. "end". and. Unit (J). ne. "END") then 
call verify_model(Model(J), Check) 
if(. not. Check) then 
write(0, '("Error ! Model name not found in Unit or Vessel datafile 
\cs")') 
write(0, '("Please retype 
goto 1000 
endif 
J=J+1 
goto 1000 
end if 
Unit(J)=" 
J=J-1 
return 
end 
c \014 
subroutine read-links 
c 
C 
C 
integer Link-port(2,40) 
character*10 Link unit(2,40) 
integer L 
logical Link-check 
common /Links_text/ Link-unit 
common /Links numb/ L, Link_port 
write(0, '(//, "Type in, one at a time, the links between the units. Type") 
\c') 
write(O, '("END xxx to stop. ")') 
write(0, '(/, " UPSTREAM DOWNSTREAM")') 
write(0, '(" UNIT PORT UNIT PORT")') 
L=1 
1000 write(0, '(i2, *' %$)') L 
read(0, *) Link unit(l, L), Link_port(1, L), Link_unit(2, L), Link_port(2, L) 
if(Link unit(1, L). ne. "END". and. Link_unit(l, L). ne. "end") then 
call verify_link(Lýnk unit(1, L), Link_port(1, L), Link_unit(2, L), Link_por 
\ct(2, L), Link_check) 
if(. not. Link_check) then 
write(0, '("Retype link I")') 
goto 1000 
endif 
L=L+1 
goto 1000 
end if 
Link unit(1, L)=" " 
Link unit(2, L)=" " 
Link-port(1, L)=" " 
Link-port(2, L)=" 
L=L-1 
return 
end 
c \014 
subroutine output_configuration 
C 
character*20 Filename*15, Version*2, Date, User 
character*10 Unit(40), Model(40), List models(40) 
integer Link port(2,40), Line_port(20,2), Z, No_of_mats 
character*10 Link_unit(2,40), Line_vessel(20,2), Proo_mat(20), List_proc_mat 
\cs(20) 
integer J, L, M, i, i 1, i2, i3, i4 
character Imp_code(20)*1, Imp_name(20)*30 
integer Number_imps 
character Egn(20)*160, Pipe_egn(20)*200 
integer No_pipe_egns 
c 
common /Units-text/ Unit, Model 
common /Units-numb/ J 
common /Links-text/ Link_unit 
common /Links numb/ L, Link_port 
common /File-data/ Filename, Version, Date, User 
common /List_models_text/ List_models 
common /List-models-numb/ M 
common /Lines-text/ Line_vessel 
common /Lines-numb/ Line_port, Z 
common /Proc_materials_text/ Proc_mat, List_proc_mats 
common /Proc_tnaterials_numb/ No_oP_mats 
common /Imps-text/ Imp_code, Imp_name 
common /Imps-numb/ Number-imps 
common /Mat-cons-text/ Eqn, Pipe_eqn 
common /Mat-cons-numb/ No_pipe_eqns 
C 
write(8, '("/*", //)') 
write(8, '("Filename = ", a20)') Filename 
write(8, '(" Version ", a2)') Version 
write(8, '(/, "Created on ", a20)') Date 
write(8, '(" by ", a20, //)') User 
write(8, '(" UNIT NAME MODEL NAME")') 
do 1000, i=1, J 
write(8, '(12, " ", alO, " ", alO)') i, Unit(i), Model(i) 
1000 continue 
write(8, '(//)') 
write(8, '(" UPSTREAM DOWNSTREAM")') 
write(8, '(" UNIT PORT UNIT PORT")') 
do 1500, i=1, L 
write (8, ' (i2, ** '*, alO, " %12, " ", alO, " %i2)') i, Link_unit(1, i) 
\c, Linkport(1, i), Link_unit(2, i), Linkport(2, i) 
1500 continue 
write(8, '(//)') 
write(8, '("Line SOURCE DRAIN PROCESS")') 
write(8, '("No. VESSEL PORT VESSEL PORT MATERIAL")') 
do 1600, i=1, Z 
write(8, ' (i2, " ", a10, " ", i2, alO, i2, " ", a)') i, L \cine_vessel(i, 1), Line.. ort(i, l), Line_vessel(i, 2), Line_port(i, 2), Proc_mat(i) 
1600 continue 
write(8, '(//, "Impurities")') 
write(8, '(* ----------- %/)') 
write(8, '("Code Name", /)') 
do 1700, i=1, Number_imps 
write(6, '('* %a, " ", a)') Imp_code(i), Imp_name(i)(1: Length(Imp_name 
\c(i))) 
1700 continue 
write(8, '(//, "Materials of Construction Terminal Events")') 
write(8, '(.. ----------------------------------------- "'/)') 
do 1800, i=1, No-pipe_egns 
write(8, '(a)') Egn(i)(1: Length(Eqn(i))) 
1800 continue 
write(8, '(//, "*/", //)') 
il=Length(Filename) 
write(8, '("conf_filename("", a, ""). ")') Filename(1: il) 
il=Length(Version) 
write(8, '("conf_version(" ", a, "" ). ")') Version(1: il) 
il=Length(Date) 
write (8, ' ("conf_date (" ", a, "") ." )') Date (1: il) i1=Length(User) 
write(8, '("conf_who(''", User(1: il) 
write(8, '(1/)') 
write(8, '("unit_models([", $)') 
do 2000, i=1, M 
if(i. ne. 1) write(8, '(", ", $)') 
i1=Length(List_models(i)) 
write(8, '(a, $)') List_models(i)(1: il) 
2000 continue 
write(8, 'C"]). ", /)') 
do 2200, i=1, J 
il=Length(Unit(i)) 
i2=Length(Model(i)) 
write(8, '("key(", a, ", ", a, "). ")') Unit(i)(1: i1), Model(i)(1: i2) 
2200 continue 
write(8, '(/)') 
do 2400, i=1, L 
il=Length(Link_unit(1, i)) 
i3=Length(Link_unit(2,1)) 
write(8, '("link(", a, ", ", i2, i2, Link_unit(1, i)(1: il), L 
\cink-port(1, i), Link_unit(2, i)(1: i3), Link port(2, i) 
2400 continue 
write(8, '(I)') 
do 2600, i=1, Z 
i1=Length(Line_vessel(i, 1)) 
i2=Length(Line_vessel(i, 2)) 
write (8, 'C'line(", i2, ", ", a, ", %U, %%a, %%U, ") . ") ')i, Line_vessel (i \c, 1) (1: i1), Line-port(i, 1), Line_vessel(i, 2) (1: i2), Line-port(i, 2) 
2600 continue 
write(8, '(/)') 
do 3000, i=1, Z 
write(8, '("material_in_line(", 12, ", ", a, "). ")') i, Proc_mat(i)(1: Length( 
\cProc_mat(i))) 
3000 continue 
write(8, '(/)') 
write(8, '("process_material_models([", $)') 
do 3500, i=1, No of_mats 
if(i. ne. 1) then 
write(8, '(", ", $)') 
end if 
write(8, '(a, $)') List-proc_mats(i)(1: Length(List-proc_mats(i))) 
3500 continue 
write(8, '("]). ")') 
write(8, '(/)') 
do 3600, i=1, Number_imps 
write(8, '("impurity(", a, "). ")') Imp_code(i) 
3600 continue 
write(8, '(/)') 
do 3700, i=1, No_pipe_egns 
write(6, '(a)') Pipe_egn(i)(1: Length(Pipe_eqn(i))) 
3700 continue 
write(8, '(/)') 
return 
end 
c \014 
subroutine list-unit-models 
c 
character*10 Unit(40), Model(40), List_models(40), F1ag*1 
integer J, M, i, il 
C 
common /Units_text/ Unit, Model 
common /Units_numb/ J 
common /List-models-text/ List-models 
common /List_models_numb/ M 
C 
M=0 
do 2000, i=1, J 
Flag="n" 
do 1000, il=1, M 
if(Model(i). eq. List_models(il)) then 
Flag=.. y. 
i1=M 
endif 
1000 continue 
if(Flag. eq. "n") then 
M=M+1 
List-models(M)=Model(i) 
end if 
2000 continue 
return 
end 
c \014 
subroutine list-lines 
C 
character*10 Unit(40), Mode1(40), Vessel_list(20), Mode1_of_unit 
character*10 Link unit(2,40), Line vessel(20,2) 
integer Linkoort(2,40), L, Vessel_inlet_ports(20,6), Vessel_outletoorts(20 
\c , 6), Drain_link_no, No of_vessels integer Line_port(20,2), i, i1, i2, i3, Z 
logical Model check 
0 
common /Vessel_data_text/ Vessel-list 
common /Vessel_data_numb/ Vessel_inlet_ports, Vessel_outlet_ports, No_of_ve 
\cssels 
common /Links-text/ Link_unit 
common /Links_numb/ L, Link_port 
common /Lines_text/ Line_vessel 
common /Lines numb/ Line_port, Z 
Z=0 
do 3000, i=1, L 
c Go through all the links in turn 
call model_from_unit(Link_unit(1, i), Model_of_unit, Model_check) 
do 2500, il=1,20 
c For each link check if the upstream unit is a vessel if(Vessel_list(il). eq. Model_of_unit) then 
c i3 is the number of outlet ports of the vessel i3=Vessel_outlet_ports(il, l) 
do 2000, i2=2, i3+1 
c Go through the outlet ports, one at a time. if(Link_port(1, i). eq. Vessel_outlet_ports(il, 12)) then 
c Check that the link port matches the vessel outlet port 
call follow_to_drain_vessel(i, Drain_link_no) 
Z=Z+1 
Line_vessel(Z, 1)=Link_unit(1, i) 
Line vessel(Z, 2)=Link_unit(2, Drain_link_no) 
Line_port(Z, 1)=Link_port(1, i) 
Line_port(Z, 2)=Link_port(2, Drain_link no) 
end if 
2000 continue 
endif 
2500 continue 
3000 continue 
return 
end 
\014 
subroutine follow_to_drain_vessel(First_1ink, Drain_link) 
integer i, Up_link, Drain_link, First_link 
character*10 Flag*3, Up_unit, Down_unit, Vessel_list(20), Link_unit(2,40), Mod 
\cel_of-unit 
integer L, Link_port(2,40), Up_port, Down_port 
logical Model_check 
common /Vessel_data_text/ Vessel-list 
common /Links_text/ Link-unit 
common /Links_numb/ L, Link_port 
Up-link=First-link 
10 Up unit=Link unit(1, Up_link) 
Up_port=Linkoort(1, Up_link) 
Down unit=Linkunit(2, Up_link) 
Down_port=Link_port(2, Up_link) 
Flag="not" 
do 1000, i=1,20 
c Check if the current unit is in the list of vessels. If it is, the 
c drain unit has been found. 
call model_from unit(Down_unit, Model_of_unit, Model_check) 
if(Vessel_list(i). eq. Model of_unit) then 
Drain-link=Up-link 
i=20 
Flag="end" 
end if 
1000 continue 
if(Flag. ne. "end") then 
The current unit is not the drain vessel for this line. So, find the 
next unit in the line ( by finding the next link ) and go back and try again. 
do 2000, i=1, L 
if(Link_unit(1, i). eq. Down_unit) then 
Up_1ink=i 
goto 10 
end if 
2000 continue 
end if 
return 
end 
c \014 
subroutine model_from_unit(A_unit, A_model, Check) 
c 
character*10 Unit(40), Model(40), A_unit, A_model 
integer i, J 
logical Check 
c 
common /Units-text/ Unit, Model 
common /Units_numb/ J 
c 
do 1000, i=1, J 
if(Unit(i). eq. A_unit) then 
A model=Model(i) 
i=J 
Check=. true. 
endif 
1000 continue 
return 
end 
c \014 
subroutine verify_link(Up_unit, Up_port, Down_unit, Down_port, Check) 
C 
character*10 Unit_list(40), Vessel_list(20), Up_unit, Down_unit 
character*10 Up model, Down_model 
integer Vessel_inlet_ports(20,6), Vessel_outlet_ports(20,6), No_of_vessels 
integer Unit_inlet_ports(20,6), Unit_outlet_ports(20,6), No_of_units 
integer Up_port, Down_port 
integer i, ii 
logical Check, Up_unit_check, Up_port_check, Down_unit_check, Down_port_check 
c 
common /Vessel_data_text/ Vessel_list 
common /Vessel_data_numb/ Vessel_inlet_ports, Vessel outlet_ports, No_oP ve 
\cssels 
common /Unit-data-text/ Unit-list 
common /Unit-data-numb/ Unit_inlet_ports, Unit outlet_ports, No_of units 
c 
Up_unit_check=. false. 
Up.. ort_check=. false. 
Down_unit_check=. false. 
Down-port-check=. false. 
Check=. false. 
call model_from unit(Up_unit, Up_model, Up_unit_check) 
c Check if the up unit does exist. If it does not then got to the next 
c stage. It it does exist then reset flag and carry on. 
if(. not. Up_unit_check) goto 2200 
Up_unit_check=. false. 
do 1000, i=!, No-of-vessels 
if(Up_model. eq. Vessel_list(i)) then 
Up_unitcheck=. true. 
500 
1000 
1500 
2000 
2200 
3500 
4000 
4500 
5000 
5200 
do 500, i1=2, Vessel_outlet_ports(i, 1)+1 
if(Up_port. eq. Vessel_outlet_ports(1, il)) then 
Up-port-check=. true. 
il=Vessel_outlet_ports(i, 1)+1 
endif 
continue 
i=No_of_vessels 
endif 
continue 
if(. not. Up_unit_check) then 
do 2000, i=1, No_of_units 
if(Up_model. eq. Unit_list(i)) then 
Up-unit-check=. true. 
do 1500, i1=2, Unit_outlet_ports(i, 1)+1 
if(Up_port. eq. Unit_outlet_ports(i, il)) then 
Up-port-check=. true. 
il=Unit_outlet_ports(i, 1)+1 
end if 
continue 
i=No_of_units 
end if 
continue 
end if 
Now check the downstream end of the link 
call model_from_unit(Down_unit, Down_model, Down_unit_check) 
Check if the down unit does exist. If it does not then got 
stage. It it does exist then reset flag and carry on. 
if(. not. Down_unit_check) goto 5200 
Down unit_check=. false. 
do 4000, i=1, No oP vessels 
if(Down_model. eq. Vessel_list(i)) then 
Down_unit_check=. true. 
do 3500, i1=2, Vessel_inlet_ports(i, 1)+1 
if(Down_port. eq. Vessel_inlet_ports(i, ii)) then 
Down-port-check=. true. 
il=Vessel_inlet_ports(i, 1)+1 
endif 
continue 
i=No_of_vessels 
end if 
continue 
if(. not. Down_unit_check) then 
do 5000, i=1, No_oP units 
if(Down model. eq. Unit_list(i)) then 
Down-unit-check=. true. 
do 4500, i1=2, Unit_inlet_ports(i, 1)+1 
if(Downcort. eq. Unit_inlet_ports( 
Down-port-check=. true. 
il=Unit_inlet_ports(i, 1)+1 
endif 
continue 
i=No_of_units 
end if 
continue 
endif 
if(Up_unit check) then 
if(. not. Upcort_check) then 
write(0, '("Error 1 No such outlet port 
i, il)) then 
to the next 
for model specified for ups 
\ctream unit")') 
endif 
else 
write(O, '("Error ! Upstream unit is not known")') 
endif 
if(Down unit_check) then 
if(. not. Down_portcheck) then 
write(0, '("Error ! No such inlet port for model specified for down \cstream unit")') 
endif 
else 
write(O, '("Error ! Downstream unit is not known")') 
endif 
if(Up_unit_check. and. Up_port_check. and. Down_unit_check. and. Down_port_chec \ck) then 
Check=. true. 
else 
Check=. false. 
end if 
return 
end 
c \014 
subroutine verify_model(Unit_model, Check) 
C 
character*10 Unit_model, Vessel_list(20), Unit_list(40) 
integer Vessel_inlet_ports(20,6), Vessel_outlet_ports(20,6), No_of_vessels 
integer Unit_inlet_ports(20,6), Unit_outlet_ports(20,6), No_of_units 
integer i 
logical Check 
c 
common /Vessel_data_text/ Vessel_list 
common /Vessel-data-numb/ Vessel_inlet_ports, Vessel outlet_ports, No_of_ve \cssels 
common /Unit-data-text/ Unit-list 
common /Unit data_numb/ Unit_inlet_ports, Unit_outlet_ports, No_of units 
C 
Check=. false. 
do 1000, i=1, No_of_units 
if(Unit_model. eq. Unit_list(i)) then 
Check=. true. 
i=No_of_units 
endif 
1000 continue 
if(. not. Check) then 
do 2000, i=1, No_of_vessels 
if(Unit_model. eq. Vessel_list(i)) then 
Check=. true. 
i=No_of vessels 
endif 
2000 continue 
endif 
return 
end 
c \014 
subroutine Process-materials 
character*10 Proc mat(20), List_proc_mats(20), Line_vessel(20,2) 
integer Z, Line_port(20,2), i, il, No of_mats 
character Flag 
c 
common /Lines_text/ Line_vessel 
common /Lines_numb/ Line_port, Z 
common /Proc_materials_text/ Proc_mat, List_proc_mats 
common /Proc_materials_numb/ No_of_mats 
c 
No-of-mats=0 
write(0, '(/, "Input of process materials")') 
write(0, '( --------------------------- 
do 2000, i=1, Z 
write (0, ' (//, "Line %12, " : ", a, " port %i2, " to ", a, " port %i2 
\c, /)') i, Line vessel(i, 1)(l: Length(Line_vessel(i, l))), Line_port(i, l), Line vess 
\cel(i, 2)(1: Length(Line vessel(i, 2))), Lineoort(i, 2) 
write(0, '("Process material ? 
read(0, *) Proc_mat(i) 
Flag="n" 
do 1000, i1=1, No_of_mats 
if(List_proo_mats(il). eq. Proc_mat(i)) then 
Flag=. 'y" 
il=No-of-mats 
end if 
1000 continue 
if(Flag. eq. "n") then 
No of_mats=No_of_mats+l 
List_proc_mats(No_of_mats)=Proc_mat(i) 
end if 
2000 continue 
write(0, '(/, "End of input of process materials", /)') 
return 
end 
c \014 
subroutine impurities 
C 
character*20 Letter*3, Name, Imp_code(20)*l, Imp_name(20)*30 
integer Number-imps 
C 
common /Imps_text/ Imp_code, Imp_name 
common /Imps-numb/ Number-imps 
c 
write(0, '("Impurity Definition")') 
write(0, '(.. -------------------")') 
write(0, '(/, "Type in, for one impurity at a time, the letter code and nam 
\ce of each of")') 
write(0, '("the impurities that are referenced in this configuration. Term 
\cinate the")') 
write(0, '("list with "end list" ")') 
write(0, '(/, "Letter Impurity")') 
write(0, '(" code name")') 
Number-imps=0 
1000 read(0, *) Letter, Name 
if(. not. (Letter. eq. "End". or. Letter. eq. "end". or. Letter. eq. "END")) then 
if(Length(Letter). eq. 1. and. ichar(Letter(1: 1)). ge. 97. and. ichar(Letter(1 
\c: 1)). lt. 122) then 
Number_imps=Number_imps+l 
Imp_code(Number_imps)=Letter 
Imp_name(Number_imps)=Name 
else 
write(0, '("Letter code incorrect ! Retype ! ")') 
write(0, '("(The letter code must be a lower case letter of the alph 
\cabet)")') 
end if 
goto 1000 
end if 
return 
end 
c \014 
subroutine mats-of-construction 
c 
character Reply*1, Egn(20)*160, Pipe_egn(20)*200 
character Variable*5, Port*1, Deviation*4, Text*20 
character*1 Var(6) 
integer No_pipe_egns, i8, ml, m2, orig_i8 
logical Flag 
C 
common /Mat_oons_text/ Eqn, Pipe_eqn 
common /Mat-cons-numb/ No_pipe_egns 
common /Variables/ Var 
c 
c Set up and initialise arrays 
c 
Var(1)="p" 
Var(2)="q" 
Var(3)="t" 
Var(4)="1"_ 
Var(5)="x" 
Var(6)="i" 
No_pipe_egns=0 
i8=1 
C 
write(0, '(//, "Materials of Construction")') 
write(O, '(.. --------------------------)') 
100 write(0, '(/, "Define a materials of construction terminal event ? (y or n) 
read(O, *) Reply 
if(Reply. eq. "n") goto 6000 
if(Reply. ne. "y") goto 100 
No_pipe_egns=No_pipe egns+l 
write(0, '("Type in the equation (enclosed in quotes) ... ")') read(0, *) Egn(No_pipe_eqns) 
Pipe_egn(No_pipe_egns)(1: 18)="rule(pipe, effect, [" 
ml=19 
i8=1 
c Read in the variable, port and deviation of the "cause" 
call get variable(Variable, Egn(No_pipe_eqns), i8, Flag) 
if(. not. Flag) goto 3000 
call get_port(Port, Egn(No_pipe_eqns), i8, Flag) 
if(. not. Flag) goto 3000 
c Read in the space after the variable and port if(Egn(No_pipe_eqns)(i8: i8). eq. " ") then 
i8=i8+1 
else 
Flag=. false. 
goto 3000 
end if 
call get_deviation(Deviation, Egn(No pipe_egns), i8, Flag) 
if(. not. Flag) goto 3000 
m2=ml+6+Length(Variable)+Length(Deviat ion) 
Pipe_egn(No_pipe_eqns)(ml: m2)="["//Variable(1: Length(Variable))//", "//Por \ct(1: 1)//", "//Deviation(1: Length(Deviation))//"]], ^ 
m1=m2+1 
c Read in the ">" that signifies the end of the cause side of the equation if(Eqn(No_pipe_egns)(i8: i8). eq. ">") then 
i8=i8+1 
else 
Flag=. false. 
Soto 3000 
endif 
c Open up the list of consequences 
m2=m1 
Pipe_egn(No_pipe_eqns)(m1: m2)="[" 
ml=m2+1 
c Get the next consequence 
1000 orig_i8=i8 
call get_variable(Variable, Egn(No_pipe_eqns), i8, Flag) 
c If the variable does not exist then go to text collection if(. not. Flag) then 
i8=orig_i8 
goto 2000 
endif 
call get-port(Port, Egn(No-pipe_eqns), i8, Flag) 
c If the port does not exist then backspace over the "port" read and go to 
c text collection 
if(. not. Flag) then 
i8=orig_i8 
goto 2000 
endif 
c Read the space between port and deviation. If this space does not exist 
c then backspace over the "port" read and go to text collection 
if(Egn(No_pipe_eqns)(i8: i8). eq. " ") then 
i8=i8+1 
else 
i8=orig_i8 
goto 2000 
end if 
call get_deviation(Deviation, Egn(No_pipe_eqns), i8, Flag) 
c If no deviation exists then the equation is rejected 
if(. not. Flag) goto 3000 
c Drop the current consequence into the Pipe_egn 
m2=ml+4+Length(Variable)+Length(Deviation) 
Pipe_egn(No_pipe_eqns)(ml: m2)="["//Variable(1: Length(Variable))//", 
\ct(1: 1)//", "//Deviation(l: Length(Deviation))//"]" 
m1=m2+1 
c Skip the text collection section 
goto 2500 
c Text collection section 
2000 call get_text(Text, Egn(No_pipe_eqns), i8, Flag) 
c If no text exists the reject equation 
if(. not. Flag) goto 3000 
c Drop the current consequence into the Pipe_eqn 
m2=ml+11+Length(Text) 
Pipe_egn(No-pipe_eqns)(ml: m2)="["'//Text(l: Length(Text))//"', ' 
m1=m2+1 
c If a comma follows then another consequence is to be collected 
2500 if(Eqn(No_pipe_egns)(i8: i8). eq. ", ") then 
i8=i8+1 
c Drop a comma to separate the cons in the Pipe_eqn 
m2=ml 
Pipe_egn(No_pipe_eqns)(rnl: m2)=", " 
ml=m2+1 
goto 1000 
end if 
c Close the Pipe_eqn 
m2=ml+2 
Pipe_egn(No_pipe_egns)(ml: m2)="]). " 
ml=m2+1 
c Blank out the rest of the Pipe_egn 
do 2800, i=ml, 200 
Pipe_egn(No_pipe_eqns)(i: i)=" 
2800 continue 
c 
print*, Pipe_egn(No-pipe_eqns) 
c 
c Go and see if another equation is to be collected 
goto 100 
c 
c We have a failure so point to the failure and reduce the count of 
"//Par 
, ]. 
c equations by one 
3000 do 4000,1=1,18 
write(0, '(a, $)') 
4000 continue 
write(0, '(a)') 
write(0, '("Translation failed 1")') 
No_pipe_egns=No-pipe_egns-1 
goto 100 
C 
6000 return 
end 
c \014 
subroutine get_variable(Variable, Egn, i8, Flag) 
c 
character*1 Var(6) 
character Variable*5, Egn*160 
integer i, i8, i8_orig 
logical Flag 
c 
common /Variables/ Var 
c 
c Initialise the variable to blank to avoid transferring ctl chars at the 
c end of the string 
Variable=" 
c 
c Save the value of the counter so that if this routine fails then the 
c counter can be rest to its original value 
i8_orig=i8 
c 
do 1000, i=1,6 
if(Egn(i8: i8). eq. Var(i)) then 
Flag=. true. 
Variable(1: 1)=Var(i) 
i=6 
i8=i8+1 
else 
Flag=. false. 
endif 
1000 continue 
c 
c Special treatment for the concentration variable 
if(Variable(1: 1). eq. "x") then 
Variable(1: 3)="[x, " 
if(ichar(Eqn(i8: i8)). ge. 49. and. ichar(Egn(i8: i8)). le. 57) then 
Variable(4: 4)=Egn(i8: i8) 
Variable(5: 5)="]" 
Flag=. true. 
i8=i8+1 
c Read the minus sign following the concentration term 
if(Egn(i8: i8). eq. "-") then 
i8=i8+1 
Flag=. true. 
else 
Flag=. false. 
end if 
else 
Flag=. false. 
end if 
end if 
c 
c Special treatment for the impurity variable 
if(Variable(1: 1). eq. "i") then 
Variable(1: 3)="[i, " 
c Check that the impurity referred to is a lower case letter of the c alphabet or that it is the generic dummy impurity 
- if(Egn(i8: i8). eq. "_". or. (Ichar(Eqn(i8: i8)). ge. 97. and. ichar(Egn(i8: i8)) \c. le. 122)) then 
Variable(4: 4)=Egn(i8: i8) 
Variable(5: 5)="]" 
Flag=. true. 
i8=i8+1 
c Read the minus sign following the impurity term 
if(Eqn(i8: i8). eq. "-") then 
i8=i8+1 
Flag=. true. 
else 
Flag=. false. 
endif 
else 
Flag=. false. 
end if 
end if 
c 
c If this goal has failed then reset the value of 18 if(. not. Flag) then 
i8=i8_orig 
end if 
return 
end 
c \014 
subroutine getport(Port, Egn, i8, Flag) 
0 
character*1 Port 
character Eqn*160 
integer i, i8 
logical Flag 
C 
if(ichar(Eqn(i8: i8)). ge. 49. and. ichar(Egn(i8: i8)). 1e. 57) then 
Port=Egn(i8: i8) 
Flag=. true. 
i8=i8+1 
else 
Flag=. false. 
end if 
return 
end 
c \014 
subroutine get_deviation(Deviation, Egn, i8, Flag) 
0 
character Eqn*160, Deviation*4 
integer i8 
logical Flag 
C 
if(Egn(i8: i8+1). eq. "HI") then 
Deviation="high" 
i8=i8+2 
Flag=. true. 
goto 1000 
end if 
if(Egn(i8: i8+1). eq. "LO") then 
Deviation=" low" 
i8=i8+2 
Flag=. true. 
goto 1000 
endif 
if(Egn(i8: i8+3). eq. "NONE") then 
Deviation="none" 
i8=i8+4 
Flag=. true. 
goto 1000 
endif 
c 
c There is no deviation ! 
Flag=. false. 
c ýy 1000 return 
end 
c \014 
subroutine get_text(Text, Egn, i8, Flag) 
c 
character Eqn*160, Text*20 
integer i8, i9 
logical Flag 
c 
c Initialise Text to blanks so that no ctl chars at the end of the text 
c are sent through to main 
Text=" 
i9=i8+1 
200 if(Egn(i9: i9). eq. ", ") then 
Text=Egn(i8: i9-1) 
i8=i9 
goto 1000 
end if 
if(Egn(i9: i9). eq. ">") then 
Text=Egn(i8: i9-1) 
i8=i9 
goto 1000 
end if 
if(i9. ge. Length(Egn)) then 
Text=Eqn(i8: ) 
i8=i9 
goto 1000 
end if 
a 
c Advance counter by one and check again for the end of the text i9=i9+1 
goto 200 
c 
c End of text 
1000 Flag=. true. 
return 
end 
APPENDIX D 
Listing of 
'identifier" Program 
226 
I 
identifier 
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ 
/* identifier - Hazard Identification Program 
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ 
NOTES 
1) This version has a working cause and effect identifier to search 
for effects through the unit models in the line. 
2) The steps followed by the cause and effect identifier are as 
follows ... 
i) Find all the causes and effects of the top event at the 
source vessel 
ii) Find all possible causes of the top event at the unit under 
consideration 
iii) Find all possible effects of the top event at the unit under 
consideration 
iv) Repeat (ii) and (iii) for every unit in the line 
v) Follow the top event through the propagation rules at the 
drain vessel and save all effects 
vi) Repeat (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) for all the lines 
vii) Conduct cause and effect searches on all the vessels 
3) This system also employs a generic unit, a pipe, in each process 
line. This results in minimum duplication of output. 
4) This version utilises the cause and effect searches on the vessels 
after the searches on the lines have been completed. 
5) This version utilises process material models to check the validity 
of the causes and to check for any effects of the process deviation 
on the process material. 
6) This version has a concentration change utility. 
7) This version has a routine to deal with lines that are normally closed 
to flow. 
8) The printing stage has been amended so as to change non-valid NONE 
variables to LOW. The only valid NONE variables are FLOW and LEVEL. All 
other variables have NONE deviations changed to LOW. 
9) There is a utility available to handle impurities as a variable 
deviation. 
10) All the source vessels are assumed to be sources for all deviations 
apart from escape and impurities. 
*/ 
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ 
/* STANDARD CLAUSES -- member, append, prt, etc. */ 
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */ 
member(X, [X; _])" 
member(X, [_; Y]) 
/* standard member clause */ 
member M Y). 
append([], K, K). /* standard append clause 
append([X; K1], K2, [X; K3]) : - 
append(K1, K2, K3). 
delete(_, [], []). /* standard delete clause 
delete(X, [X; L], M) : - 
delete(X, L, M). 
delete(X, [Y; L1], [Y; L2]) 
delete(X, L1, L2). 
islist([H; T]). /* standard list test 
islist([]). 
prt([]) : - /* easy-print clause */ 
nl. 
prt(CH; T]) : - 
write(H), tab(1), prt(T). 
file_prt([]) : - /* print to file in quotes */ 
nl. 
fileort([H; T]) : - 
put(039), write(H), put(039) , tab(1), file_prt(T). 
plist([]) : - /* print list clause */ 
nl. 
plist([H; T]) : - 
write(H), nl, plist(T). 
user_output(Output_list) /* output only if option is correct */ 
output-option(a) 
output-option(c) 
prt(Output_list). 
user_output(Output_list) : - 
user-write(Item) . - 
output-option(a) 
output-option(c) 
write(Item). 
user-write(Item) . - 
file_output(Output_list) : - /* output only if option is correct */ 
output-option(b) 
output option(c) 
outfile(Outfile), 
tell(Outfile), 
file_prt(Output_list), 
I te11(user). 
file_output(Output_list) :- 
file_plist(C)). 
file_plist([H; T]) : - 
file_output(H), 
file output([]), 
file_plist(T). 
user-tab(Tab) :- 
output_option(a) 
output-option(c) 
tab(Tab). 
user-tab(Tab) :- 
file tab(Tab) :- 
output_option(b) 
output-option(c) 
tab(Tab). 
file-tab(Tab) :- 
last of_list(X, [X]). 
last of_list(X, [_; Y]) 
last_of_list(X, Y). 
/* output list to file if opted for */ 
/* tab on right output option */ 
/* obtain last element of list */ 
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ 
/* CLAUSES FOR OPTION RECOGNITION AND MANIPULATION OF FLOWLINES 
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */ 
deviations([none, high, low)). 
opposite_of(none, high). 
opposite_of(low, high). 
opposite of(high, low). 
variables((flow, pressure, temperature]). 
/* clauses for available options */ 
List of valid variable deviation combinations 
*/ 
variable_deviation(flow, none). 
variable deviation(flow, low). 
variable_deviation(flow, high). 
variable deviation(pressure. low). 
variable_deviation(pressure, high). 
variable deviation(temperature, low). 
variable deviation(temperature, high). 
variable deviation(escape, ' '). 
variable deviation([i, _], 
high). /* Impurity variable deviation */ 
vessel variable deviation(level, low). 
vessel_variable_deviation(level, high). 
vessel variable_deviation(pressure, low). 
vessel variable deviation(pressure, high). 
Clauses to convert variable names into their keys 
*1 
variable_key(flow, q) :-I. 
variable_key(temperature, t) 
variable_key(pressure, p) 
variable_key(level, l) : - 
variable_key(Anyother, Anyother) :-!. 
1* 
Key clause for the generic pipe unit. This is to allow for the fact that the 
automatic selection of the pipe unit would mean that the configuration 
file would not have a key for the pipe unit. 
*/ 
key(pipe, pipe). 
Clauses to enable the recognition of certain keywords in the causes. 
keyword(blockage). 
keyword(cavitation). 
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ /* CONTROLLING CLAUSE FOR EXPERT HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */ 
/* 
This is the clause controlling the different stages of the cause and 
effect search. At a later stage it may prove expedient to insert a 
deny clause in order to invoke this clause automatically. 
*/ 
start :- 
filename, !, 
load-up-unit-models,!, 
load_up_process materialmodels,!, 
output-configuration-info,!, 
conduct search. 
The conduct-search goal is used to separate the two stages of the search - 
the line search and the vessel search. The line searches are failed in order 
to proceed through all the lines. The second invocation of conduct-search is 
used to initiate the vessel searches at the source vessels. The third 
invocation of conduct-search is used to continue the search at the drain 
vessels. The fourth goal is the catchall. 
*ý 
conduct search 
line(Linenumber, S_vessel, S_port, D vessel, D_port), 
variable deviation(Var, Dev), 
variable key(Var, Kvar), 
Pile output([line, Linenumber]), 
file_output([Dev, Kvar]), 
start_line(Linenumber, S_vessel, S_port, D vessel, D_port, Var, Dev), 
file_output([end_of_list]) 
fail. 
conduct-search : - 
line(Linenumber, S_vessel, S_port, D_vessel, D_port), 
assert(linenumber(O)), 
search_vessel_variables(S_vessel, S_port), 
retractall(linenumber(_)) 
fail. 
conduct-search : - 
line(Ln, S_vessel, S_port, D_vessel, D_port), 
search_downstream vessel(D_vessel, D_port), 
fail. 
conduct-search. 
search_downstream vessel(Vessel, Port) : - 
line(_, Vessel, 
_, _, _), 
, 
fail. 
search_downstream_vessel(Vessel, Port) 
assert(linenumber(0)), 
search vessel variables(Vessel, Port), 
retractall(linenumber(0)), 
II 
fail. 
Start the line search by first checking the propagation steps at the source 
vessel. If there are any vessel deviations that could give rise to the 
current line deviation then this is to be developed. The search of the line 
can proceed after the source vessel check. 
start_line(Ln, S_vess, S_port, D_vess, D_port, Var, Dev) : - 
line var_dev_assert(Ln, Var, Dev), 
variable_key(Var, Kvar), 
reverse_propagation_steps_at_source(S_vess, S_port, Kvar, Dev), 
cause-and-effect-search, 
This clause checks for the existence of propagation rules that may give rise 
to the current deviation at the source vessel. 
reverse_propagation_steps_at_source(Vessel, Port, Var, Dev) : - 
key(Vessel, Vessmodel), 
rule(Vessmodel, p, [Var, Port], Proplist, Inproplist), 
strip_prop_list_into_causes(Vessel, Port, Var, Dev, Proplist), 
strip_inprop_list_into_causes(Vessel, Port, Var, Dev, Inproplist), 
fail. 
This clause checks for the existence of propagation rules that will indicate 
the effect that the current deviation will have on the other variables at the 
vessel. 
*1 
reverse-propagation-steps at_source(Vessel, Port, Var, Dev) : - 
key(Vessel, Vess_model), 
rule(Vess_model, p, [Outvar, Outport], Proplist, Inproplist), 
Outvar \_ Ex, 
-], 
member([Var, Port], Proplist), 
assert(effect(_, Vessel, [Var, Port, Dev], [[Outvar, Outport, Dev]])), 
save_effect at_vessel(Vessel, Var, Dev, Port, Outvar, Dev, Outport) 
fail. 
This clause checks for the existence of propagation rules that will indicate 
the inverse effects that the current deviation will have on the other 
variables at the vessel. 
reverseoropagation_steps_at_source(Vessel, Port, Var, Dev) 
opposite of(Dev, Oppdev), 
key(Vessel, Vessmodel), 
rule(Vess_model, p, [Outvar, Outport], Proplist, Inproplist), 
Outvar \_ [x, 
_], 
member([Var, Port], Inproplist), 
assert(effect(_, Vessel, [Var, Port, Dev], [[Outvar, Outport, Oppdev]])), 
save_effect_at_vessel(Vessel, Var, Dev, Port, Outvar, Oppdev, Outport) 
fail. 
Catchall clause for the case where there are no propagation rules referring to 
the current deviation. 
*1 
reverse_propagation_steps_at source(Vessel, Port, Var, Dev). 
Break up the list of proportional entries and flag them as causes. 
strip_prop_list_into_causes(Vessel, Port, Var, Dev, [[Pvar, Pport]; Restlist]) 
assert(cause(_, Vessel, [Var, Port, Dev], [[Pvar, Pport, Dev]])), 
I 
strip_prop_list_into_causes(Vessel, Port, Var, Dev, Restlist). 
strip_prop_list_into_causes(Vessel, Port, Var, Dev, []). 
Break up the list of inversely proportional entries and flag them as causes. 
strip_inprop_list_into_causes(Vessel, Port, Var, Dev, [[Pvar, Pport]; Restlist]) 
opposite_of(Dev, Opposite dev), 
assert(cause(_, Vessel, [Var, Port, Dev], [[Pvar, Pport, Opposite dev]])), 
i 
strip_inprop_list_into_causes(Vessel, Port, Var, Dev, Restlist). 
strip_inprop_list_into_causes(Vessel, Port, Var, Dev, []). 
Clause to control the search at the vessels. The vessel variables are 
considered in turn. Once the vessel variables have been dealt with, the 
vessels are searched for the concentration changes. This is done by the second 
invocation of the search-vessel-variables clause. Note that an uninstantiated 
port number is used for the calls to "reverse-propagation-steps at_source" 
and "source_vessel search". This is so that all the ports of the vessel are 
considered for the causes and consequences of the vessel variable deviation. 
search_vessel_variables(S_vessel, S_port) : - 
vessel-variable deviation(Var, Dev), 
variable_key(Var, Kvar), 
file output([line, 0]), 
file_output([Dev, Kvar, S_vessel]), 
reverse_propagation_steps_atsource(S_vessel, _S_port, 
Kvar, Dev), 
source_vessel search(Kvar, Dev, S_vessel, _S_port), 
/* 
_S-port=Sport file_output([end of_list]), 
fail. 
i* The vessels are first searched for the occurrence of high concentrations and 
then for the occurrence of low concentrations. 
search vessel_variables(S_vessel, S_port) : - 
retractall(deviation(_)), 
assert(deviation(high)), 
file_output([line, 0]), 
file output((high, x, S_vessel]), 
get_conc_changes(Svessel), 
print cone_changes(S vessel), 
file_output([end_of_list]), 
retractall(deviation(_)), 
i 
assert(deviation(low)), 
file_output([line, 0]), 
file_output([low, x, S_vessel]), 
get conc_changes(S vessel), 
print_conc_changes(S vessel), 
file output([end_of_list]), 
retractall(deviation(_)), 
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ 
/* INPUT OF"CASE ID, CONFIGURATION FILE AND UNIT & PROPERTY MODELS */ 
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */ 
/* 
This stage takes in the configuration file name and calls up all the 
related unit model files. Note the "repeat" goal in the clause 
"filename". This will allow backtracking to resatisfy the selection 
of the output option. 
*/ 
filename : - 
nl, nl, 
write('Type in the case identification 
read(Inname), nl, 
get_io_filenames(Inname, Inputfile),!, 
consult(Inputfile), nl, 
i 
nl, nl, 
write('Output options are ... '), nl, nl, 
write('a) Full continuous reporting to 
write('b) Brief report to file'), nl, 
write('c) Full report to terminal AND 
repeat, 
name ... '), 
terminal'), nl, 
brief report to file'), nl, nl, 
write('Option ? ... '), 
read(Option), 
nl 
check-output option(Option), 
i 
assert(output_option(Option)). 
Append ". conf" to the study name to obtain the input filename and 
to the study name to obtain the output filename. 
get_io_filenames(Name, Infile) 
name(Name, List), 
append(List, [046,099,111,110,102], Inlist), 
append(List, [046,112,114,111,095,111,117,116], Outlist), 
name(Infile, Inlist), 
name(Outfile, Outlist), 
assert(outfile(Outfile)). 
check_output_option(a). 
check_output_option(b). 
check_output_option(c). 
check_output_option(_) : - 
write('Invalid Option ! '), nl, fail. 
Load up all the models for the units referenced 
plus the model for the generic pipe unit. 
load_up unit_models 
unit models(J), 
append(J, [pipe], J1), 
load(J1). 
load([H; T]) : - 
consult(H), 
load(T). 
load([]). 
pro-out" 
in the configuration file 
i* Load up all the models for the properties of the materials contained in the 
configuration file. 
*/ 
load_up_process_material models : - 
protess_material_models(J), 
load(J). 
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ 
/* OUTPUT CONFIGURATION INFORMATION AND SELECT LINE FOR INVESTIGATION */ 
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */ 
/* 
This stage prints out brief details of the configuration. The name of 
the configuration datafile together with the date on which it was 
written is printed out. 
*1 
output_configuration_info 
nl, nl, 
conf_filename(Name), 
conf date(Date), 
conf_who(Who), 
write('Configuration file : '), write(Name), nl, 
write(' created on '), write(Date), nl, 
write(' by : '), write(Who), nl. 
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ 
/* SELECTION OF PROPERTY AND GUIDEWORD FOR SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION */ 
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */ 
i* 
This stage allows the assertion of variable and deviation for the cause 
and effect search. 
The "variable_key" goal translates from the variable word to the variable 
symbol used in the search. 
*/ 
line_var_dev_assert(L, V, D) : - 
retractall(variable(_)), 
retractall(deviation(_)), 
retractall(linenumber(_)), 
variable_key(V, Kvar), 
assert(variable(Kvar)), 
assert(deviation(D)), 
assert(linenumber(L)). 
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ 
/* SEARCH FOR CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF HIGH IMPURITY LEVELS 
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ 
This stage conducts a cause and effect search for high impurity levels 
before the general cause and effect search of process deviations. Each 
process line is checked, this includes the source and drain vessels. 
*/ 
cause-and-effect-search 
retractall(ref(_)), 
assert(ref(0)), 
linenumber(Ln), 
line(Ln, S vessel, S_port, D_vessel, D_port), 
variable([i, _]), deviation(high), 
link(S_vessel, S-port, Next_unit, Next port), 
check_line_is_open(Next_unit, Next_port, D_vessel, D_port), 
, 
collect_line_impurities(S_vessel, S_port, Next_unit, Next_port, D vessel, 
\cD_port). 
collect_line_impurities(S vessel, S_port, Next_unit, Next port, D_vessel, D port) 
impurity(I), 
search next_impurity(I, S_vessel, S-port, Next_unit, Next_port, D vessel, D 
\o_port), 
fail. 
search_next_impurity(I, S vessel, Sport, Next_unit, Next_port, D_vessel, D_port) : - 
, 
impurity_cause_search(I, S vessel, S_port), 
impurity_effect_searoh(I, S_vessel, S_port), 
impurity_print(I, S_vessel, S_port), 
impurity cause search(I, pipe, 1), 
impurity_effect_search(I, pipe, 1), 
impurity_print(I, pipe, 1), 
impurity_search_on_line(I, Next unit, Next_port, D_vessel, D_port), 
Catchall for when the impurities are exhausted 
collect_line_impurities(S vessel, S_port, Next_unit, Next_port, D_vessel, D_port) :- 
impurity_search_on_line(I, D vessel, D_port, D_vessel, D_port) : - 
impurity_cause_search(I, D vessel, Dport), 
impurity_effect search(I, D_vessel, D_port), 
impurity_print(I, D_vessel, D port). 
impurity_search_on_line(I, A_unit, A_port, D_vessel, D_port) 
impurity_cause_search(I, A_unit, A_port), 
impurity_effect search(I, A_unit, A_port), 
impurity_print(I, A unit, A_port), 
link(A_unit, 
_, 
Next unit, Next_port), 
impurity_search_on_line(I, Next unit, Next_port, D_vessel, D_port). 
impurity_cause_search(I, Unit, 
_) key(Unit, Kunit), 
rule(Kunit, Ruletype, Causes, Events), 
Ruletype \= effect, 
member([[i, I], _, 
high], Events), 
assert(cause(_, Unit, [[i, I], ' ', high], Causes)) 
fail. 
impurity_cause_search(I, Unit, 
_) :- 
impurity_effect search(I, Unit, _) : - key(Unit, Kunit), 
rule(Kunit, Ruletype, Events, Effects), 
member([[i, I], _, 
high], Events), 
assert(effect(_, Unit, [[i, I], ' ', high], Effects) 
fail. 
impurity_effect_search(I, Unit, 
_) 
impurity_print(I, A_unit, 
_) : - user-output([]), 
user_output(C]), 
linenumber(Ln), 
user_output(['Line ', Ln, ' ', A unit, ' Impurity ', I, ' high']), 
user_output(C -------------------------------------------------- 1), 
user_output([]), 
user_output(['Causes']), 
impurity_print_causes(I, A_unit), 
user-output([]), 
user_output(['Consequences']), 
impurity-print effects(I, A_unit). 
impurity_print_causes(I, Unit) :- 
cause(R, Unit, [[i, I], ' ', high], Causes), 
retract(cause(R, Unit, [[i, I], ' ', high], Causes)), 
print out_impurity_causes(Causes, Unit, I) 
fail. 
impurity-print causes(I, Unit). 
: - impurity_print_effects(I, Unit) 
effect(R, Unit, [[i, I], ' ', high], Effects), 
retract(effect(R, Unit, [[i, I], ' ', high], Effects)), 
print_out_impurity_effects(Effects, Unit, I) 
fail. 
impurity_print effects(I, Unit). 
print out_impurity_causes([[Var, Port, Dev]; Tail], Unit, I) 
file_output([I, Unit, cause, Var, Port, Dev]), 
user_output([Var, Port, Dev]), 
print_out_impurity_causes(Tail, Unit, I). 
printout_impurity_causes([], Unit, I). 
print_out_impurity_effects([[Var, Port, Dev]: Tail], Unit, I) 
file_output([I, Unit, effect, Var, Port, Dev] ), 
user_output([Var, Port, Dev]), 
print_out_impurity_effects(Tail, Unit, I). 
print_out_impurity_effects([], Unit, I). 
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ 
/* SEARCH FOR CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF USER SPECIFIED VARIABLE DEVIATION */ 
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ 
This stage controls the mechanics of the search for causes and effects. 
The line is considered one unit at a time and for each unit the search 
for causes at the unit is invoked followed by the invocation of the 
search for effects of the particular cause. 
*/ 
Controlling clause for the cause and effect search of a variable deviation. on 
a line. The process line is checked to see if it is open to flow. In the case 
of the line being closed the search is directed by the second invocation of 
cause-and-effect-search. The source vessel is first consulted followed by 
consultation of the generic pipe unit. The search is then directed along the 
process line. 
cause-and-effect-search 
retractall(ref(_)), 
assert(ref(O)), 
linenumber(Ln), 
line(Ln, S ve. sel, S_port, D_vessel, D_port), 
variable(Var), 
deviation(Dev), 
link(S_vessel, S_port, Next_unit, Next_port), 
check_line_is_open(Next_unit, Next_port, D vessel, D_port), 
souroe_vessel_search(Var, Dev, S_vessel, S_port), 
, 
cause_search_on_unit(Var, Dev, pipe, _), 
effect search_on unit(Var, Dev, pipe, _), 
print_causes_and_effects(Var, Dev, pipe, _), 
line_units_search(Ln, S_vessel, S_port, D_vessel, D_port, Var, Dev). 
Clause to check that the process line is open. This consists of travelling 
down the process line consulting the propagation rules at each unit. There are 
two catchalls for this clause. The first is for the variable "escape" for 
which the line is assumed open and the second is for when the end of the line 
has been reached. - 
check_line_is open(Unit, Port, D_vessel, D.. port) :- /* Catchall for the variable 
\c"escape" */ 
variable(escape). 
check_line_is_open(D_vessel, D_port, D_vessel, D_port). /* Catchall for end of li 
\cne */ 
check-line-is open(Up_unit, Up_in_port, D_vessel, D_port) 
link(Up_unit, Upout_port, Down_unit, Down_in_port), 
variable(Var), 
key(Up_unit, Model), 
rule(Model, p, [Var, Up_out_port], Pos_inputs, Neg_inputs), 
member([Var, Up_in_port], Pos_inputs), 
check_line_is_open(Down_unit, Down_in_port, D_vessel, D_port). 
Clause to pick up all the saved effects at the source vessel 
source_vessel search(Var, Dev, S_vessel, S_port) 
retract(saved_effect(S vessel, Cause_var, Cause_dev, Cause_port, Var, D 
\cev, S_port)), 
assert(cause(_, S vessel, [Var, S_port, Dev], [[Cause_var, Cause_port, Ca 
\cuse dev]])) 
fail. 
Catchall clause to conduct cause and effect search on the vessel after all 
saved effects at the vessel have been picked up. Note that there is one 
automatic cause, that the vessel supplies the variable deviation. 
source vessel search(Var, Dev, S vessel, S_port) : - 
/* Cut to prevent backtracking past this point 
Var = escape ; /* Automatic cause for escape not set up */ 
var(S_port) ; /* Auto cause for vessel v'bles not set up 
assert(cause(_, S vessel, [Var, S_port, Dev], [[Var, S port, Dev]])) 
)' 
c 
Var = escape, /* Do not need a port number for escape 
cause_search_on_unit(Var, Dev, S_vessel, _), 
cause_search_on_unit(Var, Dev, S_vessel, S_port) 
effect_search_on unit(Var, Dev, S_vessel, S_port), 
Var = escape, /* Do not need a port number for escape */ 
print_causes and_effects(Var, Dev, S_vessel, _), 
print_causes and_effects(Var, Dev, S_vessel, S_port) 
). 
Pick up the next unit in the line and conduct cause and effect searches on the 
unit 
*/ 
line_units_search(Ln, Up_unit, Up_port, Down_vess, Down_port, Var, Dev) 
link(Up unit, Up_port, Next unit, Next_port), 
Next_unit \= Down_vess, 
cause-search-on unit(Var, Dev, Next_unit, _), 
effect. search_on_unit(Var, Dev, Next_unit, _), 
print_causes_and_effects(Var, Dev, Next_unit, _), 
link(Next_unit, Out_port, 
_, _), 
/* The outlet port is used for the next 
\c stage of the line search 
i 
line_units_search(Ln, Next_unit, Out_port, Down_vess, Down_port, Var, Dev). 
The case of the next unit in the line being the drain vessel. In this case 
conduct cause and effect searches on the drain vessel and then step through 
the propagation rules in order to save effects at the vessel. 
*/ 
line_units_search(Ln, Up_unit, Up_port, Down vess, Down_port, Var, Dev) : - 
link(Up_unit, Up_port, Down vess, Down_port), 
Var = escape, /* Do not need a port number for escape */ 
cause search on_unit(Var, Dev, Down vess, _), 
cause_sesrch on_unit(Var, Dev, Down vess, Downoort) 
( 
Var = escape ; 
assert(effect(_, Down_vess, [Var, Down-port, Dev] ,[ [Var, Down_port, Dev] 
\c])) 
effect search on_unit(Var, Dev, Down_vess, Downoort), 
Var = escape, /* Do no need a port number for escape */ 
print_causes_and_effects(Var, Dev, Down_vess, _), 
); 
print-causes and_effects(Var, Dev, Down_vess, Down_port) 
material effect_search(Ln, Var, Dev, Mat), 
i 
print_causes_and_effects(Var, Dev, Mat, _no_port), 
do_propagation_steps(Var, Dev, Down_vess, Down_port). 
Check if the current variable deviation will be transformed to another. If so, 
print and save the effect and check for more propagation rules that affect 
the current variable deviation. 
*/ 
do_propagation_steps(Var, Dev, Down vess, Down_port) : - 
key(Down vess, K_down_vess), 
rule(K_down_vess, p, [Out_var, Out_port], Pos_inputs, Neg_inputs), 
Out_var \_ [x, 
_] , 
/* No prop' rules for concn to be selected */ 
member([Var, Down_port], Pos_inputs), 
assert(effect(_, Down_vess, [Var, Down_port, Dev], [[Out_var, Out_port, De 
\cv]])}, 
\cort) 
print_oauses_and_effects(Var, Dev, Down vess, Down_port), 
effect_search on_unit(Out var, Dev, Down vess, Out_port), 
print_causes_and_effects(Out_var, Dev, Down_vess, 0ut_port), 
save_effect_at_vessel(Down vess, Var, Dev, Down_port, Out var, Dev, Out_p 
Pail. 
Check if the current variable deviation will be inversely transformed to 
another. If so, print and save the effect and check for more propagation rules 
that contain the current variable deviation. 
*/ 
do_propagation_steps(Var, Dev, Down_vess, Down_port) : - 
key(Down_vess, K_down vess), 
rule(K down vess, p, [Out_var, Out_port], Pos_inputs, Neg_inputs), 
Out_var \_ [x, 
_] , 
/* No prop' rules for conon to be selected */ 
member([Var, Down_port], Neg_inputs), 
opposite_of(New_dev, Dev), 
assert(effect(_, Down vess, [Var, Down_port, Dev], [[Out var, Out_port, Ne 
\cw_dev]])), 
print causes_and_effects(Var, Dev, Down_vess, Down_port), 
effect_search on unit(Out var, New_dev, Down vess, Out_port), 
print_causes_and_effects(Out_var, New_dev, Down_vess, 0ut_port), 
save effect at_vessel(Down vess, Var, Dev, Down_port, Out var, New_dev, 0 
\cut_port) 
fail. 
Catchall for when there is no propagation of the current variable deviation. 
*/ 
do_propagation_steps(Var, Dev, Down vess, Down_port). 
Check if this effect is already saved 
this additional saved effect. If not, 
"saved effect" predicate. 
*/ 
at the vessel. If so, stop and discard 
then save the effect in the form of a 
save_effect at_vessel(Vessel, In_var, In dev, In_port, Out_var, Out_dev, Out_port) : - 
saved_effect(Vessel, In_var, In dev, Innort, Out_var, Out_dev, Out_port), 
save_effect_at_vessel(Vessel, In_var, In_dev, In_port, Out_var, Out_dev, Out_port) : - 
assert(saved_effect(Vessel, In_var, In_dev, In_port, Out_var, Out dev, Out_ 
\cport)). 
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ 
/* CAUSE AND EFFECT IN PROCESS LINE WHERE NO FLOW IS THE NORMAL STATE */ 
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */ 
This second invocation of cause-and-effect-search is to deal with the process 
lines where no flow is the normal state. In such lines a search is made for 
the causes and effects of HI flow (i. e. SOME flow when there should be NONE). 
Correspondingly, this cause-and-effect-search goal only deal with HI flow. The 
other process deviations are dealt with by the catchall because there is no 
action required. 
*/ 
cause-and-effect-search : - 
retractall(ref(_)), 
retractall(cause(_, _, _, _)), 
/* No causes/effects from previous */ 
retractall(effect(_, _, _, _)), 
/* vessel searches on dev'ns other 
assert(ref(O)), /* than q none are to be saved */ 
linenumber(Ln), 
line(Ln, S_vessel, S_port, D_vessel, D_port), 
variable(q), /* Note that ONLY flow is to be considered */ 
deviation(high), /* Note that ONLY high is to be considered */ 
I 
link(S vessel, S_port, Next unit, Next_port), 
find_closed units_in_line(Next_unit, Next_port, D_vessel, D_port). 
cause-and-effect-search. /* Catchall for closed lines when Q HI is not the d 
\ceviation 
Find the closed units in the line and check for the causes of HI flow. Only 
the closed units are considered because faults in ONLY those units will lead 
to flow. With all the other units this is a normal condition. 
*/ 
find_closed_units_in_line(D_vessel, D_port, D_vessel, D_port). /* Catchall for th 
\ce end of the line */ 
find_closed_units_in_line(Unit, Port, D vessel, D_port) :- /* This unit is OPEN */ 
1ink(Unit, Outcort, Next unit, Next_port), 
key(Unit, Model), 
rule(Model, p, [q, Out_port], Pos_inputs, Neg_inputs), 
member([q, Port], Pos_inputs), 
i 
find closed units_in_line(Next_unit, Next_port, D_vessel, D_port). 
find closed units_in_line(Unit, Port, D vessel, D_port) :- /* This unit is CLOSED 
\c*/ 
link(Unit, Out_port, Next unit, Next_port), 
cause_search_on_unit(q, high, Unit, _Port), 
, 
effect_search_on_unit(q, high, Unit, _Port), 
print_causes_and_effects(q, high, Unit, _Port), 
, 
find_closed_units_in_line(Next_unit, Next_port, D_vessel, D_port). 
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ 
/* CAUSE SEARCH ON A PARTICULAR UNIT IN THE RELEVANT PROCESS LINE 
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */ 
/* 
This stage performs a search for causes of a specific top event and 
follows the "fault tree" right down to the base events at the unit. 
The "effect" ruletypes are excluded from being used in the cause search. 
cause_search_on unit(Var, Dev, Unit, Port) : - 
key(Unit, Kunit), 
rule(Kunit, Ruletype, Causes, Events), 
Ruletype \= effect, 
member([Var, Port, Dev], Events), 
assert(cause(_, Unit, [Var, Port, Dev], Causes)), 
develop_cause_at_unit(Unit, Causes) 
fail. 
cause_search_on_unit(Var, Dev, Unit, Port) 
develop_cause_at_unit(Unit, [[Var, Port, Dev]; Tail]) : - 
check_for_cause_keywords(Var, Port, Dev, Unit), 
cause_search on_unit(Var, Dev, Unit, Port), 
develop_cause_at unit(Unit; Tail). 
develop Dause at unit(Unit, [3) : - 
Note that the blank items reject any causes that are other process 
deviations. 
check_for_cause keywords(Var, ' ', ' ', Unit) . - keyword(Var), 
linenumber(Ln), 
Ln \= 0, /* Ensure that the unit is not a vessel */ 
material_in_line(Ln, Mat), 
material_cause(Mat, Var, Causes), 
assert(cause(_, Unit, [Var, ' ', ' '], Causes)). 
Catchall for cases where there is no keyword, unit is a vessel and where 
there are no material causes. 
*/ 
check_for_cause_keywords(Var, Port, Dev, Unit). 
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ 
/* SEARCH FOR THE EFFECT OF THE DEVIATION ON THE PROCESS MATERIAL 
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ 
material_effect search(Ln, Var, Dev, Mat) : - 
material_in_line(Ln, Mat), 
material_effect(Mat, Var, Dev, Effects), 
assert(effect(_, Mat, [Var, ' ', Dev], Effects)). 
material_effect_search(Ln, Var, Dev, Mat) : - 
material_in_line(Ln, Mat). 
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ /* SEARCH FOR EFFECTS OF A PARTICULAR SCENARIO CAUSING THE "TOP EVENT"*/ 
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ 
This stage incorporates a search for the effects of a particular 
"scenario". i. e. the other effects that may result from the "cause 
tree" which will lead to the variable deviation being investigated. 
The search is followed through right to the "event statements" in 
each unit. 
Treat the search for the effects of escape as a special case - the effects 
are only checked for on the process material. Conduct this search for the 
effects on the process material only after the whole of the line has been 
searched for causes of escape. 
effect search on_unit(escape, ' ', Down_vess, Port) : - 
linenumber(Ln), 
line(Ln, S vess, S_port, Down_vess, Port), 
material-effect search(Ln, escape, ' ', Mat). 
Catchall for when the current unit is not the last to be searched for 
causes. In this case, omit the search for effects of escape and go on. 
effect_search_on_unit(escape, ' ', Unit, Port) : - 
/* 
Find an effect at the unit and develop that effect at the unit as far as 
possible. 
effect search on unit(Var, Dev, Unit, Port) : - 
key(Unit, Kunit), 
rule(Kunit, Ruletype, Events, Effects), 
Ruletype = effect, 
member([Var, Port, Dev], Events), 
assert(effect(_, Unit, [Var, Port, Dev], Effeots)), 
develop_effects_at unit(Unit, Effects) 
fail. 
i* No effects to be found 
*/ 
effect_search_on_unit(Var, Dev, Unit, Port) :- 
Develop further the first effect in the list of effects passed down and then 
develop the tail of the list. 
*/ 
develop effects_at unit(Unit, [[Var, Port, Dev]; Tail]) : - 
effect-search-on unit(Var, Dev, Unit, Port), 
develop_effect_at_unit(Unit, Tail). 
End of the list of effects to be developed. 
*/ 
develop_effects_at_unit(Unit, []). 
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ 
/* PRINTING STAGE FOR ONE PARTICULAR SET OF CAUSES AND EFFECTS 
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */ 
/* 
This stage prints out the results of a cause and effect search on a 
unit together with the results of this particular cause. The head goal 
of this stage is called by the "cause-and-effect-cut" goal in the cause 
search stage. This goal is repeatedly called for every successful cause 
search. The clauses for "cause" and "effect" are retracted during this 
print stage. 
*/ 
Clause controlling the printing out of all the causes and effects of a 
variable deviation at a particular unit. 
*/ 
print_causes_and_effects(Var, Dev, Unit, Port) : - 
linenumber(0), 
i 
user-output([]), 
user-output([]), 
user_output(['Vessel search on ', Unit]), 
user_output(['-------------------------------- 
user_output(C]), 
user_output([Dev, Var]), 
user_output([]), 
user_output(['Causes']), 
user_output(Cl ------ 13), 
cause structure_print(Var, Dev, Unit, Port), 
user_output(C]), 
user_output(['Effects'3), 
user_output([ -------- 11), 
effect-structure print(Var, Dev, Unit, Port). 
print_causes_and effects(Var, Dev, Unit, Port) 
linenumber(Ln), 
user-output([]), 
user_output([]), 
user_output(['Line', Ln, ' Search on ', Unit]), 
user_output(['-------------------------------------- 
user_output([]), 
user_output((Dev, Var]), 
user_output([]), 
user_output(['Causes']), 
user_output(['------']), 
cause_structure. print(Var, Dev, Unit, Port), 
user-output([]), 
user_output(['Effects']), 
user_output(['------- ']), 
effect_structure_print(Var, Dev, Unit, Port). 
Collect causes of the variable deviation, output them to file and to the 
terminal. 
*/ 
cause_structure_print(Var, Dev, Unit, Port) : - 
cause(R, Unit, [Var, Port, Dev], Allcauses), 
retract(cause(R, Unit, [Var, Port, Dev], Allcauses)), 
print_out_causes(Allcauses, Unit, Port, Dev) 
fail. 
Catchall for no more causes of the deviation variable. 
*/ 
cause_structure_print(Var, Dev, Unit, Port). 
Clause to structure the output of the causes. Tab to next stop, output first of 
the list of causes, then go and expand the first of the list, then recall this 
clause with the tail of the list of causes. 
*/ 
print out_causes([[Cvar, Cport, Cdev]: Tail], Unit, Port, Dev) 
check_valid_none_items(Cvar, Cdev, Checked_dev), 
file_output([Unit, port, Port, cause, Cvar, Cport, Checked dev]), 
user_output([port, Port, ' ', Cvar, Cport, Checked dev]), 
cause_structureorint(Cvar, Cdev, Unit, Cport), 
i 
print_out_causes(Tail, Unit, Port, Dev). 
Finish printing in the event of an empty list. 
*/ 
print out causes([], Unit, Port, Dev). 
Collect effects of the variable deviation, output them to file and to the 
terminal. 
*/ 
effect_structure-print(Var, Dev, Unit, Port) 
effect(R, Unit, [Var, Port, Dev], Effects), 
retract(effect(R, Unit, [Var, Port, Dev], Effeots)), 
print_out effects(Effects, Unit, Port, Dev) 
), 
fail. 
Catchall for no more effects. 
*/ 
effect_structure_print(Var, Dev, Unit, Port). 
Clause to structure the output of effects. Tab to the next stop, output the 
first of the list of effects, then go and expand the first of the list, then 
recall this clause with the tail of the list. 
*1 
print out effects([[Evar, Eport, Edev]; Tai1], Unit, Port, Dev) : - 
check_valid_none_items(Evar, Edev, Checked_dev), 
file output([Unit, port, Port, effect, Evar, Eport, Checked_dev]), 
user_output([port, Port, ' ', Evar, Eport, Checked_dev]), 
effect-structure_print(Evar, Edev, Unit, Eport), 
print-out_effects(Tail, Unit, Port, Dev). 
Finish printing in the event of an empty list. 
*/ 
print_out_effects([], Unit, Port, Dev). 
Clauses to check the validity of the items 
only NONE deviations that are allowed are 
All other NONE deviations should read LOW. 
unaffected. 
*/ 
that have NONE deviations. The 
with the variables FLOW and LEVEL. 
Deviations other than NONE are 
check_valid_none_items(q, none, none). 
check_valid_none_items(l, none, none). 
check_valid_none_items(Var, none, low). 
check valid_none_items(Var, Anydev, Anydev). 
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ 
/* CLAUSES FOR COLLECTING CONCENTRATION CHANGES AT VESSELS 
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */ 
Controlling clause for the search at a vessel. The different input lines 
are dealt with one at a time. The fail ensures that every line coming into 
the vessel is considered. 
get_conc_changes(Vessel) : - 
getmaterial_in_an_input_line(Vessel, Vport, Mat), 
ensure mat diff to_that_in vessel(Vessel, Vport, Mat), 
fail. 
Catchall for when all the incoming lines have been considered. 
get_conc_changes(Vessel). 
/* 
If the material coming into the vessel is the same as that in one of the lines going out of the vessel then this particular line is discarded. The reason for this is that there will be no sensible concentration changes to collect for a material that is in actual fact just being recycled. 
ensure_mat_diff_to_that_in_vessel(Vessel, Vport, Mat) : - line(Ln, Vessel, Port, 
_, _), material_in_line(Ln, Mat), 
, 
fail. 
The material coming into the vessel in this line-is different to that in all 
of the lines leaving the vessel. Thus, go and and collect the causes of 
concentration change for this line. 
ensure_mat_diff_tothat_in_vessel(Vessel, Vport, Mat) : - drop_off_all concc ropagations(Vessel, Vport, Mat), 
fail. 
Clause to enable the calling up of a material coming into a specific port on a 
particular vessel. 
get_material_in_an_input_line(Vessel, Port, Material) : - line(Ln, 
_, _, 
Vessel, Port), 
material_in_line(Ln, Material). 
Clause to control the search for causes of concentration changes of the 
component coming into the specific part of the vessel. 
drop_off_all_conc_propagations(Vessel, Vport, Mat) 
key(Vessel, Vessel_mod), 
rule(Vessel_mod, p, [[x, Vport], Portout], Pos_list, Neg_list), 
drop_off_positive_conc_propagations(Vessel, [[x, Vport], Portout], Pos_li 
\cst), 
drop_off_negative_conc_propagations(Vessel, [[x, Vport], Portout], Neg_li 
\cst). 
Clause to deal with the causes of concentration change that are themselves 
concentration changes of the same deviation. 
drop_off_positive conc_propagations(Vessel, [[x, Vport], Portout], [[[x, Nport], V_in 
\c_port]; Restlist]) : - 
line(Ln, 
_, _, 
Vessel, V_in_port), 
material_in_line(Ln, Newmat), 
line (Lna, 
_, _, 
Vess el, Vport) , 
material_in_line(Lna, Mat), 
deviation(Dev), 
assert(cause(_, Vessel, [[x, Mat], Portout, Dev], [[x, Newmat], V_in_port, Dev 
\c])), 
drop_off_positive_conc_propagations(Vessel, [[x, Vport], Portout], Restli 
\ost). 
Clause to deal with the causes of concentration change that are process deviations. 
drop_off_positive_conc_propagations(Vessel, [[x, Vport], Portout], [[Var, V_in_port] 
\c; Restlist]) : - 
l ine (Lna, 
_, _, 
Vessel, Vport) , 
material_in_line(Lna, Mat), 
deviation(Dev), 
assert(cause(_, Vessel, [[x, Mat], Portout, Dev], [Var, V_in_port, Dev])), 
drop_off-po sitive_conc_propagations(Vessel, [Ex, Vport], Portout], Restli 
\cst). 
Catchall for the end of the list. 
drop_off positive_conc. propagations(Vessel, [[x, Vport], Portout], []). 
1* 
Clause to deal with the causes of concentration change that are themselves 
concentration changes but with the deviation of the opposite sign. 
drop_off_negative_conc_propagations(Vessel, [[x, Vport], Portout], [[[x, Nport], V_in 
\c_port]: Restlist]) : - 
line(Ln, 
_, _, 
Vessel, V_in_port), 
material_in_line(Ln, New_mat), 
line(Lna, 
_, _, 
Vessel, Vport), 
material_in_line(Lna, Mat), 
deviation(Dev), 
opposite_of(Dev, Opp_dev), 
assert(cause(_, Vessel, [[x, Mat], Portout, Dev], [[x, Newmat], V_in_port, Opp 
\c_dev])), 
drop_off_negative_conc_propagations(Vessel, [[x, Vport], Portout], Restli 
\cst). 
Clause to deal with the causes of concentration change that are process 
deviations of the opposite sign to the deviation to the concentration change. 
drop_off_negative_conc_propagations(Vessel, [[x, Vport], Portout], [[Var, V_in_port] 
\c; Restlist]) : - 
line(Lna, 
_, _, 
Vessel, Vport) , 
material_in_line(Lna, Mat), 
deviation(Dev), 
opposite_of(Dev, Opp_dev), 
assert(cause(_, Vessel, [[x, Mat], Portout, Dev], [Var, V_in_port, Opp_dev])) 
\c, 
drop_off_negative_cono_propagations(Vessel, [[x, Vport], Portout], Restli 
\cst). 
Catchall for the end of the list. 
drop_off_negative_conc_propagations(Vessel, [[x, Vport], Portout], []). 
Controlling clause for the printing out of all the concentration changes that 
have been found for one particular vessel. 
print_conc_changes(Vessel) : - 
user-output([]), 
user-output([]), 
user output(['Concentration change searches on vessel : ', Vessel]), 
user_output(C'--------------------------------------------------']), 
user_output(C]), 
print_next_conc_change(Vessel). 
Print the concentration changes of one component at a time. Select a 
component for which there is a concn change and then go and print the 
relevant causes. The fail ensures that all the components are printed out. 
print next conc_change(Vessel) : - 
cause(_, Vessel, [[x, Component], Port, Dev], Cause), 
user_output(['Causes of concentration of ', Component, ' ', Dev, ' at 
\cport ', Port]), 
print_the_one_component_conc_change(Vessel, Component) 
fail. 
Catchall for no more components. 
print next conc_change(Vessel). 
i* Print out all the causes of concentration change of the particular component 
that are themselves concentration changes. 
print_the_one component_conc_change(Vessel, Comp) 
cause(_, Vessel, [[x, Comp], Port, Dev], [[x, Pcomp], Pport, Pdev]), 
retract(cause(_, Vessel, [[x, Comp], Port, Dev], [[x, Pcomp], Pport, Pdev]) 
\c), 
user_output(['x of ', Pcomp, ' ', Pdev, ' at port ', Pport]), 
file_output([Comp, Vessel, Port, cause, x, Pcomp, Pport, Pdev]) 
fail. 
Print out all the causes of concentration change of the particular component 
that are variable deviations. 
print the_one_component_conc_change(Vessel, Comp) : - 
cause(_, Vessel, [[x, Comp], Port, Dev], [Cvar, Cport, Cdev]), 
retract(cau. ise(_, Vessel, [ [x, Comp], Port, Dev], [Cvar, Cport, Cdev]) ), 
user_output([Cvar, Cport, Cdev]), 
file_output([Comp, Vessel, Port, cause, Cvar, ' ', Cport, Cdev]) 
fail. 
Catchall for no more causes of concentration change for the particular 
component. 
print_the one_component_conc_change(Vessel, Comp). 
APPENDIX E 
Listing of 
"compacter" Program 
250 
compacter. fortran 
program compacter 
c 
integer Lnumber, L, V, Vds, V_c_no(20,5), V_e_no(20,5) 
integer Lds, L_c no (20,12) , L_e_no (20,12 ) 
character*6 Line_devs(12,2), Vessel_devs(5,2) 
character*20 Fname*10, Infile, Outfile, Confile 
character*20 Worda, Wordint*5 
character*20 Vessel(20) 
character*5 V_c_v(20,5,20)*25, V_c_p(20,5,20), V_c_d(20,5,20) 
character*5 V_e v(20,5,20)*25, V_e_p(20,5,20), V_e_d(20,5,20) 
character*5 L_c_u(20,12,100)*20, L_c_port(20,12,100)*2, L_c_v(20,12,100)*25 
\c, L_c_p(20,12,100), L_c_d(20,12,100) 
character*5 L_e_u(20,12,100)*20, L_e_port(20,12,100)*2, L_e_v(20,12,100)*25 
\c, L_e_p(20,12,100), L_e_d(20,12,100) 
c 
integer V_c_conc_no(20,2,10), Hilo, No_of_comps, Comp no 
character*25 V_c_conc_in_v(20,2,10,10), V_c_conc_in_c(20,2,10,10), Comp 
character*2 V_c_conc_in_p(20,2,10,10), V_c_conc_out_p(20,2,10,10) 
character Component(10)*25, V_c_conc_in_d(20,2,10,10)*5 
c 
character*5 L_imp_c_unit(20,20,40)*20, L_imp_c_v(20,20,40)*25, L_imp_o_p(20 
\c, 20,40), L_imp_c d(20,20,40) 
character*5 L_imp_e_unit(20,20,40)*20, L_imp_e_v(20,20,40)*25, L_imp_e_p(20 
\c, 20,40), L_imp_e_d(20,20,40) 
character*10 Impurity-list(20) 
integer No_of_imps, L_imp_c_no(20,20), L_imp_e_no(20,20) 
c 
common /Vessel_names/ Vessel 
common /No-of-vessels/ V 
common /Vessel_deviations/ Vessel_devs 
common /No vessel_devs/ Vds 
common /No_of_V_ces/ V_c_no, V_e_no 
common /V_cause_list/ V_c_v, V_c_p, V_c_d 
common /V-effect-list/ V_e_v, V_e_p, V_e_d 
common /No-of-lines/ L 
common /Line-deviations/ Line_devs 
common /No-line dews/ Lds 
common /No_of_l_ces/ L_c_no, L_e_no 
common /L-cause-list-l/ L_c_u, L c_port 
common /L_cause_list_2/ L_c_v, L_c_p, L_c_d 
common /L-effect-list-l/ L_e_u, L_e_port 
common /L_effect_list_2/ L_e_v, L_e_p, L_e_d 
C 
common /Vessel_conc_nos/ V_c_conc_no, No_of_comps 
common /Vessel_conc_txt/ V_c_conc_in_v, V_c_conc_in c, V_c_conc_inc, V_c_co \cnc_in_d, V_c_conc_out_p 
common /Component_names/ Component 
c 
common /Impurity_causes/ L_imp_c unit, L_imp_c_v, L_imp_c_p, L_imp_c_d 
common /Impurity_effects/ Limp e_unit, L_imp e_v, L_imp_e_p, L_imp_e_d 
common /Impurities/ Impurity_list 
common /Impurity-nos/ No_of_imps, L_imp_c_no, L_imp_e_no 
C 
c Initialise all variables 
c 
V=0 
do 130, i=1,20 
Vessel(i)=" 
do 120, i1=1,5 
V_c_no(i, il)=0 
V_e_no(i, il)=0 
do 110, i2=1,20 
V_c v(i, il, 12)=" 
V_c_p(i, il, i2)= 
V_c_d(i, il, 12)=" 
V_e v(i, il, i2)=" 
V_e-p(i, il, i2)= 
V_e_d(i, il, i2)=" 
110 continue 
120 continue 
130 continue 
L=0 
No-of-imps=0 
do 160, i=1,20 
do 150, i1=1,12 
L_c_no(i, i1)=0 
L_e_no(i, il)=0 
do 140, i2=1,100 
L_c_u(i, il, i2)=" 
L_c_port(i, i1,12)= 
L_c_v(i, ii, i2)=" 
L_c-p(i, il, i2)=" 
L_c_d(i, i1, i2)=" 
L_e_u(i, i1,12)=" 
L_e-port(i, il, i2)=" 
L_e_v(i, il, 12)= 
L_e p(i, i1, i2)=" 
L_e_d(i, i1,12)=" 
140 continue 
150 continue 
do 158, i1=1,20 
Impurity-list(il)=" 
L_imp_c_no(i, i1)=0 
L_imp_e_no(i, il)=0 
do 156,12=1,40 
L_imp_c_unit(i, ii, i2)=" 
L_imp_c v(i, il, i2)= 
L_imp_c-p(i, il, i2)=" 
L_imp_c d(i, ii, i2)= 
L_imp_e_unit(i, ii, 12)=" 
L_imp_e_v(i, il, i2)=" 
L_imp_e-p(i, il, i2)= 
L_imp_e_d(i, ii, i2)=" 
156 continue 
158 continue 
160 continue 
Line_devs(1,1)="q" 
Line devs(1,2)="none" 
Line_devs(2,1)="q" 
Line devs(2,2)="low" 
Line_devs(3,1)="q" 
Line_devs(3,2)="high" 
Line_devs(4,1)="p" 
Line_devs(4,2)=°low" 
Line devs(5,1)="p" 
Line_devs(5,2)="high" 
Line_devs(6,1)="t" 
Line devs(6,2)="low" 
Line_devs(7,1)="t" 
Line devs(7,2)="high" 
Line devs(8,1)="escape" 
Line devs(8,2)=" 
Las=8 
C 
Vessel_devs(1,1)="p" 
Vessel devs(1,2)="low" 
Vessel_devs(2,1)="p" 
Vessel devs(2,2)="high" 
Vessel devs(3,1)="1" 
Vessel_devs(3,2)="low" 
Vessel_devs(4,1)="1" 
Vessel_devs(4,2)="high" 
Vds=4 
C 
c Read in the case identification name 
c 
write(O, '("Type in the case identification name 
read(0, *) Fname 
Infile=Fname(1: Length(Fname))//". pro_out" 
Outfile=Fname(1: Length(Fname))//". compact" 
Confile=Fname(1: Length(Fname))//". conf" 
C 
c Open input filename, check status and rewind 
c 
open(9, file=lnfile, status="OLD", err=9010) 
rewind 9 
C 
c Open output file and check status 
C 
open(8, file=Outfile, status="NEW", err=9020) 
C 
c Open configuration file, check status and rewind 
c 
open(7, file=Confile, status="OLD", err=9030) 
C 
c Write header to output file 
c 
write(8, '("HAZOP file created from prolog run file : ", a)') Infile 
write(8, '(///)') 
write(8, '(.. -------------------------------------------------------------- 
\o-------------- )') 
c 
c Start running through the prolog output file 
c 
1050 read(9, *, end=1100) Worda, Wordint 
read(Wordint, '(i5)') Lnumber 
if(Lnumber. eq. 0) then 
call vessel-routine 
else 
call line-routine 
end if 
goto 1050 
1100 call prune-line-doubled-items 
call prune vess doubled_items 
call cut_out_doubled_units 
call unit-pruning 
call separate-line-items 
call print out 
stop 
C 
c Error statements 
c 
c Opening input file error 
9010 write(0, '("Input file does not exist ! ")') 
goto 9040 
c opening output file error 
9020 write(0, '("Output file name already exists ! ")') 
goto 9040 
c Opening configuration file error 
9030 write(0, '("Configuration file does not exist ! ")') 
9040 write(0, '(/, "File handling error 
stop 
end 
C 
C 
subroutine vessel-routine 
integer V, Vds, V_c_no(20,5), V_e_no(20,5) 
character*6 Vessel_devs(5,2) 
character*20 Vessel(20) 
character*5 V_c_v(20,5,20)*25, V_c-P(20,5,20), V_c_d(20,5,20) 
character*5 V_e v(20,5,20) *25, V_e-P(20,5,20) , V_e d(20,5,20) 
character Dev*6, Var*6, Vess*20, Flag*5 
integer i, Vess_nc, Loc_b, Nc, Ne 
character*25 Worda, Wordb, Wordc, Wordd 
character Unit*20, Port*2, Causeff*25 
integer V_c_conc_no(20,2,10), Hilo, No_of_comps, Comp_no 
character*25 V_c_conc_in_v(20,2,10,10), V_c_conc_in_c(20,2,10,10), Comp 
character*2 V_c_conc_in_p(20,2,10,10), V_c_conc_out_p(20,2,10,10) 
character Component(10)*25, V_c conc_in_d(20,2,10,10)*5 
C 
common /Vessel-names/ Vessel 
common /No of_vessels/ V 
common /Vessel deviations/ Vessel_devs 
common /No_vessel_devs/ Vds 
common /No_of_V_ces/ V_c_no, V_e_no 
common /V-cause-list/ V_c v, V_c_p, V_c_d 
common /V-effect-list/ V_e_v, V_eo, V_e_d 
C 
common /Vessel_conc_nos/ V_c_conc_no, No of_comps 
common /Vessel_conc_txt/ V_c_conc_in_v, V_c_conc_in_c, V_c_conc_in_p, V_c co 
\cnc_in d, V_c_conc_out_p 
common /Component names/ Component 
c 
read(9, *) Dev, Var, Vess 
Flag="false" 
do 1000, i=1, V 
if(Vessel(i). eq. Vess) then 
Vess_no=i 
i=V 
Flag="true" 
endif 
1000 continue 
if(Flag. eq. "false") then 
Vess_no=V+1 
V=V+1 
Vessel(V)=Vess 
endif 
C 
c Check if this is a concentration cause. If it is then direct it to the 
c latter part of this vessel-routine subroutine. 
c 
if(Var. eq. "x") goto 2000 
c 
do 1200, i=1, Vds 
if(Vessel_devs(i, 1). eq. Var. and. Vessel_devs(i, 2). eq. Dev) then 
Loc b=i 
i=Vds 
endif 
1200 continue 
Nc=V_c_no(Vess_no, Loc_b) 
Ne=V_e no(Vess_no, Loc_b) 
1500 read(9, *) Worda 
if(Worda. ne. "end_of_list") then 
backspace 9 
read(9, *) Unit, Worda, Port, Causeff, Wordb, Wordc, Wordd 
if(Causeff. eq. "cause") then 
Nc=Nc+1 
V_c_v(Vess_no, Loc_b, No)=Wordb 
V_c_p(Vess_no, Loc_b, Nc)=Wordc 
V_c_d(Vess_no, Loc b, Nc)=Wordd 
else 
Ne=Ne+1 
V_e_v(Vess no, Loc_b, Ne)=Wordb 
V_e_p(Vess_no, Loc b, Ne)=Wordc 
V_e_d(Vess_no, Loc_b, Ne)=Wordd 
end if 
goto 1500 
end if 
V_c_no(Vess_no, Loc_b)=Nc 
V_e no(Vess no, Loc_b)=Ne 
c Now skip the concentration routine and go to the end 
goto 3000 
C 
c Section dealing with the causes of concentration changes 
C 
2000 read(9, *) Worda 
if(Worda. ne. "end_of_list") then 
backspace 9 
read(9, *) Comp, Unit, Port, Causeff, Worda, Wordb, Wordc, Wordd 
Flag="false" 
do 2500, i=1, No_of_comps 
if(Comp. eq. Component(i)) then 
Comp_no=i 
i=No_of_comps 
Flag="true" 
end if 
2500 continue 
if(Flag. eq. "false") then 
No of_comps=No of_comps+l 
Comp-no=No-of-comps 
Ccmponent(Comp_no)=Comp 
endif 
if(Dev. eq. "low") Hilo=l 
if(Dev. eq. "high") Hilo=2 
V_c_conc_no(Vess_no, Hilo, Comp_no)=V_c_conc_no(Vess_no, Hilo, Comp_no)+1 
V_c conc_in v(Vess_no, Hilo, Comp_no, V_c conc_no(Vess_no, Hilo, Comp no))= 
\cWorda 
\cWordb 
\cWordc 
\cWordd 
V_c_conc_in_c(Vess_no, Hilo, Comp_no, V_c_conc_no(Vess_no, Hilo, Comp no))= 
V_c_conc_in_p(Vess_no, Hilo, Comp_no, V_c_conc_no(Vess_no, Hilo, Comp_no))= 
V_c_conc_out_p(Vess_no, Hilo, Comp_no, V_c_conc_no(Vess_no, Hilo, Comp_no)) 
V_c_conc_in_d(Vess_no, Hilo, Comp_no, V_c_cönc_no(Vess no, Hilo, Comp_no))= 
\c=Port 
goto 2000 
endif 
3000 return 
end 
subroutine line-routine 
c 
integer L, Lds, L_c_no(20,12), L_e_no(20,12) 
character*6 Line_devs(12,2) 
character*5 L_c_u(20,12,100)*20, L_c_port(20,12,100)*2, L_c_v(20,12,100)*25 
\c, L c_p(20,12,100), L_c_d(20,12,100) 
character*5 L_e_u(20,12,100)*20, L_e_port(20,12,100)*2, L_e_v(20,12,100)*25 
\c, L_e_p(20,12,100), L_e_d(20,12,100) 
character*25 Worda, Wordb, Wordc, Wordd, Wordint*5 
character Unit*20, Port*2, Causeff*25 
character Dev*6, Var*6 
integer i, Ln, Loc_b, No, Ne 
c 
character*5 L_imp_c_unit(20,20,40)*20, L_imp_c_v(20,20,40)*25, L_imp_e_p(20 
\c, 20,40), L_imp_c_d(20,20,40) 
character*5 L_imp_e_unit(20,20,40)*20, L_imp_e_v(20,20,40)*25, L_imp_e_p(20 
\c, 20,40) , L_imp_e_d (20,20,40 ) 
character*10 Imp, Impurity_list(20), Imp_flag, Impurities_read*4 
integer No_of_imps, Imp_number, L_imp_c no(20,20), L_imp_e_no(20,20), Nic, Nie 
c 
common /No-of-lines/ L 
common /Line_deviations/ Line_devs 
common /No_line_devs/ Lds 
common /No_of_l_ces/ L_c_no, L_e no 
common /L-cause-list-l/ L_c_u, L_c_port 
common /L_cause_list_2/ L_c_v, L_c. p, L_c d 
common /L_effect_list_l/ L_e_u, L_e_port 
common /L-effect-list-2/ L_e_v, L_e_p, L_e d 
c 
common /Impurity-causes/ L_imp_c_unit, L_imp_c_v, L_imp_c_p, L_imp_c_d 
common /Impurity_effects/ L_imp_e unit, L_imp_e_v, L_imp_e_p, L_imp_e_d 
common /Impurities/ Impurity_list 
common /Impurity_nos/ No of_imps, L_imp_c_no, L_imp_e_no 
c 
backspace 9 
read(9, *) Worda, Wordint 
read(Wordint, '(15)') Ln 
if(Ln. gt. L) L=Ln 
read(9, *) Dev, Var 
c 
c If the variable deviation is an impurity one then go to latter section if(Dev. eq. "high". and. Var(1: 5). eq. "[i, _") goto 
2000 
do 1000, i=1, Lds 
if(Line_devs(i, 1). eq. Var. and. Line_devs(i, 2). eq. Dev) then Loc b=i 
i=Lds 
end if 
1000 continue 
Nc=L_c no(Ln, Loc_b) 
Ne=L e_no(Ln, Loc_b) 
1200 read(9, *) Worda 
if(Worda. ne. "end_of_list") then 
backspace 9 
read(9, *) Unit, Worda, Port, Causeff, Wordb, Werde, Wordd 
if(Causeff. eq. "cause") then 
Nc=Nc+1 
L_c_u(Ln, Loc_b, Nc)=Unit 
L_c_port(Ln, Loc_b, Nc)=Port 
L_c v(Ln, Loc_b, Nc)=Wordb 
L_c_p(Ln, Loc b, Nc)=Wordo 
L_c_d(Ln, Loc_b, Nc)=Wordd 
else 
Ne=Ne+1 
L_e_u(Ln, Loc_b, Ne)=Unit 
L e_port(Ln, Loo__b, Ne)=port 
L_e_v(Ln, Loc_b, Ne)=Wordb 
L e_p(Ln, Loc_b, Ne)=Wordc 
L_e_d(Ln, Loc_b, Ne)=Wordd 
end if 
goto 1200 
endif 
L_c_no(Ln, Loc_b)=Nc 
L_e no(Ln, Loc_b)=Ne 
return 
C 
c Impurity section 
2000 Impurities_read="none" 
2010 read(9, *) Worda 
if(Worda. ne. "end_of_list") then 
Impurities_read="some" 
backspace 9 
read(9, *) Imp, Unit, Causeff, Wordb, Wordc, Wordd 
Imp-flag="not-found" 
do 2100, i=1, No_of_imps 
if( Imp. eq. Impurity_list(i)) then 
Imp_number=i 
i=No_of_imps 
Imp-flag="found" 
endif 
2100 continue 
if(Imp_flag. ne. "found") then 
No_of_imps=No_of_imps+l 
Impurity_list(No_of_imps)=Imp 
Imp_number=No_of_imps 
end if 
Nic=L_imp_c_no(Ln, 'Imp_number) 
Nie=L_imp_e_no(Ln, Imp_number) 
if(Causeff. eq. "cause") then 
Nic=Nic+1 
L_imp_c_unit(Ln, Imp_number, Nic)=Unit 
L_imp_c_v(Ln, Imp_number, Nie)=Wordb 
L_imp_c_p(Ln, Imp_number, Nic)=Wordc 
L_imp c_d(Ln, Imp_number, Nic)=Wordd 
else 
Nie=Nie+1 
L_imp_e_unit(Ln, Imp_number, Nie)=Unit 
Limp e v(Ln, Imp_number, Nie)=Wordb 
L_imp_e_p(Ln, Imp_number, Nie)=Wordc 
L_imp_e_d(Ln, Imp_number, Nie)=Wordd 
end if 
L_imp_c_no(Ln, Imp_number)=Nic 
L_imp_e_no(Ln, Imp_number)=Nie 
goto 2010 
endif 
return 
end 
subroutine Prune-line-doubled-items 
character*5 L_c_u(20,12,100)*20, L_c-port(20,12,100)*2, L_c_v(20,12,100)*25 
\o, L_c_p(20,12,100), L_c d(20,12,100) 
character*5 L_e_u(20,12,100)*20, L_eport(20,12,100)*2, L_e_v(20,12,100)*25 
\c, L_e-p(20,12,100) ,L e_d (20,12,100 ) integer L_c_no(20,12), L_e_no(20,12), i, i1, i2, i3, i4 
common /No_of_1_ces/ L_c_no, L_e_no 
common /L cause_list_1/ L_c_u, L_c_port 
common /L_cause_list_2/ L_c_v, L_c_p, L_c_d 
common /L effect_list_1/ L_e_u, L effort 
common /L_effect_list_2/ L_e_v, L_e_p, L_e_d 
C 
c Step through all the process lines 
do 3000, i=1,20 
C 
c Step through all the process deviations 
do 2000, i1=1,12 
C 
c Step through the lists of causes 
do 1000, i2=1, L_c_no(i, il)-1 
do 500, i3=i2+1, L_c_no(i, i1) 
if(i3. le. L_c_no(i, i1)) then 
if(L_c_u(i, il, i3) . eq. L_c_u(1, i1, i2) . and. L_c_v(1, il, i3). eq. \cL_c_v(i, il, i2). and. L c-p(i, il, i3). eq. L_cc(i, il, i2). and. L_c_d(i, il, i3). eq. L_c 
\c_d(i, il, i2)) then 
do 300, i4=i3, L_c_no(i, 11)-1 
L_c_u(i, i1, i4)=L_c_u(i, i1, i4+1) 
L_c-port(i, ii, i4)=L_c. port(i, ii, i4+1) 
L_c v(i, ii, i4)=L c v(i, il, i4+1) 
L_c_p(i, i1, i4)=L_c_p(i, i1,14+1) 
L_c_d(i, i1, i4)=L_c_d(i, i1, i4+1) 
300 continue 
L_c_no(i, i1)=L_c_no(i, il)-1 
i3=i3-1 
endif 
endif 
500 continue 
1000 continue 
c 
c Step through the lists of effects 
c 
do 1900, i2=1, L_e no(i, i1)-1 
do 1500, i3=i2+1, L_e_no(i, il) 
if(i3.1e. L_e_no(i, il)) then 
if (L_e_u(i, i1, i3) . eq. L_e_u(i, i1, i2) . and. L_e_v(i, i1, i3) . eq. \cL_e v(i, ii, i2). and. L en(i, ii, i3). eq. L_en(i, ii, i2). and. L_e_d(i, ii, i3). eq. L_e 
\c_d(i, il, i2)) then 
do 1300, i4=i3, L_e_no(i, il)-1 
L_P u(i, ii, i4)=L_e_u(i, ii, i4+1) 
L_e_port(i, ii, i4)=L_enort(i, il, i4+1) 
L_e v(1., ii, i4)=L_e_v(i, ii, i4+1) 
L_e-p(i, il, i4)=L_en(i, il, i4+1) 
L_e_d(i, ii, i4)=L_e_d(i, ii, i4+1) 
1300 continue 
L_e_no(i, il)=L_e_no(i, il)-1 
i3=i3-1 
endif 
endif 
1500 continue 
1900 continue 
2000 continue 
3000 continue 
end 
subroutine prune_vess doubled_items 
0 
character*5 V_c v(20,5,20)*25, V_c-p(20,5,20), V_c d(20,5,20) 
character*5 V_e v(20,5,20)*25, V_e-p(20,5,20), V_e d(20,5,20) 
integer V_c_no(20,5), V_e_no(20,5), i, ii, i2, i3, i4 
c 
common /No_of_V_ces/ V_c_no, V_e_no 
common /V_cause_list/ V_c v, V_c_p, V_c_d 
common /V-effect-list/ V_e_v, V_e_p, V_e_d 
c 
c Step through all the vessels 
do 3000, i=1,20 
C 
c Step through all the deviations 
do 2000, il=1,5 
c 
c Step through the lists of causes 
do 1000, i2=1, V_c_no(i, i1)-1 
do 500, i3=i2+1, V_c_no(i, ii) 
if(i3. le. V_c_no(i, il)) then 
if(V_c_v(i, il, i3), eq. V_c_v(i, il, i2). and. V_c_p(i, il, i3) . eq. \cV_c_p(i, i1, i2). and. V_c_d(i, i1, i3). eq. V_c_d(i, il, i2)) then 
do 300, i4=i3, V_c_no(1., il)-1 
V_c v(i, ii, i4)=V_c v(i, il, i4+1) 
V_c-p(i, il, i4)=V_c_p(i, i1, i4+1) 
V_c_d(i, i1, i4)=V_c_d(i, i1, i4+1) 
300 continue 
V_c_no(i, il)=V_c_no(i, ii)-i 
i3=i3-1 
end if 
endif 
500 continue 
1000 continue 
c 
c Step through the lists of effects 
c 
do 1900, i2=1, V_e_no(i, i1)-1 
do 1500, i3=i2+1, V_e_no(i, i1) 
if(i3.1e. V_e_no(i, il)) then 
if(V_e_v(i, ii, i3). eq. V_e_v(i, il, i2) . and. V_e_p(i, il, i3) . eq. \cV_e_p(i, il, 12). and. V_e_d(i, il, i3). eq. V_e_d(i, i1, i2)) then 
do 1300, i4=i3, V_e_no(i, i1)-1 
V_e_v(i, il, i4)=V_e v(i, il, i4+1) 
V_e_p(i, i1, i4)=V_e-p(i, i1, i4+1) 
V_e_d(i, i1, i4)=V_e d(i, i1, i4+1) 
1300 continue 
V_e_no(i, il)=V_e_no(i, il)-1 
i3=i3-1 
end if 
end if 
1500 continue 
1900 continue 
2000 continue 
3000 continue 
end 
subroutine cut_out_doubled_units 
c 
character*5 L_c_u(20,12,100)*20, L_c_port(20,12,100)*2, L_c_v(20,12,100)*25 
\c, L c_p(20,12,100), L c_d(20,12,100) 
character*5 L_e_u(20,12,100)*20, L_e_port(20,12,100)*2, L_e_v(20,12,100)*25 
\c, L e_p (20,12,100) , L_e_d (20,12,100 ) integer L_c_no(20,12), L_e_no(20,12), i, i1, i2, i3, j, k 
0 
common /No_of_1_ces/ L_c_no, L e_no 
common /L_cause_list_1/ L_c_u, L ccort 
common /L-cause-list-2/ L_c_v, L_cp, L_c_d 
common /L-effect-list-l/ L_e u, L_eport 
common /L_effect_list_2/ L_e_v, L_e-p, L_e_d 
C 
100 
150 
180 
200 
1000 
1100 
1150 
do 3000, i=1,20 
do 2000, i1=1,12 
do 1000, i2=1, L_c_no(i, ii) 
j=0 
k=0 
j=k+1 
k=j 
if(k. ge. L_c no(i, il)) goto 180 
if(L c_u(i, il, k). eq. L_c_u(i, il, k+1)) 
k=k+1 
goto 150 
end if 
if(j. eq. k. and. k. lt. L_c_no(i, il)) goto 
do 200, i3=j+1, k 
L_c_u(i, i1, i3)=" 
continue 
if(k. 1t. L_c_no(i, il)) goto 100 
continue 
do 1990,12=1, L_e_no(i, il) 
j=0 
k=0 
j=k+1 
k=j 
if(k. ge. L_e_no(i, il)) goto 1180 
if(L e_u(i, il, k). eq. L_e u(i, ii, k+l)) 
k=k+1 
goto 1150 
endif 
then 
100 
then 
1180 if(j. eq. k. and. k. 1t. L_e_no(i, i1)) goto 1100 
do 1200, i3= j+1, k 
L_e_u(i, il, i3)= 
1200 continue 
if(k. 1t. L_e_no(i, i1)) goto 1100 
1990 continue 
2000 continue 
3000 continue 
end 
subroutine unit_pruning 
C 
integer L, Unitnumber 
character*15 Unit(40), Model(40), Worda, Wordb, Wordint*6 
character*15 A unit, A_model, Modell, Model2 
character*6 Line_devs(12,2) 
integer Lds, L_c_no(20,12), L_e_no(20,12) 
character*5 L_c u(20,12,100)*20, L_ccort(20,12,100)*2, L_c_v(20,12,100)*25 
\c, L cc(20,12,100), L_o_d(20,12,100) 
character*5 L_e_u(20,12,100)*20, L_eport(20,12,100)*2, L_e_v(20,12,100)*25 
\c, L_ec(20,12,100), L_e d(20,12,100) 
c 
common /No-of-lines/ L 
common /Line-deviations/ Line devs 
common /No-line-dews/ Lds 
common /No of_1 ces/ Lc no, L_e_no 
common /L-cause-list-l/ L_c_u, L c port 
common /L-cause-list-2/ L a_v, L_c_p, L_c d 
common /L-effect-list-l/ L_e_u, L_e_port 
common /L_effect_list_2/ Lev, L eo, L e_d 
common /Units-text/ Unit, Model 
common /Units numb/ Unitnumber 
common /Unit_Model/ A_unit, A_model 
c 
c Read the unit and model names from the configuration file 
c 
1000 read(7, *, end=9000) Worda, Wordb 
if(Worda. ne. "UNIT". and. Wordb. ne. "NAME") goto 1000 
c 
c Located the point from which to start reading the units and models 
c 
1010 read(7, *, end=9000) Wordint, Worda, Wordb 
if(Worda. ne. "DOWNSTREAM") then 
read(Wordint, '(i6)') Unitnumber 
Unit(Unitnumber)=Worda 
Model(Unitnumber)=Wordb 
goto 1010 
endif 
C 
c End of the unit and model identification part of the configuration file 
c 
c Add on the generic pipe unit 
c 
Unitnumber=Unitnumber+l 
Unit(Unitnumber)="pipe" 
Model(Unitnumber)="pipe" 
c 
c Step through the lines 
c 
do 5000, i=1,20 
c 
c Step through the line deviation variables 
C 
do 4000, i1=1,12 
c 
i2=0 
2500 i2=i2+1 
if(i2. gt. L_c_no(i, il)) goto 4000 
c Get the next non-blank unit. This will be where the item in the unit 
c array AND the item in the variable array are non-blank. 
if(L_c_u(i, i1, i2). eq. " ". or. L_c_v(i, i1,12). eq. " ") goto 2500 
c i2 is the marker for the first non-blank unit 
A_unit=L_c_u(i, il, i2) 
call get_model_of_unit 
Modell=A_model 
i3=i2 
2550 i3=i3+1 
if(13. gt. L_c_no(i, i1)) goto 2500 
if(L_c_u(i, i1, i3). eq. " ") goto 2550 
c i3 is the marker for the next non-blank unit 
A unit=L_c_u(i, ii, i3 ) 
call get-model-of-unit 
Modelt=A_model 
if(Modell. ne. Model2) goto 2550 
C 
c The models ARE the same 
c 
c Temporarily increase arrays by one 
Lc no(i, il)=L_c_no(i, il)+l 
c Shuffle all arrays down one 
do 2600,14=L_c_no(i, i1)-1, i2, -1 
L_c_u(i, ii, i4+1)=L_c_u(i, ii, i4) 
L c-port(i, il, i4+1)=L cnort(i, il, i4) 
L_c_v(i, il, i4+1)=L_c_v(i, il, i4) 
L_cc(i, il, i4+1)=L_c_p(i, il, i4) 
L_c_d(i, i1, i4+1)=L_c_d(i, il, i4) 
2600 continue 
c Insert the "same" unit in the space made by shuffling down 
L_c u(i, ii, i2)=L_c u(i, ii, i3+1) 
L_ccort(i, il, i2)=" 
L_o_v(i, il, i2)=" 
L_c_p(i, i1, i2)= 
Lc d(i, i1, i2)= 
c 
c Start i4 off at i3+1 because the array has been shuffled down, the 
c previous i3 now being equal to i3+1 
c 
i4=i3+1 
C 14 is the end of the current unit 
2650 i4=i4+1 
c 
c If i4 has exceeded the set length of the array then go to the shuffling 
c up stage 
c 
if(i4. gt. L_c_no(i, il)) then 
goto 2660 
endif 
c 
c Locate the "end" of the current unit 
if(L c_u(i, il, 14). eq. " ") goto 2650 
c 
c Shuffle array up by as much space as the duplicated unit had taken up 
2660 do 2700, i5=i3+1, L_c_no(i, ii) 
L_c_u(i, il, i5)=L_c_u(i, il, i5+i4-i3-1) 
L_c_port(i, il, i5)=L c_port(i, il, i5+i4-i3-1) 
L_c_v(i, il, i5)=L_c_v(i, il, i5+i4-i3-1) 
L_cn(i, il, i5)=L_cn(i, il, i5+i4-i3-1) 
L_c_d(i, ii, i5)=L_c d(i, il, i5+i4-i3-1) 
2700 continue 
c 
c Reset length of the array to the shuffled up length 
L_c_no(i, il)=L_c no(i, il)+i3+1-i4+1 
C In resetting the length of the array take note of the special case of 
c where the last unit to be pruned was the last. 
if(i4. eq. L_c_no(i, i1)) then 
L_c_no(i, il)=L_c_no(i, il)-1 
endif 
goto 2550 
4000 continue 
5000 continue 
c 
c Scrub all blank lines at the end 
c 
do 7000, i=1,20 
do 6000, i1=1,12 
5500 if(L_c_no(i, i1). gt. 1) then 
if(L_c_u(i, il, L_c_no(i, il))(1: 1). eq. " ". and. L_c_v(i, il, L_c_no(i, 
\cil))(1: 1). eq. " ") then 
L_c_no(i, i1)=L_c_no(i, il)-1 
goto 5500 
end if 
endif 
6000 continue 
7000 continue 
c 
return 
9000 write(0, '(//, "Error in reading configuration file ! ", //)') 
stop 
end 
subroutine separate-line-items 
c 
character*5 L_c_u(20,12,100)*20, L_c-port(20,12,100)*2, L_c_v(20,12,100)*25 
\c, L_ce(20,12,100), L_c_d(20,12,100) 
character*5 L_e_u(20,12,100)*20, L_e-port(20,12,100)*2, L_e x(20,12,100)*25 
\c, L_e-P(20,12,100), L_e_d(20,12,100) 
integer L_c_no(20,12), L e_no(20,12), i, il, i2, i3, i4 
c 
common /No_of_l_ces/ L_c_no, L_e_no 
common /L_cause_list_1/ L_c u, L_c_port 
common /L-cause-list-2/ L_c_v, L_c_p, L_c_d 
common /L-effect-list-l/ L_e_u, L_e_port 
common /L_effeot_list_2/ L_e_v, L_e_p, L_e_d 
c 
c Step through all the process lines 
do 3000, i=1,20 
c 
c Step through all the process deviations 
do 2000, i1=1,12 
c 
c Step through the lists of causes 
100 do 1000, i2=1, L c_no(i, il) 
c 
c If the CURRENT variable is non-blank and the following UNIT is non-blank 
c then insert a blank line and shuffle the array down and then increase 
c counter of causes by one. 
if(L_c v(i, i1, i2). ne. " ". and. L_c_u(i, il, i2+1). ne. " ") then 
do 500, i3=L_c_no(i, i1), i2+1, -1 
L_c_u(i, il, i3+1)=L_c_u(i, il, i3) 
L_c-port(i, ii, i3+1)=L c_port(i, il, i3) 
L_c_v(i, i1, i3+1)=L_c_v(i, i1, i3) 
L_ce(i, i1, i3+1) =L_c_p(i, i1, i3 ) 
L_c_d(i, i1,13+1)=L_c_d(i, i1, i3) 
500 continue 
L_c_u(i, i1, i2+1)= 
L_c_port(i, il, i2+1)=" 
L_c v(i, i1, i2+1)=" 
L_c_p(i, il, i2+1)= 
L_c_d(i, ii, i2+1)= 
L_c_no (i, i 1) =L_c_no (i, i 1) +1 
end if 
1000 continue 
c 
if(L_c_no(i, i1). gt. 1) then 
if(L_c_v(i, il, L_c_no(i, il)-1). ne. " ". and. L_c_u(i, i1, L_c_no(i, i1) 
\c). ne. " goto 100 
end if 
C 
C 
c Step through the lists of effects 
c 
1100 do 1900, i2=1, L_e_no(i, i1) 
c 
c If the CURRENT variable is non-blank and the following UNIT is non-blank 
c then insert a blank line and shuffle the array down and then increase 
c counter of effects by one. 
if(L_e_v(i, i1, i2). ne. " ". and. L_e_u(i, i1, i2+1). ne. " ") then 
do 1500, i3=L_e_no(i, i1), 12+1, -1 
Le u(i, ii, i3+1)=L_e u(i, il, i3) 
L_e-port(i, il, i3+1)=L_e port(i, il, i3) 
L e_v(i, i1, i3+1)=L_e_v(i, i1,13) 
L_e_p(i, il, i3+1)=L_e_p(i, il, i3) 
L_e_d(i, ii, 13+1)=L_e_d(i, il, i3) 
1500 continue 
L_e_u(i, ii, 12+1)=" 
L_enort(i, i1, i2+1)=" 
L_e_v(i, il, i2+1)=" 
L_e-p(i, il, i2+1)=" 
L_e_d(i, i1, i2+1)=" 
L_e no(i, il)=L_e_no(i, il)+1 
endif 
1900 continue 
c 
if(L_e_no(i, il). gt. 1) then 
if(L_e_v(i, il, L_e_no(i, il)-1). ne. " ". and. L_e_u(i, il, L_e_no(i, il) 
\c). ne. " goto 1100 
endif 
C 
2000 continue 
3000 continue 
end 
subroutine printout 
c 
integer V, Vds, V_c_no (20,5) , V_e_no (20,5 ) integer L, Lds, L_c_no(20,12), L_e no(20,12) 
integer Maxnumber 
character*6 Line_devs(12,2), Vessel_devs(5,2) 
character*3 C_flag, E_flag 
character*20 Vessel(20) 
character*5 V_c_v(20,5,20)*25, V_c_p(20,5,20), V_c d(20,5,20) 
character*5 V_e v(20,5,20)*25, V_e_p(20,5,20), V_e_d(20,5,20) 
character*5 L_c_u(20,12,100)*20, L c_port(20,12,100)*2, L_c_v(20,12,100)*25 
\c, L_cc(20,12,100), L_c_d(20,12,100) 
character*5 L_e_u(20,12,100)*20, L_e_port(20,12,100)*2, L_e x(20,12,100)*25 
\c, L_e_p (20,12,100) , L_e d (20,12,100 ) 
c 
integer V_c_conc no(20,2,10), Hilo, No_of_comps, Comp_no 
character*25 V_c_conc_in_v(20,2,10,10), V_c_conc_in_c(20,2,10,10), Comp 
character*2 V_c_conc_inn(20,2,10,10), V_c_conc_out_p(20,2,10,10) 
character Component(10)*25, V_c_conc_in d(20,2,10,10)*5 
c 
character*5 L_imp_c_unit(20,20,40)*20, L_imp_c_v(20,20,40)*25, L_imp_c_p(20 
\c, 20,40) , L,. imp_c d (20,20,40 ) 
character*5 L_imp_e_unit(20,20,40)*20, L_imp_e_v(20,20,40)*25, L_imp_e_p(20 
\c, 20,40) , L_imp_e d (20,20,40 ) 
character*10 Impurity-list(20) 
integer No_of_imps, L_imp c_no(20,20), L_imp_e_no(20,20) 
C 
integer k 
character*4 Conc_items_flag, combine_strings*39 
C 
common /Vessel names/ Vessel 
common /No-of-vessels/ V 
common /Vessel_deviations/ Vessel_devs 
common /No vessel_devs/ Vds 
common /No_of V_ces/ V_c_no, V_e_no 
common /V_cause_list/ V_c_v, V_cc, V_c_d 
common /V-effect-list/ V_e v, V_e-p, V_e_d 
common /No_of_lines/ L 
common /Line deviations/ Line_devs 
common /No_line_devs/ Lds 
common /No_of_l_ces/ L_c_no, L e_no 
common /L cause_list_1/ L_c_u, L_c_port 
common /L-cause-list-2/ L_c_v, L_c_p, L_c_d 
common /L_effect_list_l/ L_e u, L e_port 
common /L-effect-list-2/ L_e_v, L_e_p, L_e_d 
c 
common /Vessel_conc_nos/ V_c_conc_no, No_of_comps 
common /Vessel_conc_txt/ V_c_conc_in v, V_c_conc_in c, V_c_cone_in_p, V_c_co \cnc_in_d, V_c_conc_out_p 
common /Component-names/ Component 
C 
common /Impurity_causes/ L_imp_c_unit, L_imp_c_v, L_imp_c-p, L_imp_c_d- 
common /Impurity-effects/ L_imp_e_unit, L_imp_e_v, L_imp_e_p, L_imp_e d 
common /Impurities/ Impurity-list 
common /Impurity_nos/ No_of_imps, L_imp_c_no, L_imp_e_no 
c 
c 
c Print out vessel details 
c 
c Step through all the process vessels 
do 1000, i=1, V 
c 
c Step through all the vessel process deviations 
do 900, i1=1, Vds 
c 
c Check if there are any causes or effects for the current deviation. If 
c there are none then print a message to that effect and skip the cause 
c and effect printing stage. 
if(V_c_no(i, il). eq. 0. and. V_e_no(i, il). eq. 0) then 
c write(8, '(/, "No causes and effects of ", a, " ", a, " found on vesse \cl ", a)') Vessel devs(il, l), Vessel_devs(il, 2), Vessel(i) 
else 
c write(8, '("CTL-L")') 
write(8, '(///)') 
write(8, '(.. ----------------------------------------------------- 
\0 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
\c----")') 
write(8, '(/, "Search on vessel : ", a)') Vessel(i) 
write(8, '(/, a, " ", a, /)') Vessel_devs(il, l), Vessel_devs(il, 2) 
write(8, '("CAUSES", t67, "CONSEQUENCES", /)') 
Ma. 'cnumber=V_c_no(i, il) 
if(V_e_no(i, il). gt. Maxnumber) Maxnumber=V_e_no(i, il) 
do 700, i2=1, Maxnumber 
if(V_e_no(i, il). ge. i2) then 
write(8, '(a, " "$)') eombine_stri \cngs(V_c_v(i, i1, i2), V_c_p(i, ii, i2), V_c_d(i, ii, i2) ) 
else 
write(8, '(" 
endif 
if(V_e_no(i, i1). ge. i2) then 
\c2), V_e_d(i, il, i2)) 
write(8, '(a)') combine_strings(V_e_v(i, il, i2), V_e-p(i, il, i 
else 
write(8, '(" ")') 
end if 
700 continue 
end if 
900 continue 
do 980, i1=1,2 
c 
c Check if there any concentration change causes or effects to be printed. 
c If there are none, then skip the printing section. 
Conc_items_flag="none" 
do 950, k=1, No of_comps 
if(V_c_conc_no(i, il, k). gt. 0) Conc_items_flag="some" 
if(Conc_items_flag. eq. "some") k=No_of_comps 
950 continue 
if(Conc_items_flag. eq. "none") then 
c write(8, '("No concentration ", $)') 
c if(il. eq. 1) write(8, '("low", $)') 
c if(il. eq. 2) write(8, '("high", $)') 
c write(8, '(" causes or effects found on vessel ", a)') Vessel(i) 
else 
write(8, '(///)') 
write(8, '(.. ----------------------------------------------------- 
\c----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
\c---- ")') 
write(8, '(/, "Concentration search on vessel : ", a, /)') Vessel(i) 
do 970, i2=1, No of_comps 
write(8, '(//, "Causes of concentration of ", a, " ", $)') Compone 
\cnt(12) 
if(il. eq. 1) write(8, '("low", /)') 
if(il. eq. 2) write(8, '("high", /)') 
do 960, i3=1, V_c_conc_no(i, ii, i2) 
write(8, ' (a, " %a, " "., a, " ", a)) ) V_c conc_in v(i, il, i2, i3 ) 
\c, V_c_conc_in_c(i, il, i2, i3), V_c_conc_ino(i, i1, i2, i3), V_c_conc_in_d(i, il, i2, i3 
\c) 
960 continue 
write(8, '(/)') 
970 continue 
endif 
write(8, '(//)') 
980 continue 
1000 continue 
c 
c Print out line details 
c 
c Step through all the lines 
do 3000, i=1, L 
c 
c Step through all the line deviations 
do 1900, i1=1, Lds 
c write(8, '("CTL-L")') 
write(8, '(///)') 
write(8, '("-------------------------------------------------------- 
\c----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
\c-")') 
c 
c Check if there are any causes or effects for the current deviation. If 
c there are none then print a message to that effect and skip the cause 
c and effect printing stage. 
if(L_c_no(i, il). eq. 0. and. L_e_no(i, il). eq. 0) then 
write(8, '(/, "No causes and effects of ", a, " ", a, " found on line 
\c", 12)') Line_devs(il, l), Line_devs(il, 2), i 
else 
write(8, '(/, "Search on line ", i2)') i 
write(8, '(/, a, '* .., a)') Line_devs(il, 1), Line devs(il, 2) 
write(8, '(/, "CAUSES", t67, "CONSEQUENCES", /)') 
Maxnumber=L_c_no(i, il) 
if(L_e_no(i, il). gt. Maxnumber) Maxnumber=L_e_no(i, il) 
do 1700, i2=1, Maxnumber 
if(L_c_no(i, i1). ge. i2) then 
write(8, '(a, " ", a, a, ", $)') L_c_u(i, il, 12), L , _coort \c(i, il, i2), combine strings(L_c_v(i, il, i2), L cc(i, il, i2), L_c d(i, ii, i2)) 
else 
write(8, '(" 
\c ", $)') 
endif 
if(L_e_no(i, il). ge. i2) then 
write(8, '(a, " ", a, " ", a)') L_e_u(i, i1, i2), L_eeort(i, il, 
\ci2), combine strings(L_e v(i, il, i2), L_en(i, il, i2), L_e_d(i, il, i2) ) 
else 
write(8, '(" ")') 
endif 
1700 continue 
end if 
1900 continue 
c 
c Print out details on impurities for each line 
c 
write(8, '(//)') 
write(8, '(.. ----------------------------------------------------------- 
\c--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
\c') 
write(8, '("Line ", i2, " IMPURITIES ")') i 
write(8, '(//)') 
do 2800, i1=1, No_of_imps 
write(8, '("Impurity ", a, " high")') Impurity_list(il)(1: Length(Impur 
\city_list(il))) 
write(8, '("Causes", t67, "Consequences")') 
Maxnumber=L_imp_c no(1, ii) 
if(Maxnumber. lt. L_imp e_no(i, ii)) Maxnumber=L_imp_e_no(i, il) 
do 2400, i2=1, Maxnumber 
if(L_imp_c_no(i, il). ge. 12) then 
write(8, ' (a, " "pa, " ", W) L_imp_c_unit(i, il, i2), combine 
\c strings(L_imp_c_v(i, il, i2), L_imp_cn(i, il, i2), L_imp_c_d(i, ii, i2) ) 
else 
write(8, '(" 
\c ", $)' ) 
end if 
if(L_imp_e no(i, i1). ge. i2) then 
write(8, '(a, " ", a)') L_imp_e_unit(i, il, i2), combine_strings(L 
\c_imp_e_v(i, il, i2), L_imp_e-p(i, il, i2), L_imp_e_d(i, il, i2) ) 
else 
write(8, '(" ")') 
endif 
2400 continue 
write(8, '(/)') 
2800 continue 
write(8, '(//)') 
3000 continue 
return 
end 
C 
C 
character*15 Unit(40), Mode1(40), A_unit, A_model 
integer i, J, Unitnumber 
subroutine get-model-of-unit 
common /Units-text/ Unit, Model 
common /Units numb/ Unitnumber 
common /Unit Model/ A_unit, A_model 
C 
do 1000, i=1, Unitnumber 
if(Unit(1). eq. A_unit) then 
A_model=Model(i) 
i=Unitnumber 
end if 
1000 continue 
return 
end 
character*39 function combine_strings(stra, strb, strc) 
c 
character stra*(*), strb*(*), strc*(*) 
character*2 Spaces 
integer ia, ib, ic, lena, lenb, lenc 
c 
ia=len(stra) 
ib=len(strb) 
ic=len(strc) 
lens=Length(stra) 
lenb=Length(strb) 
lenc=Length(strc) 
Spaces=" 
C 
if(lena. eq. 0) then 
combine_strings=" 
else 
combine_strings=stra(1: lena) 
endif 
if(lenb. gt. 0) then 
combine-strings=combine_strings(1: Length(combine_strings))//Spaces(1: 2 \c)//strb(1: lenb) 
end if 
if(lenc. gt. 0) then 
combine_strings=combine_strings(1: Length(combine_strings))//Spaces(1: 2 \c)//strc(1: lenc) 
end if 
c 
return 
end 
integer function Length(String) 
character String*(*) 
integer i 
i=len(String) 
if(String(i: i). ne. " ") goto 2 
i=i-1 
if(i. eq. 0) goto 2 
goto 1 
Length=i 
return 
end 
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Water_sep. conf 
/* 
Filename = Water_sep. conf 
Version 1 
Created on 4/8/86 
by jop 
UNIT NAME MODEL NAME 
1 sourcel hyd_source 
2 pumpt pumpset_a 
3 nrv3 nrv 
4 meter4 fq_c_bypas 
5 pipelines pipeline 
6 cntrl v16 cv_c bypas 
7 valve7 valve 
8 settler8 settler 
9 pump9 pumpset a 
10 dividerlO divider 
11 orificell orifice 
12 valve12 valve 
13 cntrl_vl13 cv_c_bypas 
14 exchangl4 ht_exchg_a 
15 sinkl5 sink 
16 sourcel6 source 
17 sinkl7 sink 
18 valvel8 valve 
19 sinkl9 sink 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
UPSTREAM 
UNIT PORT 
sourcel 1 
pump2 2 
nrv3 2 
meter4 2 
pipeline5 2 
cntrl_v16 2 
valve? 2 
settler8 2 
pump9 2 
dividerlO 3 
orificell 2 
valvel2 2 
dividerlO 2 
cntrl v113 2 
exchangl4 2 
sourcel6 1 
exchang14 4 
settler8 4 
valvel8 2 
DOWNSTREAM 
UNIT PORT 
pump2 1 
nrv3 1 
meter4 1 
pipeline5 1 
cntrl_vl6 1 
valve? 1 
settler8 1 
pump9 1 
dividerlO 1 
orificell 1 
valvel2 1 
settlerS 3 
cntrl v113 1 
exchang14 1 
sinkl5 1 
exchangl4 3 
sinkl7 1 
valvel8 1 
sinkl9 1 
Line SOURCE DRAIN PROCESS 
No. VESSEL PORT VESSEL PORT 
1 sourcel 1 settler8 1 
2 settler8 2 dividerlO 1 
3 dividerlO 3 settler8 3 
4 dividerlO 2 exchangl4 1 
5 exchangl4 2 sinkl5 1 
6 sourcel6 1 exchangl4 3 
7 exchangl4 4 sinkl7 1 
8 settler8 4 sinkl9 1 
Impurities 
Code Name 
a water in olefin 
b lower alkanes/alkene 
c organic acids - olef 
d unreacted monomer 
e olefin in water 
s 
Materials of Construction Terminal Events 
----------------------------------------- 
ti LO>leak (major), brittle fracture 
ib-1 HI>pressure high 
is-1 HI>corrosion 
*/ 
conf_filename('Water_sep. conf'). 
conf_version('1'). 
conf_date('4/8/86'). 
conf_who('jcp'). 
MATERIAL 
olefin 
olefin 
olefin 
olefin 
olefin 
olefin 
olefin 
water 
unit_models([hyd_source, pumpset_a, nrv, fq-c_bypas, pipeline, cv_c_bypas, valve, sett \cler, divider, orifice, ht exchg_a, sink, source]). 
key(sourcel, hyd_source). 
key(pump2, pumpset_a). 
key(nrv3, nrv). 
key(meter4, fq_c bypas). 
key(pipeline5, pipeline). 
key(cntrl_vl6, cv_c_bypas). 
key(valve7, valve). 
key(settler8, settler). 
key(pump9, pumpset_a). 
key(dividerlO, divider). 
key(orificell, orifice). 
key(valvel2, valve). 
key(cntrl_v113, cv_c_bypas). 
key(exchangl4, ht_exch$ a). 
key(sinkl5, sink). 
key(sourcel6, source). 
key(sinkl7, sink). 
key(valvel8, valve). 
key(sinkl9, sink). 
link(sourcel, 1, pump2,1). 
link(pump2,2, nrv3,1). 
link(nrv3,2, meter4,1). 
link(meter4,2, pipeline5,1). 
link(pipeline5,2, cntrl_v16,1). 
link(cntrl v16,2, valve7,1). 
link(valve7,2, settler8,1). 
link(settler8,2, pump9,1). 
link(pump9,2, dividerlO, 1). 
link(dividerlO, 3, orificell, 1). 
link(orificell, 2, valvel2,1). 
link(valvel2,2, settler8,3). 
link(dividerlO, 2, cntrl vll3,1). 
link(cntrl_v113,2, exchangl4,1). 
link(exchangl4,2, sinkl5,1). 
link(sourcel6,1, exchangl4,3). 
link(exchangl4,4, sinkl7,1). 
link(settler8,4, valvel8,1). 
link(valvel8,2, sinkl9,1). 
line( 1, sourcel, 1, settler8,1). 
line( 2, settler8,2, dividerlO, 1). 
line( 3, dividerlO, 3, settler8,3). 
line( 4, dividerlO, 2, exchangl4,1). 
line( 5, exchangl4,2, sinkl5,1). 
line( 6, sourcel6,1, exchangl4,3). 
line( 7, exchangl4,4, sinkl7,1). 
line( 8, settler8,4, sinkl9,1). 
material-in-line( 
material-in-line( 
material-in-line( 
material-in-line( 
material-in-line( 
material-in-line( 
material-in-line( 
material-in-line( 
1, olefin). 
2, olefin). 
3, olefin). 
4, olefin) . 5, olefin). 
6, olef in). 
7, olefin). 
8, water). 
process_material_models([olefin, water]). 
impurity(a). 
impurity(b). 
impurity(c). 
impurity(d). 
impurity(e). 
rule(pipe, effect, [[t, l, low]], [['leak (major)', ' ', ' '], ['brittle fracture', ' ', 
\o' ']]). 
rule(pipe, effect, [[[i, b], 1, high]], [['pressure high', ' 
rule(pipe, effect, [[[i, c], 1, high]], [['corrosion', p "I I]]). 
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cv_c_bypas 
Model : cv_c_bypas 
Control loop (control valve, controller, sensor) and bypass 
Propagation Equations 
--------------------- 
p2=f(p1) 
q2=f(q1) 
t2=f(tl) 
xl-2=f(xl-1) 
i_-2=f(i_-1) 
Initial Event Statements 
loop fails closed, isolatn valve closed>q2 NONE, pl HI 
loop fails pt-clsd, isolatn vlve pt-clsd>q2 LO 
loop fails open, bypass fails, bypass directed open>q2 HI 
sensor fails closed, cntrlr fails closed, ctl-vl fails closed, set-pnt mvd closed> 
\cloop fails closed 
sensor fails pt-clsd, cntrlr fails pt-clsd, ctl-vl fails pt-clsd, set-pnt mvd pt-c 
\clsd>loop fails pt-clsd 
sensor fails open, cntrlr fails open, ctl-vl fails open, set-pnt mvd open>loop fai 
\cls open 
blockage>q2 LO 
leak>escape 
Terminal Event Statements 
------------------------- 
rule(cv_c_bypas, p, [p, 2], [[p, 1]], []). 
rule(ov_c_bypas, p, [q, 2], [[q, 1]], []). 
rule(cv_c_bypas, p, [t, 2], [[t, 1]], []). 
rule (cv_c_bypas, p, [[x, 11,2], [[[x, 11,1]), []). 
rule (cv_c_bypas, p, [[i, _], 2], [[[i, _], 1]], []). 
rule (cv_c_bypas, functional, [[' loop fails closed', ' ' ,' '], ['isolatn valve close \cd', ' ,,, '1], C[q, 2, none], [p, l, high]]). 
rule(cv_c_bypas, functional, [[' loop fails pt-clsd', ' ', ' '], ['isolatn vlve pt-cl 
\csd', ' ', ' ']], [[q, 2, low31). 
rule(cv_c_bypas, functional, [[ loop fails open'. ' ', ' '] ['bypass fails', ' , \c], ['bypass directed open', ' ', ' ']], [[q, 2, high]]). 
rule(cv_c_bypas, functional, [[' sensor fails closed', ' ', ' '], ['cntrlr fails clos 
\ced', ' ', ' '], ['ctl-vl fails ], [ set-pnt mvd closed'. ' ]], closed', ' ', ' 
\c[['loop fails closed', ' ', ' ']]). 
rule(cv_c_bypas, functional, [(' sensor fails pt-clsd', ' ', ' '], ['cntrlr fails pt- 
\cclsd', ' ', ' '], ['ctl-vl fail s pt-clsd', ' ', ' '], [' set-pnt mvd pt-clsd', ' ', ' 
\c']], [['loop fails pt-clsd', ' ', ' ']]). 
rule(cv_c_bypas, functional, [(' sensor fails open', ' ' ,' '], ['cntrlr fails open', \c' ', ' '], ['ctl-vl fails open', ' ', ' '], ['set-pnt mvd open', ' ', ' ']], [['loop 
\cfails open', ' ', ' ']]). 
rule(cv_c_bypas, hydraulic, [['blockage', ' ', ' ']], [[q, 2,1ow]]). 
rule(ov_c_bypas, containment, [['leak', ' ', ' ']], [['escape', ' 
divider 
/* 
Model : divider 
Binary divider - no flow distribution specified 
Propagation Equations 
p2=f(pl) 
p3=f(p1) 
q2=f(ql) 
q3=f(ql) 
t2=f(tl) 
t3=f(tl) 
xl-2=f(xl-1) 
xl-3=f(xl-1) 
i= 2=f(i_-1) 
i= 3=f(i_ 1) 
Initial Event Statements 
blockage>p2 HI, p3 HI 
blockage, leak (major)>q2 LO, q3 LO, q2 NONE, q3 NONE 
blockage - other leg>q2 HI, q3 HI 
leak>escape 
Terminal Event Statements 
rule(divider, p, [p, 2], [[p, 1]], []). 
rule(divider, p, [p, 3), [(p, l]], []). 
rule(divider, p, [q, 2], [[q, 1]], []). 
rule(divider, p, [q, 3], [[q, 1]], []). 
rule(divider, p, [t, 2], [[t, 1]], []). 
rule(divider, p, [t, 3), [[t, l]], []). 
rule(divider, p, [[x, l], 2], [[[x, 1], 1]], []). 
rule(divider, p, [[x, 1], 3], [[[x, 1], 1]], []). 
rule(divider, p, [[i, _], 
2], [[[i, 
_], 
1]], []). 
rule(divider, p, [[i, _], 
3], [[[i, 
_], 
1]], []). 
rule(divider, hydraulic, [['blockage', ' ', ' '3], [[p, 2, high], [p, 3, high]]). 
rule(divider, hydraulic, [['blockage', ' ', ' '], ['leak (major)', ' ', ' ']], [[q, 2, lo 
\cw], [q, 3, low], [q, 2, none], [q, 3, none] ]) . 
rule(divider, hydraulic, [['blockage - other leg', ' ', ' ']], [[q, 2, high], [q, 3, high \C]]). 
rule(divider, containment, [['leak', ' ', ' ']], [['escape', ' ', ' ']]). 
fq_c_bypas 
Model : fq_c_bypas 
Flowmeter and bypass 
Propagation Equations 
p2=f(pl) 
42=f(41) 
t2=f(tl) 
xl-2=f(xl-1) 
i= 2=f(i_ 1) 
Initial Event Statements 
------------------------ 
bypass fails, bypass directed open>q2 HI 
leak>esc ape 
Terminal Event Statements 
------------------------- 
q2 LO, q2 HI>inaccurate measurmnt 
*/ 
rule(fq_c bypas, p, [p, 2], [[p, 1]], [] ). 
rule(fq_c bypas, p, [q, 2], [ [q, 1] ], [ ]) . 
rule(fq_c_bypas, p, [t, 2], [[t, 1]], []). 
rule(fq_c_bypas, p, [[x, 1], 2], [[[x, 1], 1]], [j). 
rule(fq_c_bypas, p, [[i, _], 
21, [[[i, 
_], 
1]], []). 
rule(fq_c bypas, functional, [['bypass fails', ' ', ' '], ['bypass directed open', ' \c', ' ']], [[q, 2, high]]). 
rule(fq_c_bypas, containment, [['leak', ' ', ' ']], [['escape', ' 
rule(fq-c bypas, effect, [[q, 2, low], [q, 2, high]], [['inaccurate measurmnt', ' \c]). 
ht_exchg_a 
i* 
Model : ht_exchg_a 
Heat Exchanger - tube side higher press, shell to tube transfer, no phase chg 
Propagation Equations 
--------------------- 
p2=f(pi) 
q2=f(ql) 
t2=f (tl, t3, q3, -ql ) 
xl-2=f(x1-1) 
i= 2=f(i_-1) 
p4=f(p3) 
q4=f(q3) 
t4=f (t1, t3, q3, -ql ) 
x3-4=f(x3-3) 
i= 4=f(i_-3) 
Initial Event Statements 
------------------------ 
tube fouling>t2 LO, t4 HI, q2 LO, pl HI 
shell leak (major)>q4 NONE, q4 LO, p4 LO 
tube leak (major)>q2 LO, p2 LO, p4 HI 
tube leak>id-4 HI 
leak>escape 
Terminal Event Statements 
------------------------- 
*/ 
rule(ht_exchg_a, p, [p, 2], [[p, 1]], []). 
rule(ht exchg_a, p, [q, 2], [[q, 1]], []). 
rule(ht_exchg_a, p, [t, 2), [[t, 1], [t, 3], [q, 3]], [[q, 1]]). 
rule(ht exchg_a, p, [ [x, 1], 2], [[ [x, 1], 1) ], []) . 
rule(ht exchg_a, p, [[i, _], 
2), [[[i, 
_], 
l]], []). 
rule(ht_exchg_a, p, [p, 4], [[p, 3)), []). 
rule(ht_exohg_a, p, [q, 4], [[q, 3]], []). 
rule (ht_exchg_a, p, [ t, 4], [[t, 1], [t, 3], [q, 3) ], [[q, 1] ]) . 
rule(ht_exchg_a, p, ([x, 3], 4], ([(x, 3], 3]], []). 
rule(ht_exchg_a, p, [[i, _], 
4], [[[i, 
_), 
3]], []). 
rule(ht_exchg_a, functional, [['tube fouling', ' ', ' ']], [[t, 2, low], [t, 4, high], [q, 
\c2, low], [p, 1, high] ]) . 
rule(ht exchg a, containment, [['shell leak (major)', ' ', ' ']], [[q, 4, none], [q, 4, l 
\cow], [p, 4, low]]). 
rule(ht_exchg_a, containment, [['tube leak (major)', ' ', ' ']], [[q, 2, low], [p, 2, low 
\c], [p, 4, high] ]). 
rule(ht_exchg_a, containment, [['tube leak', ' ', ' ']], [[[i, d), 4, high]]). 
rule(ht_exchg_a, containment, [['leak', ' ', ' ']], [['escape', ' ', ' ']]). 
hyd_source 
/* 
Model : hyd_source 
Hydrocarbon source - incorporates impurities 
Propagation Equations 
--------------------- 
Initial Event Statements 
source empty>p1 LO, ql NONE 
impurity a in source>ia-1 HI 
impurity b in source>ib-1 HI 
impurity c in source>ic-1 HI 
Terminal Event Statements 
------------------------- 
*1 
rule(hyd_source, functional, [['source empty', ' ', ' ']], [[p, l, low], [q, l, none]]). 
rule(hyd source, impurity, [['impurity a in source', ' ', ' ']], [[[i, a], 1, high]]). 
rule(hyd source, impurity, [['impurity b in source', ' ', ' ']], [[[i, b], l, high]]). 
rule(hyd_source, impurity, [['impurity c in source', ' 
nrv 
Model : nrv 
Non-return valve 
Propagation Equations 
--------------------- 
P2=f(P1) 
q2=f (ql) 
t2=f(tl) 
xl-2=f(x1-1) 
i_-2f (i= i) 
Initial Event Statements 
------------------------ 
valve stuck clsd>q2 NONE 
valve fails pt. clsd>q2 LO 
leak>escape 
Terminal Event Statements 
------------------------- 
*/ 
rule(nrv, p, [p, 2], [ [p, 1] ], []) . 
rule(nrv, p, [q, 21, [[q, 1]], C]). 
rule(nrv, p, [t, 2], [[t, 1]], []). 
rule(nrv, p, [[x, 1], 2], [[[x, 1], 1]], []). 
rule(nrv, p, [[i, _], 
2], [[[i, 
_], 
1]], []). 
rule(nrv, functional, [['valve stuck clsd', ' ', ' ']], [[q, 2, none]]). 
rule(nrv, functional, [['valve fails pt. clsd', ' ', ' ']], [[q, 2, low]]). 
rule(nrv, ccntainment, [['leak', ' ', ' ']], [['escape', $ . 's I]]). 
olefin 
material_cause(olefin, blockage, []). 
material_cause(olefin, cavitation, [['low b. pt. material', ' ', ' '], ['gassy materi 
\cal', ' ,,, ']]). 
material_effect(olefin, escape, ' ', [['flammable release', ' ', ' ']]). 
material effect(olefin, t, high, [['pressure high', ' ', ' '], ['blockage', ' ', ' '], [ 
\c'polymerisation', ' ', ' ']]). 
material_effect(olefin, t, low, []). 
material_effect(olefin, p, high, []). 
material_effect(olefin, p, low, [['liquid flashes', ' 
orifice -- 
Model : orifice 
Orifice plate 
Propagation Equations 
--------------------- 
p2=f(pl) 
q2=f(q1) 
t2=f(tl) 
xl-2=f(xl-1) 
i_-2=f(i_ 1) 
Initial Event Statements 
------------------------ 
worn orifice>p2 HI, q2 HI 
blocked orifice>p2 LO, q2 LO, q2 NONE 
leak>escape 
Terminal Event Statements 
------------------------- 
*/ 
rule(orifice, p, [p, 2), [[p, 1]], []). 
rule(orifice, p, [q, 2], [[q, 1]], []). 
rule(orifice, p, [t, 2], [[t, 1]], [] ). 
rule(orifice, p, [(x, 1], 2], [[[x, 1], 1)], []). 
rule(orifice, p, [[i, _], 2], [[[i, _], 1]], [])" 
rule(orifice, functional, [['worn orifice', ' ', ' ']], [[p, 2, high], [q, 2, high]1). 
rule(orifice, fuictional, [['blocked orifice', ' ', ' ']], [[p, 2, low], [q, 2, low], [q, 2 
\c, none]]). 
rule(orifice, containment, [['leak', ' ', ' ']], [['escape', ' 
pipe 
Model : pipe 
Generic Pipe Model 
Propagation Equations 
--------------------- 
P2=f(P1) 
42=f(41) 
t2=f(tl) 
xl-2=f(xl-1) 
i= 2=f(i= 1) 
Initial Event Statements 
blockage, leak (major)>q2 LO, q2 NONE 
blockage, ht to blckd-in fluid>pl HI 
leak (major)>p2 LO 
leak>escape 
solar heat, fire>ht to blckd-in fluid 
external cold source>t2 LO 
external heat source>t2 HI 
cold weather, lagging loss>external cold source 
hot weather, fire>external heat source 
Terminal Event Statements 
------------------------- 
p1 HI>leak (major), Pipe rupture, flange leak 
*/ 
rule(pipe, p, [p, 2], [[p, l33, [3). 
rule(Pipe, P, Cq, 2], C[q, 1]], []). 
rule(pipe, p, [t, 2), CCt. 1]], [3). 
rule(pipe, p, [[x, 1], 2], [[[x, 1], 1]], []). 
rule(pipe, p, [[i, _], 
2], [[[i, 
_], 
1]], [] ). 
rule(pipe, hydraulic, [['blockage', ' ', ' '], ['leak (major)', ' ', ' '11, [[q, 2, low1, 
\c[q, 2, none]]). 
rule(pipe, hydraulic, [['blockage', ' ', ' '], ['ht to blckd-in fluid', ' ', ' ']], [[p 
\c, 1, high]]). 
rule(pipe, containment, [['leak (major)', ' ', ' '11, [[p, 2, low]]). 
rule(pipe, containment, [['leak', ' ', ' ']], [['escape', ' ']]). 
rule(pipe, environmental, [['solar heat', ' ', ' '], ['fire', ' ']], [['ht to blok 
\cd-in fluid', ' ', ' ']]). 
rule(pipe, environmental, [['external cold source', ' ']), [[t, 2, low)]). 
rule(pipe, environmental, [['external heat source', ' ']], [[t, 2, high]]). 
rule(pipe, environmental, [['cold weather', ' '], ['lagging loss', ' 
\cexternal cold source', ' 
rule(pipe, environmental, [('hot weather', ' '], ['fire', ' ', ' ']], [['external 
\cheat source', ' ', ' ']]). 
rule(pipe, effect, [[p, l, high]], [['leak (major)', ' ', ' '], ['pipe rupture', ' 
\o], ['flange leak', ' ,,, , ]]). 
pipeline 
i* 
Model : pipeline 
Pipeline 
Propagation Equations 
--------------------- 
p2=f(p1) 
q2=f(ql) 
t2=f(tl) 
x1-2=P(x1-1) 
i= 2=P(i_-1) 
Initial Event Statements 
------------------------ 
blockage, leak (major)>q2 NONE, g2 LO 
blockage, hammer/surge, ht to blckd-in fluid>p2 HI 
leak>escape 
solar heat, fire>ht to blckd-in fluid 
Terminal Event Statements 
------------------------- 
*/ 
rule(pipeline, p, [p, 2], [[p, l]], []). 
rule(pipeline, p, [q, 2], [[q, 1]], []). 
rule(pipeline, p, [t, 2], [[t, 1]], []). 
rule(pipeline, p, [[x, 1], 2], [[[x, 1), 1]], []). 
rule(pipeline, p, [[i, _], 
2], [[[i, 
_], 
1]], [] ). 
rule(pipeline, functional, [['blockage', ' '], ['leak (major)', ' ']], [[q, 2, 
\cnone], [q, 2, low] ]). 
rule(pipeline, hydraulio, [['blockage', ' '], ['hammer/surge', ' '], ['ht to 
\cblckd-in fluid', ' ', ' ']], [[p, 2, high]]). 
rule(pipeline, containment, [['leak', ' ', ' ']], [['escape', ' 
rule(pipeline, environmental, [C'solar heat', ' ', ' '], ['fire', ' ', ' ']], CC'ht to 
\cblckd-in fluid', ' ', ' ']]). 
pumpset_a 
Model : pumpset_a 
Pumpset -2 100% pumps, one running and the other on standby 
Propagation Equations 
--------------------- 
P2=f (P1) 
q2=f(ql) 
t2=f(tl) 
xl-2=f(xl-1) 
i. 2=f(i_-1) 
Initial Event Statements 
------------------------ 
loss of NPSH, rotation fault, impeller fault, cavitation>q2 LO, q2 NONE 
delivery shut in>q2 NONE, p2 HI 
delivery part shut>q2 LO 
no change to stndby, stndby fail on dmand, maloperatn of valves>q2 NONE 
blockage>q2 NONE, g2 LO, p2 HI 
pump fluid overheats>t2 HI 
leak (major)>q2 NONE, q2 LO 
leak>escape 
ht to blckd-in fluid>p2 HI 
solar heat, fire>ht to blckd-in fluid 
Terminal Event Statements 
------------------------- 
q2 NONE>pump fluid overheats 
*/ 
rule(pumpset_a, p, [p, 2], [[P, 1]], []). 
rule(pumpset a, P, [4,2], [[q, l]], []). 
rule(pumpset_a, p, [t, 2], [[t, 1]], []), 
rule(pumpset a, p, [ [x, 1], 2], [[ [x, 1], 1] ], [ ]) . 
rule(pumpset_a, p, [[i, _], 
2], [[[i, 
_], 
1]], []). 
rule(pumpset_a, hydraulic [['loss of NPSH' ' ', ' '], ['rotation fault', ' ], [ 
\c'impeller fault', ' ', ' '] [, cavitation', ' ,,, , ]],, [[q, 2 low], [q, 2, none]])" 
rule(pumpset_a, hydraulic, [['delivery shut in', ' ', ' ']], [[q, 2, none], [p, 2, high]] 
\c)" 
rule(pumpset_a, hydraulic, [['delivery part shut', ' ', ' ']], [[q, 2, low]]). 
rule(pumpset_a, hydraulic, [['no change to stndby', ' ', ' '], ['stndby fail on dman 
\cd', ' ', ' '], ['maloperatn of valves', ' ', ' ']], [[q, 2, none]3). 
rule(pumpset_a, hydraulic, [['blockage', ' ', ' ']], [[q, 2, none], [q, 2, low], [p, 2, high 
\c]]). 
rule(pumpset_a, hydraulic, [['pump fluid overheats', ' ', ' ']], [[t, 2, high]]). 
rule(pumpset_a, containment, [['leak (major)', ' ', ' ']], [[q, 2, none], [q, 2, low]]). 
rule(pumpset_a, containment, [['leak', ' ', ' ']], [['escape', ' ', ' ']]). 
rule(pumpset_a, environmental, [['ht to blckd-in fluid', ' ', ' ']], [[p, 2, high]]). 
rule(pumpset_a, environmental, [['solar heat', ' ', ' '], ['fire', ' ', ' ']], [['ht to 
\c blckd-in fluid', ' ', ' ']]). 
rule(pumpset_a, effect, [[q, 2, none]], [['pump fluid overheats', ' ', ' ']]). 
settler 
Model : settler 
Buffer/Settling tank -1 inlet, 1 outlet, pump kickback, water sump/drain 
Propagation Equations 
15=f(ql, -q2, -q4) 
t5=f(tl) 
xl-5=f(xl-1) 
q2=P(15, p5) 
p2=f(p5) 
t2=f(t5) 
q4=f(15, p5) 
p4=f(p5) 
t4=f(t5) 
xl-2=f(xl-1) 
i. 5=f(i_-1) 
i= 2=P(i_-5) 
Initial Event Statements 
------------------------ 
pressure cntrl fault, relief valve lifts, loss of N2 blanket>p5 LO 
pressure cntrl fault>p5 HI 
drain open>15 LO 
leak>escape 
sump drained too far>ie-4 HI' 
Terminal. Event Statements 
------------------------- 
ql NONE, 15, NONE>outflow(s) none 
q1 LO, 15 LO>outflow(s) low 
15 HI>liquid enters vent 
ql HI, q2 HI>poor settling, ia-2 HI 
t5 LO>drain/sump freeze-up 
is-1 HI>poor seprtn of water, water sump overfills 
is-1 HI>corrosion 
ib-1 HI>pressure high 
pl HI>overpressure, leak (major) 
*/ 
rule(settler, p, [1,5], [[q, 1]], [[q, 2], [q, 4]]). 
rule(settler, p, [t, 5], [[t, 1]], [] ). 
rule(settler, p, [[x, 1], 5], [[[x, 1], 1]], []). 
rule(settler, p, [q, 2], [[1,5], [p, 5] ], [] ). 
rule( settler, p, [p, 2], [[p, 5]], []). 
rule( settler, p, [t, 2), [[t, 5]], []). 
rule(settler, p, [q, 4], [[1,5], [p, 5]], []). 
rule(settler, p, [p, 4], [(p, 5]], []). 
rule( settler, p, [t, 4], [[t, 5]], []). 
rule(settler, p, [[x, 1], 2], [[[x, 1], 1]], []). 
rule(settler, p, [[i, _], 
5], [[[i, 
_], 
1]], []). 
rule(settler, p, [[i, _], 
2], [[[i, 
_], 
5]], []). 
rule(settler, hydraulic, [['pressure cntrl fault', ' ', ' '], ['relief valve lifts', \c' ', ' '], ['loss of N2 blanket', ' ', ' ']], [[p, 5, low]]). 
rule(settler, hydraulic, [['pressure cntrl fault', ' ', ' ']], [[p, 5, high]]). 
rule(settler, hydraulic, [['drain open', ' ', ' ']], [[1,5, low]]). 
rule(settler, containment, [['leak', ' ', ' ']], [['escape', ' ', ' ']]). 
rule(settler, impurity, [('sump drained too far', ' ', ' ']], [[[i, e], 4, high]]). 
rule(settler, effect, [[q, 1, none], [1,5, none]], [['outflow(s) none', ' ', ' ' 
rule(settler, effect, [[q, l, low], [1,5, low]], [['outflow(s) low', ' ', ' ' 
rule(settler, effect, [[1,5, high]], [['liquid enters vent', ' ', ' ']]). 
rule(settler, effect, [[q, l, high], [q, 2, high]], [['poor settling', ' ', ' '], [[i, a], 2 \c, high]]). 
rule(settler, effect, [[t, 5, low]], [['drain/sump freeze-up', ' ', ' ']]). 
rule(settler, effect, [[[i, a], 1, high]], [['poor seprtn of water', ' ', ' '], ['water 
\csump overfills', ' ', ' ']]). 
rule(settler, effect, [[[i, c], 1, high)], [['corrosion', ' ', ' ']]), 
rule(settler, effect, [[[i, b], 1, nigh]], [['pressure high', ' 
rule(settler, effect, [[p, l, hlgh]], [['overpressure', ' '], ['Leak (major)', ' 
\C' ']]}. 
s ink 
/* 
Model : sink 
Sink - one inlet 
Propagation Equations 
--------------------- 
Initial Event Statements 
------------------------ 
sink Pull>pl Hl, gl LO, ql NONE 
Terminal Event Statements 
------------------------- 
*/ 
rule(sink, functional, [['sink full', ' ', ' ']], [[p, l, high], [q, l, low], [q, l, none]]) 
\o. 
source 
/* 
Model : source 
Source - one outlet 
Propagation Equations 
--------------------- 
Initial Event Statements 
------------------------ 
source empty>pl LO, ql NONE 
Terminal Event Statements 
------------------------- 
*/ 
rule(source, iunctional, [['source empty', ' ', ' ']], [[p, l, low], [q, l, none]]). 
valve 
Model : valve 
Isolation valve (normally state open) 
Propagation Equations 
P2=f(P1) 
q2=f(ql) 
t2=f(tl) 
x1-2=f(x1-1) 
i= 2=f(i= 1) 
Initial Event Statements 
valve directed clsd>q2 NONE, pl HI 
valve partly clsd>q2 LO 
leak>escape 
Terminal Event Statements 
------------------------- 
*/ 
rule(valve, p, [p, 2], [[p, 1]], []). 
rule(valve, p, [q, 2], [[q, 1]], []). 
rule(valve, p, [t, 2], [[t, 1]], (3). 
rule(valve, p, [[x, 1], 2], [[[x, 1], 1]], []). 
rule(valve, p, [[i, _], 
2], [[[i, 
_], 
1]], []). 
rule(valve, functional, [['valve directed clsd', ' ', ' ']], [[q, 2, none], [p, l, high]] \c). 
rule(valve, functional, [['valve partly clsd', ' ', ' ']], [[q, 2, low]]). 
rule(valve, containment, [['leak', ' ', ' ']], [['escape', ' '''"']]), 
water 
material_cause(water, blockage, []). 
material_cause(water, cavitation, []). 
material_effect(water, escape, ' ', []). 
material_effect(water, t, high, []). 
material_effect(water, t, low, [('formation of ice', ' ', ' ']]). 
material_effect(water, p, high, []). 
material effect(water, p, low, []). 
APPENDIX H 
"compacter" Output for 
Water Separator Example 
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Propane_1n. conf 
Filename = Propane_ln. conf 
Version 1 
Created on 29/5/86 
by je; 
UNIT NAME MODEL NAME 
1 tanks storg_tnk 
2 valve2 valve 
3 pump3 pump 
4 nrv4 nrv 
.5 dividers divider 6 cntrl_v16 cv_n_bypas 
-7 valve7 valve 8 exchang8 ht_exchang 
9 nrv9 nrv 
10 triplO trip valve 
11 blck_bldil d_blck bld 
12 pipelinel2 pipeline 
13 blck_bld13 d_blck_bld 
14 cntrl v114 cv_n_bypas 
15 tripl5 trip_valve 
16 nrv16 nrv 
17 valvel7 valve 
18 tankl8 buffer_tnk 
19 valvel9 valve 
20 sink2O sink 
21 source2l source 
22 cntrl vl22 cv_n_bypas 
23 exchang23 ht_exchang 
24 drum24 conds drum 
25 cntrl v125 cv_n_bypas 
26 sink26 sink 
27 tank27 surge_tnk 
28 pump28 pump 
29 nrv29 nrv 
30 valve3O valve 
31 tw_valve3l thr_way_vl 
32 valve32 valve 
33 valve33 valve 
34° mixer34 mixer 
-- UPSTREAM UNIT PORT 
1 tankl 2 
2 valve2 2 
3, pump3 2 
4 -nrv4 2 
5 divider5 3 
6 ' cntrl_v16 2 
7 dividers 2 
8 valve? 2 
DOWNSTREAM 
UNIT PORT 
valve2 1 
pump3 1 
nrv4 1 
dividers 1 
cntrl v16 1 
tankl 1 
valve? 1 
exchang8 1 
9 exchang8 2 nrv9 1 
10 nrv9 2 triplO 1 
11 triplO 2 blck_bldli 1 
12 blck_bldll 2 pipelinel2 1 
13 pipelinel2 2 blck_bld13 1 
14 blck_bldl3 2 cntrl_v114 1 
15 cntrl_v114 2 triply 1 
16 tripl5 2 nrvl6 1 
17 nrvl6 2 valvel7 1 
18 valvel7 2 tankl8 1 
19 tankl8 2 valvel9 1 
20 valvel9 2 sink2O 1' 
21 source2l 1 cntrl v122 1 
22. . cntrl v122 2 exchang23 3 23 . exchang23 4 drum24 1 24 drum24 2 cntrl v125 1 
25` cntrl_v125 2 sink26 1 
26 tank27 2 pump28 1 
27 pump28 2 nrv29 1 
28 nrv29 2 exchang23 1 
29 exchang23 2 valve30 1 
30 -, valve30 2 tw_valve3l 1 
31, : tw_valve3l 2 valve32 1 
32 valve32 2 exchang8 3' 
33. exchang8 4 mixer34 1 
34 tw_valve3l 3 valve33 1 
35 - valve33 2 mixer34 2 36 mixer34 3 tank27 1 
Line; SOURCE DRAIN PROCESS 
No. - VESSEL PO RT VESSEL PO RT MATERIAL 
1 
, tankl 2 divider5 1 propane 2 divider5 3 tankl 1 propane 
.3 . ,. 
divider5 2 exchang8 1 propane 
4 exchang8 
' 
2 tankl8 1 propane 
5 ,. tankl8 - 2 sink20 1 propane 
-6. .. source2l 1 exchang23 3 water 7' exchang23 4 drum24 1 water 
8 drum24 2 sink26 1 water 
9 .. tank27 2 exchang23 1 glycol 10 exchang23 2 tw_valve3l 1 glycol 
11 tw_valve3l 2 exchang8 3 glycol 
12 exchang8 4 mixer34 1 glycol 
13 ,. tw_valve3l 3 mixer34 2 glycol 
14 . , -mixer34 
3 tank27 1 glycol 
Impurities 
Code Name 
P. propane in glycol 
gi glycol in water 
Materials of Construction Terminal Events 
----------------------------------------- 
ti LO>leak (major), brittle fracture 
*/ 
conf_filename('Fropane_1n. conf'). 
conf_version('1'). 
conf_date('6/8/86'). 
conf_who('Jop'). 
ýý... 
unit_models([storg_tnk, valve, pumpset_b, nrv, divider, cv_c_bypas, ht_exchg_b, ht_exc 
\chg_c, trip_valve, d_blck_bld, pipeline, buffer_tnk, sink, source, conds_drum, surge_t \cnk, thr_way_vl, mixer]). 
key(tankl, storg_tnk). 
key(valve2, valve). 
key(pump3, pumpset_b). 
key(nrv4, nrv). 
key(divider5, divider). 
key(cntrl_v16, cv_c_bypas). 
key(valve7, valve). 
key(exchang8, ht_exchg b). 
key(nrv9, nrv). 
key(triplO, trip_valve). 
key(blck_bldll, d_blck_bld). 
key(pipelinel2, pipeline). 
key(blck_bldl3, d blck bld). 
key(cntrl v114, cv_c_bypas). 
key(tripl5, trip_valve). 
key(nrvl6, nrv). 
key(valvel7, valve). 
key(tankl8, buffer_tnk). 
key(valvel9, valve). 
key(sink20, sink). 
key(source2l, source). 
key(cntrl v122, cv_n_bypas). 
key(exchang23, ht exchg_c). 
key(drum24, conds_drum). 
key(cntrl_vl25, cv_c_bypas). 
key(sink26, sink). 
key(tank27, surge_tnk). 
key(pump28, pumpset_b). 
key(nrv29, nrv). 
key(valve30, valve). 
key( tw_valve3l, thr_way_vl). 
key(valve32, valve). 
key(valve33, valve). 
key(mixer34, mixer). 
link(tankl, 2, valve2,1). 
link(valve2,2, pump3,1). 
link(pump3,2, nrv4,1). 
link(nrv4,2, divider5,1). 
link(divider5,3, cntrl v18,1). 
link(cntrl v18,2, tankl, 1). 
link(divider5,2, valve7,1). 
, link(valve7,2, exchang8,1). 
link(exchang8,2, nrv9,1). 
link(nrv9,2, triplO, 1). 
-link(triplO, 2, b1ck_b1d11,1). 
link(blck_bldll, 2, pipelinel2,1). 
link(pipelinel2,2, blok_bldl3,1). 
link(blck_bldl3,2, cntrl vll4,1). 
link(cntrl v114,2, tripl5,1). 
link(tripl5,2, nrvl6,1). 
link(nrvl6,2, valvel7,1). 
link(valvel7,2, tankl8,1). 
link(tankl8,2, valvel9,1). 
link(valvel9,2, sink2O, 1). 
link(source2l, 1, cntrl v122,1). 
link(cntrl x122,2, exchang23,3). 
link(exchang23,4, drum24,1). 
link(drum24,2, cntrl_v125,1). 
link(cntrl v125,2, sink26,1). 
link(tank27,2, pump28,1). 
link(pump28,2, nrv29,1). 
link(nrv29,2, exchang23,1). 
link(exchang23,2, valve3O, 1). 
link(valve30,2, tw_valve3l, 1). 
link(tw_valve3l, 2, valve32,1). 
link(valve32,2, exchang8,3). 
link(exchang8,4, mixer34,1). 
link(tw_valve3l, 3, valve33,1). 
link(valve33,2, mixer34,2). 
link(mixer34,3, tank27,1). 
line( 1, tankl, 2, divider5,1). 
line( 2, divider5,3, tankl, 1). 
line( 3, divider5,2, exchang8,1). 
line( 4, exchang8,2, tankl8,1). 
line( 5, tankl8,2, sink20,1). 
line( 6, source2l, 1, exchang23,3). 
line( 7, exchang23,4, drum24,1). 
line( 8, drum24,2, sink26,1). 
line( 9, tank27,2, exchang23,1). 
line(10, exchang23,2, tw_valve3l, 1). 
line(11, tw_valve3l, 2, exchang6,3). 
line(12, exchang8,4, mixer34,1). 
line(13, tw_valve3l, 3, mixer34,2). 
line(14, mixer34,3, tank27,1). 
material-in-line( 1, propane). 
material-in-line( 2, propane). 
material-in-line( 3, propane). 
material-in-line( 4, propane). 
material-in-line( 5, propane). 
material-in-line( 6, water). 
material-in-line( 7, water). 
material-in-line( 8, water). 
material-in-line( 9, glycol). 
material_in_line(10, glycol). 
material_in_line(11, glycol). 
material_in_line(12, glycol). 
material_in_line(13, glycol). 
material_in_line(14, glycol). 
process material_models([propane, water, glycol]). 
impurity(p). 
impurity(g). 
rule(pipe, effect, [[t, l, low]], [['leak (major)', ' ', ' '], ['brittle fracture', ' ', 
\C' , ]]). 
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buffer_tnk 
i* 
Model : buffer_tnk 
Buffer Tank 
Propagation Equations 
--------------------- 
13=f(ql, -q2) 
p2=f(p3) 
q2=f(13, p3) 
xl-2=f(xl-1) 
i_-2=f(i= 1) 
Initial Event Statements 
------------------------ 
press ctrl fail-open, rv lifts>p3 LO 
sensor fail-open, cntrlr fail-open, ctrl valve fail-open, set pt mvd open>press ct 
\crl fail-open 
press ctrl fail-olsd>p3 HI 
sensor fail-clsd, cntrlr fail-olsd, ctrl valve fail-clsd, set pt mvd clsd>press at 
\crl fail-clsd 
leak (major)>13 LO, p3 LO, q2 LO, q2 NONE 
leak>escape 
Terminal Event Statements 
13 LO>loss of outflow(s) 
13 NONE>outflow(s) none 
13 HI>tank overfilled, liquid enters vent 
*1 
rule(buffer_tnk, p, [1,3], [[q, 1]], [[q, 2]]). 
rule(buffer_tnk, p, (p, 2], [[p. 3]], []). 
rule(buffer_tnk. p, [q, 2], [[1,3], [p, 3]), []). 
rule(buffer_tnk, p, [ [x, 1], 2], [[ [x, 1], 1] ], []) . 
rule(buffer_tnk, p, [[i, _], 
2], [[[i, 
_], 
1]], []). 
rule(buffer_tnk, functional, [['press ctrl fail-open', ' ', ' '], ['rv lifts', ' ' 
\c']], [[P, 3, low]]). 
rule(buffer_tnk, functional, [['sensor fail-open', ' ', ' '], ['cntrlr foil-open', ' 
\c', ' '], ['ctrl valve fail-open', ' ', ' '], ['set pt mvd open', ' ', ' ']], [['press 
\c ctrl fail-open', ' ', ' ']]). 
rule(buffer_tnk, functional, [['press ctrl fail-clsd', ' ', ' ']], [[p, 3, high]]). 
rule(buffer_tnk, functional, [['sensor fail-clsd', ' ', ' '], ['cntrlr fail-clsd', ' 
W, ' '], ['ctrl valve fail-clsd', ' ', ' '], ['set pt mvd clsd' ' ', ' '' \ ]], C[ Press 
\c ctrl fail-clsd', ' 
rule(buffer_tnk, containment, [['leak (major)', ' ', ' ']], [[l, 3, low], [p, 3, low], (q, 
\c2, low], [q, 2, none]3). 
rule(buffer_tnk, containment, [['leak', ' ', ' ']], [['escape', ' ', ' ']]). 
rule(buffer_tnk, effect, [[1,3, low]], [['loss of outflow(s)', ' 
rule(buffer_tnk, effect, [[1,3, none]], [C'outflow(s) none', ' ', ' ']]). 
rule(buffer_tnk, effect, [[1,3, high]], [['tank overfilled', ' ', ' '], ['liquid enter 
\cs-vent', ' ', ' ']]). 
conds_drum 
i* 
Model : conds_drum 
Condensate drum 
Propagation Equations 
--------------------- 
13=P(q1, -q2) 
p2=f(p3) 
q2=f(13) 
t3=f(tl) 
t2=f(t3) 
X1-2=f(xl-1) 
i. 2=f(1_-1) 
Initial Event Statements 
------------------------ 
leak (major)>13 LO, p3 LO, g2 LO, q2 NONE 
leak>escape 
Terminal Event Statements 
------------------------- 
13. LO>loss of liquid seal 
13 HI>drum overfilled 
rule(conds_drum, p, [1,3], [[q, 1]], [[q, 2]]). 
rule(conds_drum, p, [p, 2], [[p, 3]], []). 
rule(conds_drum, p, [q, 2], [[1,3]], []). 
rule(conds_drum, p, [t, 3], [[t, 1]], []). 
rule(conds_drum, p, [t, 2], [[t, 3]], []). 
rule(conds_drum, p, [[x, 1], 2], [[[x, 1], 1]], []). 
rule(conds_drum, p, [[i, _], 
2], [[[i, 
_], 
1]], []). 
rule(conds drum, containment, [['leak (major)', ' ', ' ']], [[1,3, low], [p, 3, low], [q, 
\c2, low], [q, 2, none]]). 
rule(conds_drum, containment, [['leak', ' ', ' ']], [['escape', ' ', ' ']]). 
rule(conds_drum, effect, [[1,3, low]], [['loss of liquid seal', ' ', ' ']]). 
rule(conds_drum, effect, [[1,3, high]], [['drum overfilled', ' ', ' ']]). 
cv_c_bypas 
ý* . 
Model : cv_c_bypas 
Control loop (control valve, controller, sensor) and bypass 
Propagation Equations 
-- ------------------ 
p2=f(pl) 
q2=f(q1) 
t2=f(tl) 
xl-2=f(xl-1) 
i. 2=f(i= 1) 
Initial Event Statements 
-----=------------------ 
loop fails closed, isolatn valve closed>q2 NONE, pl HI 
loop fails pt-clsd, isolatn vlve pt-clsd>q2 LO 
loop fails open, bypass fails, bypass directed open>q2 HI 
sensor fails closed, cntrlr fails closed, ctl-vl fails closed, set-pnt mvd closed> \cloop fails closed 
sensor fails pt-clsd, cntrlr fails pt-olsd, otl-vl fails pt-clsd, set-pnt mvd pt-c \clsd>loop fails pt-clsd 
sensor fails open, cntrlr fails open, ctl-vl fails open, set-pnt mvd open>loop fai \cls open 
blockage>q2 LO 
leak>escape 
Terminal Event Statements 
------------------------- 
rule(cv_c_bypas, p, (p, 2], [[p, 1]], []). 
rule(cv_c_bypas, p, [4,2], [[4,1]], []). 
rule(cv_c_bypas, p, [t, 2], [[t, 1]], []). 
rule(cv_c_bypas, p, [[x, 1], 2], [[[x, 1], 1]], [])" 
rule(cv_c bypas, p, [[i, _], 
2], [[[i, 
_], 
1]], []). 
rule(cv_c_bypas, functional, [['loop fails closed', ' '], ['isolatn valve close 
\cd', ' ', ' ']], C[q, 2, none], [p, l, high]]). 
rule(cv_c_bypas, funotional, [['loop fails pt-clsd', ' '], ['isolatn vlve pt-cl 
\csd,,, ,,, , ]], C[q, 2, low]]). 
rule(cv_c_bypas, functional, [['loop fails open', ' ', ' '], ['bypass fails', ' 
\c], ('bypass directed open', ' ', ' ']], [[4,2, high]]). 
rule(cv_c_bypas, functional, [['sensor fails closed', ' ', ' '], ['cntrlr fails clos 
']] \ced', ' ', ' '], ['ctl-vl fails closed', ' ', ' '], ['set-pnt mvd closed', ' 
\c[['loop fails closed', ' 
rule(cv_c_bypas, functional, [['sensor fails pt-olsd', ' ', ' '], ['cntrlr fails pt- 
\cclsd', ' ', ' '], ['ctl-vl fails pt-clsd', ' ', ' '], ['set-pnt mvd pt-clsd', ' ', ' 
\c']], C['loop fails pt-olsd', ' ', ' ']]). 
rule(cv_c bypas, functional, [['sensor fails open', ' ', ' '], ['cntrlr fails open', 
\c' ', ' '], C'ctl-vl fails open', ' ', ' '], ['set-pnt mvd open', ' ', ' ']], [['loop 
\cfails open', ' ', ' ']]). 
rule(cv_o_bypas, hydraulic, [['blockage', ' ', ' ']], [[q, 2, low]]). 
rule(cv_c bypas, containment, [['leak', ' ', ' ']], [['escape', ' 
d_blck_bld 
/* 
Model : d_blck_bld 
Double block and bleed 
Propagation Equations 
--------------------- 
, p2=f(pl) 
q2=Y(q1) 
t2=Y(t1) 
x1 -2f(xl-1) 
i_-2=f(i_-1) 
: Initial Event Statements 
------------------------ C 
isolatn vl clsd>q2 NONE, p1 HI 
isolatn vl pt. clsd>q2 LO, pl HI 
leak>escape 
leak (major), drain valve open>q2 LO, q2 NONE, p2 LO 
Terminal Event Statements 
------------------------- 
*/ 
rule(d_blck_b1d, p, [p, 2], [[p, 1]], []). 
rule(d_blck_bld, p, [q, 2], [[q, 1]], []). 
rule d blck_bld, p, [t, 2], [ [t, 1]], [ ]) . 
rule(d_blck_bld, p, [[x, 1], 2], [[[x, 1], 1]], []). 
ruled blck_bld, p, [[i, _], 
2], [[[i, _], 
1]], [] ). 
rule d blck_bld, functional, [['isolatn vl clsd', ' ', ' ']], [[q, 2, none], [p, i, high] 
\c]). 
rule(d_blck_bld, functional, [['isolatn vl pt. clsd', ' ', ' ']], [[q, 2, low], [p, i, hi 
\cgh]]). 
[['leak,, , ]]), rule(d_blck_bld, containment, ] , [[ escspe ' 
rule (d_blck bld, containment, [['leak (major)', ' '], ['drain valve open', ' 
\c '1], [[q, 2, low], [4,2, none], (p, 2, low]])" 
divider 
*. _ ý. 
Model : divider 
Binary divider - no flow distribution specified 
Propagation Equations 
--------------------- 
F 
PZ-f(p1) 
p3=f(p1) 
q2=f(ql) 
q3=f(ql) 
t2=f(tl) 
t3=f(tl) 
xl-2=f(xl-1) 
xl-3=f(xl-1) 
i_-2f (i= 1) 
i_-3=f(i= i) 
Initial Event Statements 
blockage>p2 HI, p3 HI 
blockage, leak (major)>q2 LO, q3 LO, q2 NONE, q3 NONE 
blockage - other leg>q2 HI, g3 HI 
leak>escape 
Terminal Event Statements 
------------------------- 
*/ 
rule(divider, p, [p, 2], [ [p, 1] ], []) . 
rule(divider, p, [p, 3], [[p, l]], []). 
rule(divider, p, [q, 2], [[q, 1]], []). 
rule(divider, p, [q, 3]. [[q, 1]], []). 
rule(divider, p, [t, 2], [[t, 1]], []). 
rule(divider, p, [t, 3], [[t, 1]], []). 
rule (divider, p, [ [x, 1], 2] ,[[ [x, 1], 1] ], []) . 
rule(divider, p, [ [x, 1], 3], [[ [x, 1], 1] ], []) . 
rule(divider, p, [[i, _], 
2], [[[i, 
_], 
1]], []). 
rule(divider, p, [[i, _], 
3], [[[i, 
_], 
1]], []). 
rule(divider, hydraulic, [['blockage', ' ', ' '1], [[p, 2, high3, [p, 3, high]]). 
rule(divider, hydraulic, [['blockage', ' ', ' '], ['leak (major)', ' ', ' ']], [[q, 2, lo 
\cw], [q, 3, low], [q, 2, none], [q, 3, none]]). 
rule(divider, hydraulic, [['blockage - other leg', ' ', ' ']], [[q, 2, high], [q, 3, high 
\c]])" 
rule(divider, containment, [('leak', ' ', ' ']], [['escape', ' 
glycol 
material_cause(glycol, blockage, []). 
material_cause(glycol, impurity, []). 
material_cause(glycol, cavitation, []). 
material_effect(glycol, escape, _, 
[] ). 
material effect(glycol, 'concentration change', _, 
[]). 
material_effect(glycol, t, high, []). 
material effect(glycol, t, low, []). 
material_effect(glycol, p, high, C]). 
material_effect(glycol, p, low, C]). 
ht_exchg_b 
Model : ht_exchg b 
Heat Exchanger - Shell to tube transfer, tube side higher pressure 
Propagation Equations 
--------------------- 
p2=f(p1) 
. q2=f(ql) 
t2=f (tl, t3, q3, -qi ) 
xl-2=P(xl-1) 
i= 2=f(i= 1) 
F4=f(P3) 
q4=f(q3) 
t4=P(tl, t3, g3, -qi) 
x3-4=f(x3-3) 
i= 4=f(i= 3) 
Initial Event Statements 
------------------------ 
tube fouling>t2 LO, t4 HI, g2 LO, pi HI 
shell leak (major)>q4 NONE, q4 LO, p4 LO 
tube leak (major)>q2 LO, p2 LO, p4 HI 
tube leak>ip-4 HI 
leak>escape 
Terminal Event Statements 
------------------------- 
ip-4 HI>p4 HI, t4 LO 
*1 
rule(ht exchg_b, p, [p, 2], [[p, 1]], []). 
rule(ht exchg_b, p, [q, 2], [[q, 1]], []). 
rule(ht_exchg_b, p, [t, 2], [[t, 1], [t, 3], [q, 3]], [[q, 1]]). 
rule(ht_exchg_b, p, [[x, 1], 2], [[[x, 1], 1]], []). 
rule(ht_exchg_b, p, [[i, _], 
2], [[[i, 
_], 
l]], []). 
rule(ht exchg_b, p, [p, 4], [[p, 3]], []). 
rule(ht_exchg_b, p, [q, 4], [[q, 3]], []). 
rule(ht_exchg b, p, [t, 4], [[t, 1], [t, 3], [q, 3]], [[q, 1]]). 
rule(ht_exchg_b, p, [[x, 3], 4], [[[x, 3], 3]], 1]). 
rule(htexchg_b, p, [[i, _], 
4], [[[i, 
_], 
3]], []). 
rule(ht exchg_b, functional, [['tube fouling', ' ', ' ']], [[t, 2, low], [t, 4, high], [q, 
\c2, low], (p, 1, high3]). 
rule(ht_exchg_b, containment, [('shell leak (major)', ' ', ' ']], [[q, 4, none], (q, 4,1 
\cow], [p, 4, low] ]) . 
rule(ht_exchg_b, containment, [['tube leak (major)', ' ', ' ']], [[q, 2, low], [p, 2, low 
\c], (p, 4, high] ]). 
rule(ht_exchg_b, oontainment, [('tube leak', ' ', ' ']], [[[i, p], 4, high]]). 
rule(ht_exchg_b, containment, [['leak', ' ', ' ']], [['escape', ' ', ' ']]). 
rule(ht exchg b, effect, [[[i, p], 4, high]], [[p, 4, high], (t, 4, low]]). 
ht_exchg_c 
Model ht exchg_c 
Heat, Exchanger - shell to tube transfer, condensing steam 
Propagation Equations 
--------------------- 
p2=f (pl ) 
11 . 11 
q2=f(ql) 
t2=f (tl, t3, q3, -ql ) 
x1-2=f(x1-1) 
P4=f(p3) 
q4=f(q3) 
t4=f (tl, t3, q3, -ql ) 
x3-4=f(x3-3) 
i. 4=f(i_ 3) 
Initial Event Statements 
tube fouling>t2 LO, t4 HI, q2 LO, pl HI 
shell leak (major)>q4 NONE, q4 LO, p4 LO 
tube leak (major)>q2 LO, p2 LO, p4 HI 
tube leak>ig-4 HI 
leak>escape 
Terminal Event Statements 
------------------------- 
*/ 
rule( ht_exchg_c, p, [p, 2], [(p, 1]], []). 
rule(ht exchg_c, p, [q, 2], [[q, 1]], []). 
rule(ht exchg_c, p, [t, 2], [[t, 1], (t, 3], [q, 3]], [[q, 1]]). 
rule(ht exchg_c, p, [[x, 1], 2], [[[x, 1], 1]], [])" 
rule(ht exchg_c, p, [[i, _]. 
2], [[[i, 
_], 
1]], []). 
rule( ht_exchg_c, p, [p, 4], [[p, 3]], []). 
rule(ht_exchg_c, p, [q, 4], [[q, 3]], []). 
rule(ht_exchg_c, p, [t, 4], [[t, 1], [t, 3], [q, 3]], [[q, 1]]). 
rule(ht_exchg_o, p, [[x, 3], 4], [[[x, 3], 3]], []). 
rule(ht exchg c, p, [(i, _], 
4], [[(i, 
_], 
3]], [])" 
rule(ht_exchg_c, functional, [['tube fouling', ' ', ' ']], [[t, 2, low], [t, 4, high], [q, 
\c2, low], [p, 1, high] ]) . 
rule(ht_exchg_c, containment, [['shell leak (major)', ' ']], [[q, 4, none], [q, 4,1 
\cow], [p, 4, low] ]) . 
rule(ht_exchg_c, oontainment, [['tube leak (major)', ' ', ' ']], [[q, 2, low], [p, 2, low 
\c], [p, 4, high]])" 
rule(ht_exchg_c, containment, [['tube leak', ' ', ' '1], [[[i, g], 4, high]]). 
rule(ht_exchg_c, containment, [['leak', ' ', ' ']], [['escape', ' ', ' ']]). 
mixer 
/* 
Model' : mixer 
Binary mixer - cone rules assume pure fluids, no flow ratio assumed 
Propagation Equations 
p3=f(p1, p2) 
q3=f(g1, q2) 
t3=f(t1, t2) 
xl-3=f (x1-1, ql, -q2 ) 
x2-3=f(x2-2, q2, -ql) 
i. 3=ý(i_-l, i. 2) 
Initial Event Statements 
------------------------ 
leak>escape 
Terminal Event Statements 
------------------------- 
rule(mixer, p, [p, 3], [[p, 1], [p, 2]], 1]). 
rule(mixer, p, [4,3], [[q, 1], [4,211, C]). 
rule(mixer, p, [t, 3], [[t, 1), [t, 2]], C]). 
rule(mixer, p, [[x, 1], 3], [[[x, l], 1], [q, 1]], [[4,2]] ). 
rule(mixer, p, [[x, 2], 3], [[[x, 2], 2], [q, 2]], [[q, 1]]). 
rule(mixer, p, [[i, _], 
3], [[[i, 
_], 
1], [[i, 
_], 
2]], []). 
rule(mixer, containment, [('leak', ' ', ' ']], (['escape', ' ', ' ']]). 
nrv 
Model : nrv 
Non-return valve 
Propagation Equations 
--------------------- 
p2=f(p1) 
q2=f(qi) 
t2=f(tl) 
xl-2=f(xl-1) 
i. 2=f(i= 1) 
Initial Event Statements 
------------------------ 
valve stuck clsd>q2 NONE 
valve fails pt. clsd>q2 LO 
leak>escape 
Terminal Event Statements 
------------------------- 
*1 
rule(nrv, p, [p, 2], [[p, 1]], [] ). 
rule(nrv, p, [q, 2], [[q, 1]], []). 
rule(nrv, p, (t, 2), ([t, 13], C]). 
rule(nrv, p, [[x, 1], 2], [[[x, 1], 1]], []). 
rule(nrv, p, [[i, _], 
2], [[[i, 
_], 
1]], []). 
rule(nrv, functional, [['valve stuck clsd', ' ', ' ']], [[q, 2, none]]). 
rule(nrv, functional, [['valve fails pt. clsd', ' '31, [[q, 2, low]3). 
rule(nrv, containment, [['leak', ' ', ' ']], [['escape', ' ', ' ']]). 
1 
pipe 
Model pipe 
Generic Pipe Model 
Propagation Equations 
p2=t(p1) 
q2=f(q1) 
t2=f (t1) 
x1-2=f(x1-1) 
i_-2=f(i_ 1) 
Initial Event Statements 
----- ------------------ 
blockage, leak (major)>q2 LO, g2 NONE 
blockage, ht to blckd-in fluid>pl HI 
leak (major)>p2 LO 
leak>escape 
solar heat, fire>ht to blckd-in fluid 
external cold source>t2 LO 
external heat souroe>t2 HI 
cold weather, lagging loss>external cold source 
hot weather, fire>external heat source 
Terminal Event Statements 
------------------------- 
pi HI>leak (major), pipe rupture, flange leak 
XI 
rule(PiPe, P, (p, 2], 11P, 1]], C3). 
rule(pipe, p, (q. 2], CR, 1]], C]). 
rut (PiPe, P. [t. 2), [[t, 13], []). 
rule(pipe, p, [[x, 1], 2], [[[x, 1], l]], []). 
rule(pipe, p, C[i, _], 
2], [[Ci, 
_], 
1]], []). 
rule(pipe, hydraulic, [['blockage', ' ']'leak C (major)', ' '] ], C [4,2, low], 
\c[q, 2, none]]). 
rule(pipe, hydraulic, [['blockage', ' ', ' '], ['ht to blckd-in fluid', ' ', ' ]], [[p 
\c, l, high]]). 
rule(pipe, containment, [['leak (major)', ' ', ' '11, [[p, 2, low]]). 
rule(pipe, containment, [['leak', ' ', ' ']], [['escape', ' ']]). 
rule(pipe, environmental, [['solar heat', ' ']], [['ht to blok 
\cd-in fluid', ' 
rule(pipe, environmental, [['external cold source', ' '11, [[t, 2, low]]). 
rule(pipe, environmental, [['external heat source', ' '11, [[t, 2, high]]). 
rule(pipe, environmental, [['cold weather', ' ', ' '], ['lagging loss', ' 
\cexternal cold source', ' ', ' ']]). 
rule(pipe, environmental, [['hot weather', ' ', ' '], ['fire', ' ', ' ]], ' [[ external 
cheat source', ' 
rule(pipe, effect, [[p, l, high]], [['leak (major)', ' ', ' '], ['pipe rupture', ' 
\c], ['flange leak', ' ', ' ']]). 
pipeline 
i* 
Model pipeline 
Pipeline 
Propagation Equations 
--------------------- 
p2=f(pl) 
q2=f (ql ) 
t2=f(tl) 
xl-2=f(xl-1) 
i_-2=f(i_-1) 
Initial Event Statements 
------------------------ 
blockage, leak (major)>q2 NONE, q2 LO 
blockage, hammer/surge, ht to blckd-in fluid>p2 HI 
leak>escape 
solar heat, fire>ht to blckd-in fluid 
Terminal Event Statements 
------------------------- 
*1 
rule(pipeline, p, [p, 2], [[p, 1]], []). 
rule(pipeline, p, Cq, 2], [[q, 1]], []). 
rule(pipeline, p, [t, 2], [ Ct, 1] ], []) . 
rule(pipeline, p, [[x, 1], 2], 000x, 1], 1]], []). 
rule(pipeline, p, [Ci, _], 
2], [[[i, 
_], 
1]], []). 
rule(pipeline, functional, [['blockage', ' '], ['leak (major)', ' 
\cnone], (q, 2, low] ]). 
rule(pipeline, hydraulic, [[ bloc age '] ['hammer/surge', ' ''' , ], [ ht to \cblckd-in fluid', ' ', ' ']], CCp, 2, high]]). 
rule(pipeline, containment, [['leak', ' ', ' ']], [['escape', ' 
rule(pipeline, environmental, [C'solar heat', ' ', ' '], ['fire', ' ', ' ']], [('ht to 
\cblckd-in fluid', ' ', ' ']]). 
propane 09/02/86 1419.4 bst Tue 
material cause(propane, blockage, []). 
material_cause(propane, cavitation, [['pressure low', ' ', ' '], ['temperature high' 
\c, ' ,,, ']]). 
material_effect(propane, escape, _, 
[['fire hazard', ' ', ' '], ['explosion hazard', ' 
\c ,,, , ]])" 
material_effect(propane, t, high, [['vapour formation', ' ', ' ']]). 
material_effect(propane, t, low, []). 
material_effect(propane, p, high, []). 
material_effect(propane, p, low, [['liquid flashes', ' ', ' ']]). 
pumpset_b 
Model" pumpset_b 
Pumpset - Two modes 1) one running/one on standby 2) both running 
Propagation Equations 
p2=Y(PI) 
q2=f(ql) 
t2=P(t1) 
xl-2=f(x1-1) 
Initial Event Statements 
------------------------ 
loss of NPSH, rotation fault, impeller fault, cavitation>q2 LO, q2 NONE 
delivery shut in>q2 NONE, p2 HI 
delivery part shut>q2 LO 
no change to stndby, stndby fail on dmand, maloperatn of valves>q2 NONE 
only 1 on whn 2 regd>q2 LO 
no rseat of dlvry rv>q2 NONE 
blockage>q2 NONE, q2 LO, p2 HI 
pump fluid overheats>t2 HI 
leak (major)>q2 NONE, q2 LO 
leak>escape 
ht to blckd-in fluid>p2 HI 
solar heat, fire>ht to blckd-in fluid 
Terminal Event Statements 
------------------------- 
q2 NONE>pump fluid overheats 
*/ 
rule(pumpset_b, p, [p, 2], [[p, 1]], []). 
rule(pumpset_b, p, (q, 2], [[q, 1]], []). 
rule(pumpset_b, p, (t, 2], [[t, 1]], []). 
rule(pumpset b, p, [ [x, 1], 2], [[ [x, 1], 1] ], []) . 
rule(pumpset_b, p, [[i, _], 
2], [[[i, 
_), 
1]], t]). 
rule(pumpset_b, hydraulic, [['loss of NPSH', ' ', ' '], ['rotation fault', ' '' 
c'im eller fault', ' ', ' ', 'cavitation' '2 low 
][ 
rule(pumpset_b, hydraulic, [['delivery shut in', ' ', ' ']], CCq, 2, none], [p, 2, hi9h]] 
\c). 
rule(pumpset_b, hydraulic, [['delivery part shut', ' ', ' 
rule(pumpset_b, hydraulic, [['no change to stndby', ' ', ' '], ['stndby fail on dman 
, \cd', ' ', ' '), ['maloperatn of valves', ' ', ' ']], [[q, 2, none]]). 
rule(pumpset_b, hydraulic, [['only 1 on whn 2 regd', ' ', ' ']], [[q, 2, low]]). 
rule(pumpset_b, hydraulic, [['no rseat of dlvry rv', ' ', ' ']J, [[q, 2, none]]). 
rule(pumpset_b, hydraulic, [['blockage', ' ', ' ']], [[q, 2, none], [q, 2, low], [p, 2, high 
\c]])" 
rule(pumpset_b, hydraulie, [['pump fluid overheats', ' ', ''']], [[t, 2, high3]). 
rule(pumpset_b, containment, [['leak (major)', ' ', ' ']], [[q, 2, none], [q, 2, low]]). 
rule(pumpset_b, containment, [['leak', ' ', ' ']], [['escape', ' ', ' ']]), 
rule(pumpset_b, environmental, [['ht to blckd-in fluid', ' ', ' ']], [1p, 2, high]]). 
rule(pumpset_b, environmental, [['solar heat', ' ', ' '], ['fire', ' ', ' ']], [['ht to 
\c blckd-in fluid', ' ', ' ']]), 
rule(pumpset_b, effect, [[q, 2, none]], [['pump fluid overheats', ' ', ' ']]). 
s ink 
Model : sink 
Sink - one inlet 
Propagation Equations 
--------------------- 
Initial Event Statements 
------------------------ 
sink full>pl HI, ql LO, ql NONE 
Terminal Event Statements 
" ------------------------- 
*/ 
rule(sink, functional, [['sink full', ' ', ' ']], [[p, 1, high], [q, 1, low], [q, 1, none]] ) 
\c. 
source 
i* 
Model : source 
Source - one outlet 
Propagation Equations 
--------------------- 
Initial Event Statements 
------------------------ 
source empty>pl LO, gl NONE 
Terminal Event Statements 
------------------------- 
rule(source, functional, [('source empty', ' ', ' ']], [[p, l, low], [q, l, none]]). 
storg_tnk 
1*. 
Model : storg_tnk 
Storage Tank - one outlet (2) and kickback port (1) 
Propagation Equations 
--------------------- 
13=f (-q2) 
p2=f(13, p3) 
q2=f(13) 
t2=f(t3) 
x3-2=f(x3-3) 
i= 2=f(i= 3) 
Initial Event Statements 
tank overfilled>13 HI 
tank nearing e: npty> 13 LO 
drain open>13 LO, escape 
leak>escape 
Terminal Event Statements 
------------------------- 
13 HI>tank overflows 
13 LO>loss of outflow(s), q2 NONE, g2 LO 
*/ 
rule(storg_tnk, p, [1,3), [], [[q, 2)]). 
rule(storg_tnk, p, [p, 2], [[1,3], [p, 3]], C])" 
rule (storgonk, p, [q, 2], [[1,3]], [j). 
rule(storg_tnk, p, [t, 2), [[t, 3]3, []). 
rule(storg tnk, p, [[c, 3], 2], [[[x, 3], 3]], []). 
rule(storg_tnk, p, [[i, _], 
2], [[[i, 
_], 
3]], []). 
I 
rule(storg_tnk, functional, [['tank overfilled', ' ', ' 
rule(storg tnk, functional, [('tank nearing empty', ' ', ' ')], [[1,3, low)]). 
rule(storg_tnk, containment, [['drain open', ' ', ' ']], [[l, 3, low], ['escape', m I's 
\c']]). 
', ' ']]). rule(storg_tnk, containment, [['leak', ' ', '. ']], [['escape'. * 
rule(storg_tnk, effect, [[1,3, high]], [['tank overflows', ' 
rule(storg_tnk, effect, [[1,3, low]], (['loss of outflow(s)', ' ', ' '], [q, 2, none], (q 
\c, 2, low] ]) 
surge_tnk 
i* 
Model : surge tnk 
Surge Tank - one inlet and one outlet 
Propagation Equations 
--------------------- 
13=f(ql, -q2) 
p2=f(l3, p3) 
Initial Event Statements 
------------------------ 
strt up level insuff>13 LO 
leak>escape 
Terminal Event Statements 
------------------------- 
rule(surge_tnk, p, [1,3], [[q, l]], [[q, 2]]). 
rule(surge tnk, p, [p, 2], [[1,3], (p, 3]], []). 
rule(surge_tnk, functional, [['strt up level insuff', ' ', ' ']], [[l, 3, low]]). 
rule(surge_tnk, containment, [[' leak', ' ', ' ']], [['escape', ' ', ' ']]). 
thr_way_vl 
i* 
Model : thr_way_vl 
Three way valve 
Propagation Equations 
q2=f(ql, -q3) 
q3=f (q1, -q2 ) 
p2=f(pl) 
p3=f(p1) 
t2=f(tl) 
t3=f(tl) 
Initial Event Statements 
stuck to other port, set point error>q2 LO, q2 NONE, q3 LO, q3 NONE 
stuck to this port, set point error>q2 HI, q3 HI 
leak>escape 
Terminal Event Statements 
*/ 
rule(thr_way_vl, p, [q, 2], [[q, l]], C[q, 3]]). 
rule (th r_way_vl , p, [ q, 3], [[q, 1]], [[q, 2] ]) . 
rule(thr_waY v1, P, [P, 2], [[P, 1]], []). 
rule(thr_way_vl, p, [p, 3], [[p, 1]], []). 
rule(thr_way_vl, p, [t, 2], [[t, 1]], []). 
rule(thr_way_vl, p, [t, 3], [[t, 1]], []). 
rule(thr_way_vl, functional, [['stuck to other port', ' ', ' '], ['set point error', 
'1], [[q, 2, low], [q, 2, none], (q, 3, low], (q, 3, none]]). 
rule(thr_way_vl, functional, [['stuck to this port', ' ', ' '], ['set point error', ' 
\c ,, ' ']], [[q, 2, high], [q, 3, high]]). 
rule(thr_way_vl, containment, [['leak', ' ', ' ']], [['escape', ' ', ' ' 
trip_valve 
Model : trip valve 
Trip valve 
Propagation Equations 
p2=f(pl) 
q2=f(q1) 
t2=f(tl) 
xl-2=f(xl-1) 
i= 2=f(i= 1) 
Initial Event Statements 
------------------------ 
spurious closure>q2 NONE 
blockage>q2 LO, q2 NONE, pl HI 
leak>escape 
Terminal Event Statements 
*/ 
rule(trip valve, p, [p, 2], [Cp, l]], []). 
rule(trip valve,;, [q, 2], [[q, 1]], []). 
rule(trip valve,;, [t, 2], [[t, 1]], []). 
rule(trip valve, p, [[x, 1], 2], [[Cx, 1J, 1]J, []). 
rule(trip_valve, p, [[i, _], 
2], [C[i, 
_], 
1]], []). 
rule(trip_valve, Punctional, [C'spurious closure', ' ', ' '1], [[q, 2, none]]). 
rule(trip_valve, functional, [['blockage', ' ', ' ']], [[q, 2, low], [q, 2, none], [p, 1, hi 
\cgh]]). 
rule trip valve, containment, L[ 'leak', ' ', ' ')], [['escape', ' ' 1]]). 
valve 
/* 
Model : valve 
Isolation valve (normally state open) 
Propagation Equations 
--------------------- 
p2=f (pl) 
q2=f(q1) 
t2=f(tl) 
x1-2=f(x1-1) 
i. 2=f(i. 1) 
Initial Event Statements 
------------------------ 
valve directed clsd>q2 NONE, pl HI 
valve partly clsd>q2 LO 
leak>escape 
Terminal Event Statements 
------------------------- 
*/ 
rule(valve, p, [p, 2], [[p, 1)], []). 
rule(valve, p, [q, 2], [[q, 1]], []). 
rule(valve, p, [t, 2], [[t, 1]], (3). 
rule(valve, p, [[x, 1], 2], [[[x, 1], 1]], []). 
rule(valve, p, [[i, _], 
2], [[[i, 
_], 
1]], []). 
rule(valve, functional, [['valve directed clsd', ' ', ' ']], [[q, 2, none], [p, l, high]] 
\c). 
rule(valve, functional, [['valve partly clsd', ' ', ' ']], [[q, 2, low]]). 
rule(valve, containment, [[' e3' ''' ']], [['escape', ' ', ' ']]). 
water 
material_cause(water, blockage, []). 
material_cause(water, cavitation, []). 
material_effect(water, escape, ' ', []). 
material effect(water, t, high, []). 
material_effect(water, t, low, [['formation of ice', ' 
material_effect(water, p, high, []). 
material_effect(water, p, low, []). 
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